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1267 lines
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1267 lines
75 KiB
Text
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Two, Issue 21, File 9 of 11
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PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Special Edition PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
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PWN PWN
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PWN Phrack World News PWN
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PWN Special Edition Issue Two PWN
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PWN PWN
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PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
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PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
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PWN PWN
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PWN Special Thanks To Hatchet Molly PWN
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PWN PWN
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PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Special Edition PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
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Ed Schwartz Show on WGN Radio 720 AM
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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September, 27-28, 1988
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Transcribed by Hatchet Molly
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Hello. In this special presentation of Phrack World News, we have the abridged
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transcripts from the Ed Schwartz Show, a late night talk show broadcast by
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WGN Radio 720 AM - Chicago, Illinois.
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The transcripts that appear here in Phrack have been edited for this
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presentation. For the most part, I have decided to omit the unrelated chatter
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as well as any comments or discussions that are not pertinent to the intent of
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Phrack World News. In addition to this, I have also edited the speech somewhat
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to make it more intelligible, not an easy task. However, the complete unedited
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version of this broadcast can be found on The Phoenix Project (512)441-3088,
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sysoped by The Mentor.
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:Knight Lightning
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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The Cast;
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A = Anna (Self-proclaimed phone phreak in Kansas City, Missouri)
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AA = Sergeant Abagail Abraham (Illinois State Police; Computer Crime Section)
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B = Bob (A bulletin board system operator)
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BG = Bob Gates (Manager of Corporate Security for Ameritech)
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CM = Chuck Moran (Director of Internal Affairs; Ameritech Applied Technologies)
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D = Dan (A computer science major at DeVry Technical Institute in Chicago, IL)
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ES = Edward Schwartz (Our host)
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EZ = Ed Zahdi (A researcher from THE READER, a local publication in Chicago)
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G = Gordon (Hatchet Molly, a graduate student at Northern Illinois University)
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JM = John F. Maxfield (Our famous friend from BoardScan in Detroit, Michigan)
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K = Kevin (A BBS sysop)
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L = Louis (A caller)
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P = Penny (A victim)
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R = Robert (A legal hacker)
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R = Ray (A former software pirate)
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S = ?? (A consulting engineer)
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Also mentioned, but not on the show, was SHADOW HAWK of Chicago, Illinois, who
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was recently arrested for theft of software from AT&T, and TOM TCIMPIDIS, a
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famous sysop who was arrested for having, unknown to him, AT&T Calling Card
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numbers on his legal bulletin board.
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^*^
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ES: It's 12 minutes after the hour. The hour, of course, is eleven o'clock. We
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have a tremendous amount of commerce that goes on late at night and in the
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early morning. When I say commerce I'm talking about computer operations
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of all kind from keypunching to tabulating - you name it.
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We've done two programs with Ed Zahdi who is the researcher from THE READER
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(the weekly newspaper) from the "straight dope" column. Ed Zahdi does the
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research and on two appearances (on two Friday nights) within the last year
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or so on this program Ed Zahdi has received a number of phone calls...
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about computer hacking, about people whose telephones mysteriously ring in
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the middle of the night -- or almost any time of the day but constantly do
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so and they pick up the phone and there's nobody there.
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The last time Ed Zahdi was on, we were flooded with calls from people who
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claimed that;
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o There are all kinds of telemarketing people who are ringing telephones.
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o That the phone company is testing phones and you don't know it.
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o That the phone network gets tested every day and everybody's phone rings
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once or for half a ring and nobody's ever there.
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I was amazed at the number and type of calls that came in. We called the
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phone company and we asked for some cooperation and tonight we are having
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as guests not only Mr. Ed Zahdi from THE READER, but also Mr. Chuck Moran,
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the Director of Internal Affairs from Ameritech Applied Technologies. We
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also have Mr. Bob Gates, Manager of Corporate Security for Ameritech.
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We're gonna get into this whole thing as to whether or not people are using
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and abusing the phone networks. Whether or not computer hackers are
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ferreting out phone numbers with computers. Whether or not you can really
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program a computer to randomly ring every telephone in the city or not.
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If you're a computer person hang around. We're also going to talk about
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some of the things that the phone company and other allied businesses are
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doing to catch up with the computer hackers.
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JC: Well, that sounds interesting to me.
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ES: Well now are you ready for this? The Bureau of Criminal Investigation of
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the Illinois State Police has a computer fraud unit.
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JC: Uh-huh
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ES: And do you know what they like to do?
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JC: What do they like to do?
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ES: Lock up computer hackers. Tonight we're going have the computer hackers
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running for the hills! Well maybe I should say "typing for the hills" huh?
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JC: Probably! (chuckle)
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ES: Because they don't run...most of them are couch potatoes.
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JC: That's right!
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ES: Glad to see you here Ed.
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EZ: Glad to be here Ed. In In the "straight dope" we deal with all kinds of
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questions one of the questions we got onto was the question of ghost
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rings. People would hear these things primarily at night.
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ES: On their home phone?
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EZ: On their home phone. What would happen is that they'd be sitting at home
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and the telephone would ring for a half a ring or a whole ring or maybe
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even two rings. They would pick it up and nobody would be there. And I'd
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heard about this in the past. I thought it was some peculiarity of buying
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a phone from K-Mart or who knows where.
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We got easily a dozen calls in the course of the evening from people who
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had the same experience happen to them. And it would always, oddly
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enough, happen at the same time of the night or on the same day of the
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week at the same time of the night and it was pretty eerie.
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We got one woman, who I've spoken to several times since who said that she
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was an answering service operator and she had whole banks of phones and
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sets of these phones would jingle once at a certain time of the night and
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then the next day a different set would jingle at a certain time of the
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night and then the following week or the following whenever the pattern
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would repeat, but nobody was ever there. And so we decided there had to be
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some obvious solution to this problem and the speculation at the time was
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that it was some sort of a testing program that the phone company had to
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check out the trunk lines or something like that.
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So, I called up the phone company, Illinois Bell, I called up CenTel,
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called up Bell Labs, called up places like that to ask if they knew
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anything about it. I asked whether there was a testing program, if not
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what explanation could they offer. They said no, there was no testing
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program, they had no idea. They had some speculation they thought
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conceivably some sort of computer ringing service was involved, but they
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didn't have any really clear idea so we came back here a couple of months
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ago to talk about it again.
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ES: We were swamped with calls again.
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EZ: I asked for the woman, whose name is Pat, who was the answering service
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operator to give me a call. She did and she volunteered to help us out
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and see if we could use her phone system as a guinea pig and have the
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telephone company try and find out, if they had means of doing this, what
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the source of these ghost rings was. One of the things she pointed out
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was that during the Hinsdale fire or during the time that the Hinsdale
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switching system was out of operation after the fire there the ghost rings
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stopped.
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ES: Ahhhh!
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EZ: After it was repaired the rings started up again, but they were on a more
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irregular basis whereas before they were sort of like clockwork at a given
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time of the night.
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ES: Uh humm.
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EZ: Now the same sets of phones would ring on a given day, but at predictable
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times. And it would vary within an hour or so. So what I hoped to do at
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that point was to get together with Pat and try and get together with the
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phone company at her place and see what we could find out. Unfortunately
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she got sick, had a bad infection, so she was out of work for a long time.
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ES: Uh humm.
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EZ: She has just recently gotten back on the job and I spoke her today and our
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plan now is that I'll go over to her place of business on Thursday just to
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see for myself and at that point I'm going to call up probably your friend
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Ken Went at Illinois Bell.
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ES: Head of Security
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EZ: We'll see what we can find out and see if they'll do it for cheap 'cuz we
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haven't got a whole lot of resources yet. Now the problem is that the
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connection only lasts for a split second and I hope that they can find
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something out in that short of a period of time in terms of tracing but
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its not clear to me that its totally possible.
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ES: Now one of the things that we found out when you were here a few
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weeks ago on a Friday night was another element to all of this.
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Telemarketers have been known to, in terms of getting a hold of people,
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ring phones of people whose numbers they don't know.
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EZ: We got some real interesting things. There were two basic theories here
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that I guess that I should talk about. One is that computer hackers do
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this. One of the things that computer hackers do is program their
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computers to use their modems their modems to find other computers. When
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they find one, there will be a characteristic tone that will tell the
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computer on the other end that its reached another computer. If they
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don't find a computer they can disconnect real quickly before the
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connection is actually made and the charge is placed to their bills. So
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they can do this all for free basically. They'll do this routinely to
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try and find new locations of computers.
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ES: Right.
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EZ: So that was one theory. The drawback to that theory is well, why would
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they do this repeatedly with a given number? Because obviously if the
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computer isn't there Tuesday its not going to be there Friday afternoon.
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Why would they try this repeatedly every week. That was one problem. The
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second theory that was presented to us was that telemarketing firms do
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this to keep their files up to date. They want to find out if given
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numbers are still in use or something along those lines.
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ES: Cause people do move and people do change their phone numbers.
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EZ: Right, so what they do is they dial a number up real quick and hang up
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before you can answer it. At least they can detect whether the line is
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actually in use. This gives them apparently some useful information. So
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these were the two main theories and there were several elaborations on
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these that we'll probably hear more about tonight, but those were the
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theories that we had. he problem of course as I say is its not clear
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exactly what the advantage of doing this on a routine basis, weekly or
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whenever would be to the person who is doing it.
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ES: There there are some very important elements to all of this. First of all
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there was a guy on yesterday morning who apparently filed some lawsuits
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against companies that do telemarketing for disturbing him and he is going
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to set a precedent that if you are bothered at home by telemarketers that
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you can sue them and collect damages.
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Not often a lot of money but enough to make them uhh sit up and take
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notice and he is trying to teach other people how to sue telemarketing
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people.
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(Break for commercial followed by re-introductions)
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CM: Thank you, Ed. It is our pleasure to be here.
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ES: It's a pleasure to have you here. Ameritech Applied Technologies is a
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division of Ameritech the phone company, right?
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CM: Right. We're a subsidiary of Ameritech that that deals with information
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technology needs of the Ameritech family which includes Illinois Bell.
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ES: What are some of the things you work on or are responsible for?
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CM: I'm responsible for computer security for the Ameritech companies. I also
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happen to have auditing for Ameritech Applied Technologies, physical
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security for our company. That kind of stuff.
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ES: Big job!
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CM: Yes. We are involved with hackers regularly all the time.
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ES: Good to have you here tonight Chuck. Also I would like to introduce Mr.
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Bob Gates, manager of Corporate Security also with Ameritech Applied
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Technologies.
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BG: Good Morning.
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ES: And a good morning to you. Bob previously was a police officer. You have
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been in Corporate Security at Ameritech for how long now Bob?
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BG: Since divestiture which was in January 1984. Its a much more specialized
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field and you deal with one particular aspect of the whole scenario.
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ES: Is it correct, are our callers correct? Do you ring people's phones at
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various hours of the day and night? Are there "ghost" rings? Are there
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people out there playing around? Is it the phone company or is it others?
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What's going on?
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CM: Well, I've been in this telephone business for 22 years now.
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ES Okay now this is the Director of Internal Affairs for Ameritech Applied
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Technologies, Mr. Moran, go ahead.
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CM: In my days at Illinois Bell, we very often heard these complaints. We
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kept trying to find out what it was some of the things the we've
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discovered is the computer hackers! They love to scan a prefix and look
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for a computer tone. They want a computer to talk to, so it'll ring a
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phone. Their computer will ring your phone.
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ES: Now this can be done from the bedroom of a thirteen year of a computer
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phreak right? Or anybody else for that matter.
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CM: If he has got a semi-good computer mind he can do it while he is asleep.
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He can program his PC to use his modem to dial your number.
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ES: Is most of the computer hacking and unauthorized use of computers done in
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the off hours? In other words its not people in business during the day,
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right? Would that be basically your computer hacker description?
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CM: People still have to live, they still have to have jobs to feed themselves,
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and they still have to go to school or go to classes and so your going to
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find that since hacking is a hobby, it is going to done during their free
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time. Which is typically evenings, weekends, and vacation periods.
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ES: I guess what I'm getting at here is I'm trying to establish most of the the
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computer related misbehavior comes more from private homes than from
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business offices.
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CM: No. The studies seem to indicate that 80% of computer abusers are in fact
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people in business and are abusing their own company, but that is not going
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to cause your phone to ring. The people who are using the network to call
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and look for computers are the people which we typically call hackers,
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which amount for 15-25% of the computer abuse that goes on in the world.
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ES: How concerned is Ameritech and the other technology and phone
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companies around the country about all of this?
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CM: Well just as any business Ameritech is highly dependent upon information
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systems to survive. So we are concerned with whatever risks go with
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computer usage.
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ES: Did you both see the film WarGames with Matthew Broderick?
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CM and BG: Yeah.
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ES: Now while the plot is pretty far-out, the theory is workable, correct?
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BG: The natural inquisitiveness of the youthful mind, the need to explore.
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ES: We've heard stories about computer hackers who have gotten into computers
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in government offices, high schools, colleges, and universities. They've
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changed grades, added and subtracted information from formulas, and done
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all kinds of things.
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Payroll records have been changed and we've got a thing now called the
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computer virus. We've got a conviction of a guy who is going to jail for
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literally destroying a computer program two days after he left the company
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and apparently that is something that computer people are very worried
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about.
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Are we going to end up with a huge number of people called "computer
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police" here at some point? To get a handle on all of this, is that what
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we need?
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BG: I think computer security is just a natural extension of using your
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computers to ensure that they are used in a secure manner. That they
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aren't tampered with and they aren't abused. To do that you have to take
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some degree of effort to protect your computer system.
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ES: Is law enforcement geared up to deal with the kinds of crimes that you guys
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are working on, investigating and trying to deal with?
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BG: Law enforcement does have experts with them. They also have to investigate
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everything else that occurs. So it becomes a priority item to private
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companies to make a commitment to look at it themselves to protect their
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systems and include law enforcement if appropriate.
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ES: Is there a naivety on the part of a lot of people that just left computer
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systems unguarded.
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BG: Yes. In reference to the law enforcement, in our current criminal justice
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system I know that in the states that we deal with and the federal agencies
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that I have dealt with part of the problem is finding a prosecutor, a
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judge, and a jury that understands what a computer crime is, Because they
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are not computer literate.
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ES: Well stealing information and stealing time are crimes. How about the
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stories of computer hackers breaking into computers at nuclear laboratories
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like Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California. This is where they do
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the research on nuclear weapons and God knows what else. Think of the
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potential of this kind of misbehavior it's frightening.
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BG: That's why computer security has become a hot job.
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EZ: I'm still trying to focus on my immediate problem here which was the
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question of the ghost rings. What I'm hearing you say is that you think
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that the ghost rings are primarily the work of hackers.
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CM: I think its a very plausible cause.
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EZ: The question that people raise about this of course is that you can see it
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happening once in a while, but why all the time on a regular basis?
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CM: The computer hacker scans prefixes and will set his dialer look for
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computer tones. He may find a few numbers and tell two or three friends.
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Those two or three friends will now tell two or three other friends. They
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will see these numbers and then they will go and scan that whole thousand
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number group again.
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EZ: I still don't quite see why the ghost rings occur at exactly the same time
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all of the time.
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CM: I can't answer that.
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ES: I respond to that by saying the times are most likely approximate. Most
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people's watches aren't perfect and neither are their memories. However
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if the majority of the hackers are in high school, then they are probably
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going to sleep at about the same time every night and setting their dialers
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to run while they are asleep, therefore hitting the same numbers at roughly
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the same time every night.
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Is it correct to say that they can program these computers to do this work
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without any billing information being generated? And how can they do this?
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Or is that an area we should stay away from, I don't want to compromise
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you guys.
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BG: You're talking toll fraud and that's really not my area of expertise. Toll
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fraud is a fact of life, but I'm not a toll fraud person.
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CM: The presumption is that the billing doesn't kick in for a split second
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after the phone is picked up and that is what enables these guys to get
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away with this.
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BG: Talk to Ken.
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ES: Ken will tell you things that you'll never be able to talk about on the
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radio or write about I'm afraid. We're going to get into some other
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elements of all of this. Are the penalties for computer hackers set to
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meet the crime these days? I mean do we catch many of them do they get
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||
|
punished and does the punishment fit the crime?
|
||
|
CM: The computer hackers that usually get caught are juveniles, which means the
|
||
|
most you can do is keep them in jail until they are 21 and confiscate their
|
||
|
computer equipment. The U.S. Attorneys Office in the Northern District for
|
||
|
Illinois did in fact return a juvenile indictment against a hacker who used
|
||
|
the code name SHADOW HAWK. It made the front page of the Chicago Tribune.
|
||
|
ES: What did he do? Can you tell us?
|
||
|
CM: According to the Tribune, he stole software from AT&T.
|
||
|
ES: This proves that as smart as some of these hackers are, some of them get
|
||
|
caught, maybe even a lot of them get caught. So as hard as they're working
|
||
|
to defy the system apparently you people are working from inside the system
|
||
|
to foil what they are doing and catch them.
|
||
|
CM: Exactly
|
||
|
ES: If you don't prosecute them when you catch then then it will not mean a
|
||
|
thing so does that mean that the various phone companies and their
|
||
|
subsidiaries have got a very serious mood about prosecuting if you catch
|
||
|
people? Is that the way of the future?
|
||
|
CM: Every case is different. Prosecution is always an option.
|
||
|
ES: Are we a couple of years late in dealing with this problem?
|
||
|
BG: The laws typically catch up to the need. You have to identify a problem
|
||
|
before you can really address it.
|
||
|
ES: We have made arrangements thanks to our guests tonight to speak to an
|
||
|
Illinois State police detective sergeant who works on computer fraud;
|
||
|
Sergeant Abagail Abraham.
|
||
|
AA: Good morning I appreciate being here.
|
||
|
ES: Have you been listening to the radio prior to our call?
|
||
|
AA: I've been glued to the radio yes.
|
||
|
ES: Okay. Your unit is called Computer Crime Section?
|
||
|
AA: Sure.
|
||
|
ES: How long have you been in existence?
|
||
|
AA: Since February 1986.
|
||
|
ES: There obviously was a need for it. Do we have enough state laws or state
|
||
|
statutes for you to do what you have to do?
|
||
|
AA: I think so. At the time that the section came into existence, the laws
|
||
|
were not very good. Most computer crimes were misdemeanors until a few
|
||
|
months later when the attorney general held hearings in which we
|
||
|
participated and thus they drafted a law.
|
||
|
|
||
|
ES: Sergeant, is it handled better at the state level as opposed to the federal
|
||
|
level? The gentlemen here from Ameritech mentions that the US Attorneys
|
||
|
Office has recently brought a prosecution here in Northern Illinois. Is
|
||
|
his office going to be doing much more of this or do you see it being done
|
||
|
at a state level?
|
||
|
AA: I think it depends upon the kind of case. Certain cases are probably
|
||
|
better handled at the federal level and certain cases are handled best at
|
||
|
the local. When dealing with the federal agencies, the jurisdiction for
|
||
|
computer fraud is shared between the FBI and the Secret Service. So it
|
||
|
depends upon the nature of the case as to which agency would take it, but
|
||
|
many cases are not appropriate for the federal government to take part in.
|
||
|
ES: Let's say we have a student who changes a grade in a school computer
|
||
|
system. That would be more a state case I would presume than a federal
|
||
|
case right?
|
||
|
AA: Certainly it would be likely to be a state case, we had a case like that.
|
||
|
ES: If you were able to develop a case like that and have evidence, are you
|
||
|
liable to get a conviction? Our guests were saying that the courts don't
|
||
|
necessarily understand all of this. When you go into state court on this
|
||
|
kind of a thing are you getting judges and/or juries who understand what
|
||
|
you're talking about?
|
||
|
AA: Well we have had no cases go to jury trials. As a matter of fact, no cases
|
||
|
have even gone to bench trials because as like the vast majority of cases
|
||
|
in the system they are plead out.
|
||
|
ES: They plead guilty?
|
||
|
AA: We have a 100% conviction rate.
|
||
|
ES: Really!
|
||
|
AA: Our success is based very good cooperation from state's attorneys offices.
|
||
|
We've had no problems bringing our cases to them.
|
||
|
ES: Your data is so good that by the time you make your pinch there is no way
|
||
|
they can talk their way out of it. You've got them dead to rights.
|
||
|
AA: Yeah, we haven't had a problem with that.
|
||
|
ES: What kind of penalties are you getting Sarg?
|
||
|
AA: All of our cases have had a 100% conviction rate, be we haven't had that
|
||
|
many finally adjudicated. They are in various stages because the law is so
|
||
|
new.
|
||
|
ES: I presume that you're going to continue working very hard put more people
|
||
|
in jail.
|
||
|
AA: Yes, it's a growth industry.
|
||
|
ES: Is Director Margolis supportive of what you are doing?
|
||
|
AA: I think so. Our unit came into existence under the prior director, Zegal,
|
||
|
but Director Margolis has been very supportive of our efforts and I suspect
|
||
|
that he will become even more so.
|
||
|
ES: Do people who are victims of computer crime know who to report it to? If
|
||
|
you operate a business and your computer has been violated or anything at
|
||
|
all has been done to you, does the average computer owner know who to
|
||
|
report it to?
|
||
|
AA: No. That's a really easy question!
|
||
|
BG: I would, but only because I'm in the industry. However, the average small
|
||
|
business man would probably be somewhat at a loss.
|
||
|
AA: He might not even realize that is is a crime.
|
||
|
BG: That's exactly true and fortunately Illinois has had the foresight to put
|
||
|
together a unit such as the Sergeant's.
|
||
|
ES: Let's say there is a medium size company that uses computers. I'll invent
|
||
|
a company. My name is Mr. X and I own a a fairly nice real estate company
|
||
|
in the neighborhood of Chicago. I've got maybe a dozen employees and a
|
||
|
couple of years ago we went to computers to keep track of our listings, and
|
||
|
all of our accounting and our bookkeeping, our past customers, and all our
|
||
|
contactees. I mean we've got a lot of data. We communicate with some
|
||
|
other real estate agencies and so we use modems, telephone lines and let
|
||
|
computers talk to computers. Since some of this work is done when our
|
||
|
office is closed, we leave our system hooked up. I came in yesterday
|
||
|
morning and low-and-behold somebody got into our computer and erased all of
|
||
|
our data, or part of it, or changed something. I am the victim of a crime
|
||
|
should I pick up the phone and call the Illinois State Police
|
||
|
AA: Sure.
|
||
|
ES: You'll show up and you'll investigate?
|
||
|
AA: Sure.
|
||
|
ES: Okay.
|
||
|
AA: There are several ways in which a case can get to us. One of them is that
|
||
|
you as the victim could contact us directly and another way would be to
|
||
|
contact the local police and hope that they would call us.
|
||
|
ES: There's the key word...hope. Does the Chicago Police, the Wilmette
|
||
|
police, the Joliet police, do they know enough to refer these cases to you?
|
||
|
AA: I don't know if Joliet does, but Chicago and Wilmette certainly do. For
|
||
|
any of the police that are out there listening at this point let me add
|
||
|
that if we were to get a case referred to us, we will handle the case in
|
||
|
any one of a number of ways. If the local agency brings it to us and wants
|
||
|
nothing to do with the case because they have too much on their own we will
|
||
|
take the case over. If they would just like to either work cooperatively
|
||
|
or have us go with them on an interview or two to translate what the victim
|
||
|
may be saying we'd be happy to do that too. So we have enough work to do
|
||
|
now that we need not take cases over. We are happy to work with any
|
||
|
agency.
|
||
|
CM: I think one thing worth pointing out here is that we're focusing on on a
|
||
|
crime via telephone. Computer crime is done from afar where the victim
|
||
|
doesn't know the offender.
|
||
|
AA: That's true.
|
||
|
CM: The majority of cases probably don't involve telephones at all. They
|
||
|
involve companies' own employees who are committing what amounts to
|
||
|
embezzlement using computers. Either transferring money by computer to
|
||
|
their own accounts or somehow playing with the books and the employer might
|
||
|
not realize for a long time until some auditing process occurs that the
|
||
|
crime has even occurred.
|
||
|
AA: You're right. There are a number of cases like that. What happens very
|
||
|
often in a case like that when it is somebody in-house is that the company
|
||
|
will choose to not call it to the attention of the police they will choose
|
||
|
instead to take disciplinary action or fire the person. Their argument
|
||
|
most times is that they don't want the embarrassment. We do not go out and
|
||
|
seek headlines unless our victim is interested in having headline sought.
|
||
|
We don't choose to publicize cases and embarrass our victim. The stuff is
|
||
|
simply not reported that much.
|
||
|
EZ: I was talking to a computer consultant once who said that the higher you
|
||
|
are up in the company if you're involved with something like this the less
|
||
|
likelihood there is of not only you never doing time, but even getting any
|
||
|
sort of penalty involved. I was there was one particular case of a guy who
|
||
|
was an executive vice president for a bank who I think stole some
|
||
|
phenomenal amount of money was in the millions who was discovered after
|
||
|
some period of time and they didn't want it to get out that one their
|
||
|
trusted employees was a crook so they gave threw this guy a retirement
|
||
|
banquet
|
||
|
ES: Hahahahahaha.
|
||
|
EZ: They retired him from the company and he left with honors.
|
||
|
AA: I like this....
|
||
|
EZ: The consultant said he was there and it was the most hypocritical thing he
|
||
|
ever saw, but they will do it to avoid the unfavorable publicity.
|
||
|
ES: I believe it.
|
||
|
AA: Certainly if you are high in the organization and you control things then
|
||
|
you can control various procedures so that you are less likely to be caught
|
||
|
and you are probably in control of enough money that you are able to come
|
||
|
up with creative ways to embezzle it with less suspicion aroused. I'm not
|
||
|
sure why, but the more money you take the less likely you are to get
|
||
|
prosecuted.
|
||
|
ES: People admire these kinds of crime.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Commercial Break and then reintroductions including...)
|
||
|
|
||
|
ES: I want to welcome a new player to our game tonight, Mr. John Maxfield.
|
||
|
John Maxfield owns a corporate security consulting company. John...are you
|
||
|
there?
|
||
|
JM: Yes I am, good morning.
|
||
|
ES: Good morning I guess you are outside of Chicago and are you close enough to
|
||
|
have been listening to our program?
|
||
|
JM: Well ahhhhh, unfortunately ahhhh I'm ahhh a bit to the east of you and I
|
||
|
had a little trouble listening in on the radio so uhhh I've been listening
|
||
|
the last few minutes on the telephone.
|
||
|
ES: We've gotten into all kinds of data here. Have you and the sergeant ever
|
||
|
talked before?
|
||
|
JM: I don't believe so. I may have talked to somebody in the Illinois State
|
||
|
Police ummmm maybe a year or so ago, but it was not the sergeant.
|
||
|
ES: Sergeant Abraham you're still there, correct?
|
||
|
AA: Yes. I'm here
|
||
|
ES: I presume John that you know Chuck Moran and Bob Gates.
|
||
|
JM: Yes I ahhh am acquainted with ah Bob Gates.
|
||
|
ES: What does a private computer security company do?
|
||
|
JM: Well uhhh we get involved with ahhhhhh ahhhhh the cases that perhaps don't
|
||
|
make the headlines. Ummmmm and my role is more of kind of in counseling
|
||
|
clients as to how they should secure their systems and to acquaint them
|
||
|
with the risks and the kind of the nature of the enemy what they are up
|
||
|
against.
|
||
|
ES: We were talking earlier about a movie called WarGames which I'm sure you
|
||
|
must be familiar with. My guests have been telling us a little bit about
|
||
|
some of the things that go on. I suspect that the computer hacking problem
|
||
|
and related behaviors is probably very severe isn't it?
|
||
|
JM: Yes ahhh it certainly is a growing problem The movie WarGames kind of put
|
||
|
out into the public eye what had been going on very quietly behind the
|
||
|
scenes for a number of years. And uhhh of course as a result of WarGames I
|
||
|
think there was an increase in hacking activity because now a lot of the
|
||
|
uhhh hackers suddenly realized that it was something that maybe something
|
||
|
they should do and achieve notoriety.
|
||
|
ES: I have a question here that may or may not have an answer. Why is that the
|
||
|
legitimate use of the computer isn't enough to satisfy its user or owner.
|
||
|
In other words, why hack? Why misbehave? Why break the law? Why cost
|
||
|
people a fortune? I mean there are so many fascinating things you can do
|
||
|
with a computer without breaking the law why are so many people into this
|
||
|
anti-social, anti-business behavior?
|
||
|
JM: Well that's a difficult question..ahhhhhh you could say "why do we have
|
||
|
criminals?" You know when you know there's plenty of gainful employment out
|
||
|
there. Ahhhhh the thing with the computer hackers uhhh most of them are
|
||
|
thrill seekers. ahhh they are not the kind of people that are going to be
|
||
|
ahhhh good achievers with computers they're really only know how to do the
|
||
|
destructive things. They're kind of the analog of the vandal. Ahhhh
|
||
|
they're not really ahhh some of them are very bright but they're very
|
||
|
misguided. Misdirected. And uhhh it's it's kind of hard to make a
|
||
|
generalization or a stereotype because they do kind of cover a wide
|
||
|
spectrum. We've got a one end of the spectrum a lot of these young kids
|
||
|
ahhh teenagers. And they mostly seem to be boys there is very few female
|
||
|
hackers out there.
|
||
|
ES: really?
|
||
|
JM: Yeah that's an interesting phenomenon. I would say that maybe there is one
|
||
|
girl for every ten thousand boys. But ahhh anyway at the one end of the
|
||
|
spectrum we have these kids that are just kind of running loose they really
|
||
|
don't know how to do very much but ahhhh when they do manage to do it they
|
||
|
do a lot of damage. Just by sheer numbers. And then on the other end of
|
||
|
the spectrum you perhaps got a the career criminal whose chosen to commit
|
||
|
his crimes over the telephone line. Instead of you know holding up people
|
||
|
with guns uhhh he robs banks by telephone. So you've got this wide
|
||
|
spectrum and it's very hard to put a stereo type to it, but most of the
|
||
|
hackers start out because there's kind of a thrill there's sort thrill of
|
||
|
ripping off the phone company or breaking into a bank computer and
|
||
|
destroying data or something. There's a ahhhh kind of a power trip
|
||
|
involved.
|
||
|
ES: Now what you're trying to do is advise your clients how to avoid this
|
||
|
before it happens. Do most of them end up getting burned before they come
|
||
|
to you or are people smart enough to invest early?
|
||
|
JM: Security unfortunately in the business world tends to take kind of a back
|
||
|
seat because it doesn't generate profits, it doesn't generate any revenue.
|
||
|
It's an expense uhhh if if you're worried about burglars and you live in a
|
||
|
big city like I do or like Chicago. Then you know you've got to spend
|
||
|
extra money for locks and burglar alarms and it's a nuisance you've gotta
|
||
|
unlock your door with three different keys and throw back all these dead
|
||
|
bolts and stuff and turn the burglar alarm off and back on again when you
|
||
|
leave so it's a big nuisance. So security tends to be left sort of as the
|
||
|
last thing you do. And uhhh of course after a corporations been hit their
|
||
|
data's been damaged or stolen or destroyed or whatever. Then they can't
|
||
|
spend enough money, you know, to keep it from happening again.
|
||
|
ES: We have been told there is not premise that is burglar proof, there is no
|
||
|
person regardless of their importance in this world who is totally
|
||
|
protectable. Is a computer or a computer system totally protectable? I
|
||
|
mean can you teach somebody how to secure the system so the hacker just
|
||
|
can't get at it?
|
||
|
JM: Quite frankly you're you're correct. I think the only secure computer is
|
||
|
one that is unplugged. Or you change all the passwords and don't write
|
||
|
them down so no one can log on. Like any other form of security if you put
|
||
|
enough locks and bars on your doors and windows the burglar's going to go
|
||
|
somewhere else where its easier pickings. The same is true with computer
|
||
|
security. You can secure your system from all but the really ummmm you
|
||
|
know intense organized attack. Now obviously in industry we've got certain
|
||
|
segments that are targets, if you will. Banks obviously are a target,
|
||
|
that's where the money is.
|
||
|
ES: If computers are so capable and so smart, can't we say to a computer "Okay
|
||
|
Computer, protect yourself"?
|
||
|
JM: The computer actually is fairly capable of defending itself, the only
|
||
|
problem is it's not intelligent. Uhh and it doesn't really care you see
|
||
|
whether somebody breaks in or not. You see there's no human in the loop, if
|
||
|
you will. So you have to have you have to have a human someplace that
|
||
|
looks at the exception report that the computer generates and says "hey!
|
||
|
What's all these two o'clock in the morning logons...those accounts are
|
||
|
supposed to be active at that time of night." Now you can program a
|
||
|
computer to do some of that, but you still need a human auditor to
|
||
|
scrutinize the workings of the system ever now and then just to be sure
|
||
|
that the computer is protecting what its supposed to protect.
|
||
|
ES: John, what's the name of your company?
|
||
|
JM: My company is called BoardScan and we're in Detroit Michigan
|
||
|
ES: We have some callers, first up is young lady by the name of Penny. Are you
|
||
|
there Penny?
|
||
|
P: Yes I am Ed, how are you?
|
||
|
ES: Good. Are you enjoying the program?
|
||
|
P: Yes! I'm a victim!
|
||
|
ES: A victim! Tell us how.
|
||
|
P: We moved in about three months ago, two of our phones are rotary service
|
||
|
and one of them is a cheapy touch-tone that you go from touch to pulse or
|
||
|
something on it. When somebody dials out on one of the rotary phones, this
|
||
|
cheapy phone beeps back at us. Well I don't mind it too much because I've
|
||
|
got little kids and I get to know who's using the phone. Except, 10:38 at
|
||
|
night when my kids are sleeping and I'm sitting in the family room, my
|
||
|
little touch-tone phone beeps at me. Twice.
|
||
|
JM: Oh I think I can explain that, perhaps. Now it just beeps...
|
||
|
P: Twice!
|
||
|
JM: It does it every night about the same time?
|
||
|
P: Just about, yeah.
|
||
|
JM: Well there's an automatic scanner in every telephone exchange that runs at
|
||
|
night testing lines.
|
||
|
ES: Oh no! Now wait a minute!
|
||
|
P: Now wait a minute! They said that doesn't happen! No no no no.
|
||
|
ES: The phone company all right. This is the one thing that everybody we've
|
||
|
talked to in the telephone industry has denied!
|
||
|
EZ: We, ahh, yeah....
|
||
|
ES: Go ahead Ed! Take over, take over
|
||
|
EZ: We talked to a number of people at the phone company and the original
|
||
|
thought was the phone company was doing some sort of testing, but the
|
||
|
people at the phone company we talked to said "no...they don't." That
|
||
|
testing occurs only when the actual connection is made in a routine phone
|
||
|
call. This is part of the on-going sort of testing program. There is no
|
||
|
additional testing, however, they said. Now does it work differently in
|
||
|
Michigan?
|
||
|
JM: Well I don't know. I know I have a phone that ahhh will ahh...it's got
|
||
|
like a little buzzer in it and it will go "tick- tock" at about 1:30am
|
||
|
every night. And ummmm if you're on a if you're on one of the older
|
||
|
electro-mechanical exchanges uhh then I dare say there is a scanner that
|
||
|
does scan all the lines at night. And it it only stops on each line for
|
||
|
about oh a 1/2 second...just long enough to make your phone go beep-beep.
|
||
|
And I'm sure that's what the explanation is. I am pretty qualified, before
|
||
|
I got computer security work I used to install telephone exchanges.
|
||
|
P: Okay, I have a home computer. It's a Commodore I do not have a modem. Is
|
||
|
there anyway that I could get one and verify this?
|
||
|
JM: Ahhhhh I don't what a modem would have to do with the telephone company
|
||
|
testing your line at 10:30 at night. I don't see the connection there.
|
||
|
P: What would verify it? Could I verify that I'm being used as a test or
|
||
|
would it verify that I'm being scanned by some other computer someplace?
|
||
|
JM: Well no. If you were being scanned by a hacker, you'd be getting an actual
|
||
|
ring, you wouldn't get just say a short beep.
|
||
|
EZ: Penny where do you live?
|
||
|
P: Oaklawn.
|
||
|
EZ: Would you be willing to participate in a little experiment?
|
||
|
P: Sure, it happens pretty regularly.
|
||
|
EZ: Okay. Well is it every night or just some nights?
|
||
|
P: 6 nights out of 10. More than 50-50. It happened tonight as a matter of
|
||
|
fact.
|
||
|
EZ: Okay well tell you what.
|
||
|
P: It happened last night as a matter of fact!
|
||
|
ES: Penny, we'll get your name and your number and Ed is going to
|
||
|
call you during the day and do a little work with you, okay?
|
||
|
P: Sounds good.
|
||
|
ES: Thanks Penny. Hold on a minute okay?
|
||
|
P: Thank you.
|
||
|
ES: You see now, Mr Maxfield is telling us something that every source we've
|
||
|
gone to has denied. There's no such thing they tell us as of random
|
||
|
testing of the phone network either by the local phone company or by AT&T
|
||
|
they say to us "what for?" There's no need to do it. There's no reason to
|
||
|
do it. Let me ask our guests in the studio here from Ameritech. Has
|
||
|
either one of you ever heard of anything like this? Is it the kind of
|
||
|
thing that either one of you can address? I know that you're computer
|
||
|
guys, but what about this?
|
||
|
CM: I know who you've talked to over at Illinois Bell Security and at one time
|
||
|
historically they used to do testing, but they stopped that when I was
|
||
|
still at Illinois Bell.
|
||
|
ES: So this is some years ago.
|
||
|
CM: Yeah.
|
||
|
EZ: Now did it only apply to the electro-mechanical systems?
|
||
|
CM: The only offices I ever worked out of were electro-mechanical, so yes.
|
||
|
JM: Well I don't know. That would be my first guess because I know when I was
|
||
|
on electro-mechanical exchange here in Detroit that's what would happen
|
||
|
every night.
|
||
|
ES: It's a different phone company.
|
||
|
JM: Well I know, it's the same equipment though. Now on two electronic
|
||
|
switching systems the line is tested every time you make a call. So there
|
||
|
isn't any scanner like that. I think the mystery would be solved by just
|
||
|
verifying what kind of equipment you know she was being served out of.
|
||
|
EZ: It never dawned on us that that would make a difference.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Commercial Break and then reintroductions including...)
|
||
|
|
||
|
ES: I've got a call coming in here long distance from Missouri. Anna are you
|
||
|
there?
|
||
|
A: Yes I am.
|
||
|
ES: Where in Missouri are you?
|
||
|
A: I'm in Kansas City.
|
||
|
ES: And you're listening to us tonight?
|
||
|
A: Yes.
|
||
|
ES: Okay now my producer tells me that when you called up you identified
|
||
|
yourself as a computer hacker, is that correct?
|
||
|
A: I am a female phone hacker and computer hacker, Yes.
|
||
|
ES: One of the few because apparently mostly males are into this.
|
||
|
A: Uh-huh.
|
||
|
ES: Anna, talk up a little bit louder. How old are you?
|
||
|
A: I'm 27.
|
||
|
ES: Twenty seven years old and do you have a job?
|
||
|
A: No.
|
||
|
ES: You don't?!
|
||
|
A: No I have a lot of idle time.
|
||
|
ES: And you're a computer hacker. By definition what do you do
|
||
|
with your computer that makes you a hacker?
|
||
|
A: Well I scan out codes that residents and companies have with US Sprint and
|
||
|
different companies and I've used about fifteen thousand dollars worth of
|
||
|
free long distance.
|
||
|
ES: Are you calling free right now?
|
||
|
A: Yes I am. I am not paying for this call.
|
||
|
ES: Your computer has allowed you to make an illegal long distance call?
|
||
|
A: Through the computer I obtain the codes and then I dial codes with the
|
||
|
touch-tone.
|
||
|
ES: Sergeant, should I be talking to her since she's committing crime right
|
||
|
now. Am I aiding and abetting her? No wait..no. I've got a police officer
|
||
|
on here....Sarge?
|
||
|
AA: Yes.
|
||
|
ES: What do you think? Should we continue with this?
|
||
|
AA: I'd be real curious to know what her justification is for her behavior.
|
||
|
ES: How about that Ann, how about giving us an answer for this?
|
||
|
A: Well I have a lot of idle time and very little money and I like to talk to
|
||
|
a lot of my friends. I have a suggestion for companies and residents out
|
||
|
there who might have remote access codes. You might make them difficult,
|
||
|
not not easy where hackers could, you know the first things they try are
|
||
|
like 1-2-3-4, etc.
|
||
|
ES: Well let me ask you a question Anna. Have you found your computer hacking
|
||
|
to be relatively easy to do?
|
||
|
A: Yes I have.
|
||
|
ES: So you're saying that the computer people of the world have not tried hard
|
||
|
enough to keep you out?
|
||
|
A: No they haven't. I would suggest as far as the phone companies who use
|
||
|
remote access codes to make the codes more difficult.
|
||
|
ES: When we run into people like Anna who obviously have some intuitive talent
|
||
|
and some success at this, why don't we hire some of these people and put
|
||
|
their knowledge to work?
|
||
|
AA: No!
|
||
|
ES: No?
|
||
|
JM: No. No. I'd have to say no to that also.
|
||
|
A: Why not?
|
||
|
JM: You have to understand the the technical side of it. Just knowing how to
|
||
|
hack out a code doesn't qualify you as knowing how to change they system so
|
||
|
you can't hack codes anymore.
|
||
|
AA: There's a perception that these people are all whiz-kids and I don't think
|
||
|
that's the case.
|
||
|
ES: Are you a whiz-kid Anna?
|
||
|
A: No, I don't always use the computer to find these codes I have a lot of
|
||
|
friends and I also do some hacking of my own and there are a lot of
|
||
|
different methods. What you figure out is what how many digits are in the
|
||
|
codes and different things like that so it does require some brains.
|
||
|
Unless you have friends of course and that's all you rely on.
|
||
|
ES: Do you not understand that what you are doing is illegal? Does that not
|
||
|
even enter into the equation?
|
||
|
A: Of course I understand that! Yes.
|
||
|
ES: That what you are doing somebody else ultimately has to pay for Doesn't
|
||
|
that bother you? I mean if you were the victim of a thief or a burglar, I
|
||
|
presume you would call the police and you'd scream and yell until they did
|
||
|
something about it. And yet you and so many thousands of other people think
|
||
|
nothing of committing thievery and fraud by wire and God knows what other
|
||
|
crimes and because your victim is not sitting in the same room with you it
|
||
|
just doesn't seem to bother you.
|
||
|
A: Well I haven't I haven't physically bodily hurt anybody and it's mostly
|
||
|
companies you know that I've dealt with.
|
||
|
ES: That makes it okay? Companies are made up of people. Sometimes they're
|
||
|
privately owned and sometimes they're made up of stockholders, but
|
||
|
companies are people and so you're hurting people.
|
||
|
CM: I don't know what service she's coming through on, but you gotta remember
|
||
|
its costing that company money right now to enable her to talk and they've
|
||
|
got to recover those costs from their legitimate customers.
|
||
|
A: Don't they just use it as a tax write-off?
|
||
|
BG: No.
|
||
|
JM: There's been some of the smaller long distance companies, some of the
|
||
|
people that resell service provided by AT&T or Sprint, some of these
|
||
|
smaller companies have actually been bankrupted by people like Anna.
|
||
|
A: Well I happen to know the person who bankrupted one of them.
|
||
|
AA: I don't see why that's something that would make anybody proud.
|
||
|
A: I'm not proud to know this person.
|
||
|
AA: Why would you be proud to do what you're doing because you're doing the
|
||
|
exact same thing, just perhaps not at the same scale.
|
||
|
A: Well I don't I don't deal with small time companies.
|
||
|
AA: So, you and many people like you are costing large companies a enormous sum
|
||
|
of money. You're the people you're the reason that a company like Sprint
|
||
|
is not profitable and could in fact bankrupt or could have to lay people
|
||
|
off and could put people out of work.
|
||
|
A: They're not profitable?
|
||
|
JM: Sprint has been losing money almost since the beginning.
|
||
|
CM: Or just make a basic rate increase which makes phone service less
|
||
|
affordable.
|
||
|
EZ: My long distance company is All-Net which has had to change access codes
|
||
|
three times in the last year. Primarily because of hackers and I don't
|
||
|
think it's ever been profitable.
|
||
|
CM: Which is inconvenient to you as a customer.
|
||
|
EZ: Sure
|
||
|
ES: I think what bothers me the most out of this whole thing with Anna is the
|
||
|
fact that she is, committing crime literally every day and just doesn't
|
||
|
acknowledge that as either morally offensive.
|
||
|
JM: Yes you've hit on the crux of the problem here. Ahhh these phone phreaks
|
||
|
and hackers really don't see themselves as criminals and the crime here is
|
||
|
totally anonymous it's as simple as dialing some numbers on a telephone
|
||
|
that belong to someone else. Okay and so there is no victim. I mean the
|
||
|
hacker or the phone phreak doesn't even know the victim that ahh they're
|
||
|
billing the call to. In most cases.
|
||
|
ES: Like the burglar who burglarizes during the day when nobody is home he
|
||
|
doesn't see the faces of his victims and so its a very impersonal crime.
|
||
|
Anna how would you feel if someday you get a knock on the door and it's
|
||
|
the FBI or the Secret Service and they have finally tracked you down and
|
||
|
the US Attorney for Kansas City decides to indict you and they've got a
|
||
|
good case and you end up going to prison. How would you feel then?
|
||
|
A: My original reason for taking an interest in this particular hobby is that
|
||
|
someone got hold of my AT&T calling card and ran up my phone bill to
|
||
|
several thousand dollars and I took an interest in it to find out
|
||
|
originally what was going on with it. Now I have had contact with the
|
||
|
Secret Service and the FBI and they didn't do anything about the person who
|
||
|
offended me. They didn't do anything at all.
|
||
|
AA: That doesn't answer the question.
|
||
|
ES: Well what's going to happen if they come back and grab you? How would you
|
||
|
feel if you ended up having to go to prison?
|
||
|
A: I guess those are the breaks.
|
||
|
ES: Are you married or single?
|
||
|
A: I'm single.
|
||
|
ES: Does your family know that you're involved in all this?
|
||
|
A: Yes they do.
|
||
|
ES: I mean how would they react if you ended up being arrested?
|
||
|
A: I guess they wouldn't get anymore free long distance.
|
||
|
ES: They're using it too!?
|
||
|
A: They have me place the calls for them.
|
||
|
ES: You know what disturbs me. You know don't sound like a stupid person, but
|
||
|
you represent a lack of morality that disturbs me greatly. You really do.
|
||
|
I think you represent a certain way of thinking that is morally bankrupt.
|
||
|
I'm not trying to offend you, but I'm offended by you!
|
||
|
A: Well I appreciate your time and you giving me air time an everything. I
|
||
|
thought I'd let some of you know that we are out there and look out for us.
|
||
|
Change those remote access codes to more difficult codes and...
|
||
|
BG: Is that to make the challenge more difficult for you?
|
||
|
A: Possibly for some of us, but to also those hackers who don't have the
|
||
|
intelligence or don't have the friends or don't have the computers or
|
||
|
whatever they're using.
|
||
|
BG: Or the idle time.
|
||
|
A: Right, the idle time. There you go.
|
||
|
ES: How do you pay your rent Anna? Or do you live at home with your folks?
|
||
|
A: I live with my parents.
|
||
|
ES: Oh...okay.
|
||
|
AA: Why not take that time and do something constructive or socially useful?
|
||
|
A: Well I went out and applied for a job with US. Sprint and didn't get hired.
|
||
|
AA: That's good!
|
||
|
EZ: Is it any wonder?!
|
||
|
ES: Anna, do you listen to this program very often? I don't believe you've
|
||
|
ever called before have you?
|
||
|
A: No.
|
||
|
ES: Do you listen every once in a while?
|
||
|
A: Yes. I had just happened to hear through a friend that it was coming on.
|
||
|
ES: Okay. I tell you what Anna. A little something for all new callers. I've
|
||
|
got very fancy WGN T-shirts. If you give my producer your name and address
|
||
|
we'll send one to you. Okay?
|
||
|
A: Okay
|
||
|
ES: We'll be right back. (Click!) She hung up. I have to tell you the truth.
|
||
|
I thought we had her there for a minute.
|
||
|
AA: Well done!
|
||
|
JM: She hung up on you?
|
||
|
ES: The minute we went in on the line to get her address to send her the prize
|
||
|
she hung up.
|
||
|
JM: Yeah, I don't doubt that.
|
||
|
ES: I'm not trying to make an enemy out of the woman, but I really am disturbed
|
||
|
by her lack of moral fiber. I got another person on the phone claiming to
|
||
|
be a computer hacker. Dan, are you there?
|
||
|
D: Yes
|
||
|
ES: Are you a computer hacker?
|
||
|
D: No. I'm a computer science major.
|
||
|
ES: Oh, okay.
|
||
|
D: I'd like to ask your security experts what types of risk avoidance is
|
||
|
involved in providing unauthorized people into corporation's computer
|
||
|
systems?
|
||
|
BG: What you're asking us is what we do to try to keep unauthorized people out
|
||
|
and for me to answer that, would give away the store.
|
||
|
AA: Besides it would take about two days.
|
||
|
JM: I think you can answer that in generalities. As a number we're talking
|
||
|
about I guess, telephone dial-up access to computers.
|
||
|
BG: I think he's asking generically. Just computing. I don't think it would
|
||
|
be appropriate for me to discuss. There is enough literature out there,
|
||
|
you're a computer science major you read the literature and I think your
|
||
|
answer lies there.
|
||
|
EZ: Just to give you an example I know in terms not so much as computers, but
|
||
|
misuse of long distance credit card numbers, the All-Net people who I deal
|
||
|
with made their numbers longer which is the simplest thing you can do.
|
||
|
It's harder to find one that's working.
|
||
|
JM: When protecting your computers, the first line of defense is the password.
|
||
|
Obviously you don't want to use trivial passwords. Ahhh that's the first
|
||
|
line of defense. After that you add on other things like dial-back,
|
||
|
encryption and various other techniques to rule out anyone with just a
|
||
|
casual ahhh attempt at access that is just not going to get through.
|
||
|
ES: Dan, where are you going to school?
|
||
|
D: Right across the street from WGN, the Devry institute.
|
||
|
ES: What is your feeling when you hear somebody else talk about, you just heard
|
||
|
Anna, what what's your feeling about what she's doing?
|
||
|
D: I'm not really familiar with the hackers.
|
||
|
ES: Don't you see things being stolen? Does that bother you at all? I mean
|
||
|
you see the illegality of it? The immoral...morality of it?
|
||
|
D: I think it's very unethical because a lot of the companies have billions of
|
||
|
dollars in equipment.
|
||
|
ES: It's not something you're into? Correct?
|
||
|
D: That's correct, yes.
|
||
|
ES: I'm glad. Thanks for your call Dan.
|
||
|
D: Okay.
|
||
|
ES: Hello Louis are you there?
|
||
|
L: Yes I'm here.
|
||
|
ES: Okay you're on with all of our panel members Louis.
|
||
|
L: Thank you very much. I heard a story that had to do with a certain hacker
|
||
|
who had gotten inside the computer system of a let's say a large oil
|
||
|
company. We'll leave the names out of it. They had set up a security
|
||
|
system which automatically traces the call directly back to wherever the
|
||
|
originating connection is made and this goof called from his home. Two or
|
||
|
three days later, he found FBI agents on his front door step.
|
||
|
AA: I'm not familiar with the case, but it's certainly is within the realm of
|
||
|
possibility.
|
||
|
JM: This happens quite a bit. A person like Anna for example might use a long
|
||
|
distance service that is subscribing to a service from the originating
|
||
|
telephone company of identification of calling number. When the fraudulent
|
||
|
bill is generated the number that placed the call is also there and working
|
||
|
it backwards is very trivial at that point.
|
||
|
L: They simply did something like putting a trap on the line.
|
||
|
JM: On some of the systems, the trap is already there. It's just part of the
|
||
|
system, it's not really a trap at all.
|
||
|
ES: There are ways to catch people and the computer hackers like to play the
|
||
|
odds. All right Louis thank you.
|
||
|
L: Hopefully this will teach a lot of people who are considering doing
|
||
|
something like this to keep their hands off.
|
||
|
ES: I hope so, good point. Thanks for the call.
|
||
|
L: Thank you very much
|
||
|
ES: We've got a call here. Hello Bob!
|
||
|
B: I'd like to make a few comments on computer law. I live in Oaklawn and
|
||
|
they've got the most modern exchanges that Illinois Bell has to offer. My
|
||
|
son lives in that area and I know they offer features that are only
|
||
|
available on the newer switches out there. I go back with computers to
|
||
|
before Apple and IBM sold PC's, I had a couple sitting here at home.
|
||
|
ES: Uh-humm.
|
||
|
B: I bought my first modem about 1978. I consider myself somewhat a hacker,
|
||
|
but I've never really tried to get into anybody else's system, not so much
|
||
|
that I considered it illegal, simply because there wasn't that much of
|
||
|
interest to me available. As far as computers go, if I sit here and dial
|
||
|
random phone numbers in some states, now that is illegal. It's illegal if
|
||
|
your 14 year old is sitting at home at a computer, but it's not illegal if
|
||
|
your using a computerized phone system for generating sales leads.
|
||
|
ES: We call it tele-marketing.
|
||
|
B: Tele-marketing is essentially what some hackers have been hassled for and n
|
||
|
some states it is illegal now. I've accidentally accessed systems I did
|
||
|
not intend to access.
|
||
|
CM: You didn't pursue that right?
|
||
|
B: No, I've never used it. I've never used a computer for theft of services.
|
||
|
I am not about to try and defend somebody that uses a computer to as a tool
|
||
|
for theft of service from a telecommunications company. However, there are
|
||
|
certain computer laws that never should have been passed. The case of the
|
||
|
fellow out in California two or three years back that had a bulletin board,
|
||
|
somebody had posted access codes on his bulletin board. He has an
|
||
|
automated machine that answers his telephone. The telephone line is in his
|
||
|
name, the Secret Service came and confiscated his equipment Its not right
|
||
|
that this happened because of third party theft of service.
|
||
|
BG: I think the rationale is over simplistic.
|
||
|
B: Am I responsible for what you say when I answer my phone is essentially the
|
||
|
question.
|
||
|
BG: No, I think the question is, is the bulletin board operator responsible for
|
||
|
what is posted on his bulletin board.
|
||
|
B: Well that literally makes no sense. If a telemarketer calls me am I
|
||
|
responsible for anything he says after I pick up the phone?
|
||
|
BG: A bulletin board is used to disseminate information further. When a person
|
||
|
posts something, in this case a code, the bulletin board is used to further
|
||
|
spread that information.
|
||
|
JM: I believe that is the Tom Tcimpidis case that you're referring to and I'm
|
||
|
quite familiar with it. It was not quite as you put it. The stolen AT&T
|
||
|
calling card that was posted was posted anonymously one minute and one
|
||
|
minute after the AT&T card being posted by the anonymous party, Tom
|
||
|
Tcimpidis, the sysop, the operator of the bulletin board himself had been
|
||
|
on-line and had posted other messages. So there was reason to believe
|
||
|
perhaps that the anonymous person was actually the system operator. There
|
||
|
was a further complication that arose in that the stolen AT&T card belonged
|
||
|
to a former employer of the system operator. Ultimately there was not
|
||
|
enough evidence with which to charge anybody and the whole thing was
|
||
|
quietly dropped, but it did raise some interesting questions as to
|
||
|
responsibilities of the system operator because Mr. Tcimpidis said that he
|
||
|
didn't know the code was there and yet his own equipment log showed that he
|
||
|
had been on-line.
|
||
|
B: Let's take that a little further then. Let's say there was an answering
|
||
|
machine connected to his phone and we know he listened to the answering
|
||
|
machine. Let's say somebody with a voice message left him half a dozen
|
||
|
stolen credit card numbers. Would the action of the law enforcement
|
||
|
agencies have been the same?
|
||
|
JM: No...no, you're
|
||
|
B: I think you must look at a situation where over the years an unnecessary
|
||
|
fear has grown of some of the hackers. The phone phreaks scare me to an
|
||
|
extent. I've got bogus calls on my US. Sprint and All-Net bills, never got
|
||
|
one on my AT&T bill. I can see this is a definite problem, the phone
|
||
|
phreaks do scare me, and I realize that real problem is that nobody seems
|
||
|
to reconcile every call or even read their long distance bills.
|
||
|
AA: If I have an answering machine on my phone and somebody calls up and leaves
|
||
|
me information that were I to use it it would be illegal and I either erase
|
||
|
the information or turn that other person in. I have no intent to use it
|
||
|
and there is no law enforcement officer that I can imagine who is going to
|
||
|
take action and no prosecutor who would take the case.
|
||
|
ES: In other words if a guy sets up a computer bulletin board for the express
|
||
|
purpose of exchanging information he is not supposed to have when other
|
||
|
people have information their not supposed to have, I don't think there's
|
||
|
any doubt about what their intent is and about the fact that they are
|
||
|
violating the law.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Sarge, if you went after somebody like Anna for what she admitted doing,
|
||
|
stealing $15,000 dollars worth of long distance and you were able to handle
|
||
|
the investigation, come up with the evidence, and bust her, what kind of
|
||
|
penalty might she get?
|
||
|
AA: A very difficult question to answer because it depends upon her prior
|
||
|
criminal history. Most of these hackers do not have a history. In Anna's
|
||
|
case the crime would be a class four felony which would result in probably
|
||
|
simple felony probation.
|
||
|
ES: She admitted to stealing $15,000!
|
||
|
AA: I'm sure that her estimate is wildly off on the low end. if she is
|
||
|
disseminating codes then she is also somewhat responsible for other
|
||
|
people's use of the same codes.
|
||
|
ES: Could we charge someone like her with conspiracy?
|
||
|
AA: Sure!
|
||
|
ES: She is generating a continuing criminal enterprise.
|
||
|
AA: It depends again on whether you choose to prosecute her federally or at the
|
||
|
state level. She would be looking here at a class three or class two
|
||
|
felony depending upon the sum of money that she had stolen.
|
||
|
ES: The bottom line here is if the punishment doesn't fit the crime, its not
|
||
|
going to stop the criminals.
|
||
|
AA: You have to remember that these are the people who have not been processed
|
||
|
in the criminal justice systems and even to hold them over the weekend in
|
||
|
Cook County would not be an experience I'd care to repeat.
|
||
|
ES: Many of them are pretty arrogant sounding it seems.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Commercial Break And Reintroductions)
|
||
|
|
||
|
ES: We've got an interesting new telephone law here; Chapter 38 of the Illinois
|
||
|
Criminal Code. A person can be prosecuted, arrested and convicted for
|
||
|
bothering somebody even if the person doesn't answer the phone. Just
|
||
|
ringing a persons phone now is against the law, it's harassing them.
|
||
|
JM: I might add, since we're discussing harassment by phone... the hackers
|
||
|
don't like me too well and I'll get about a death threat a week from a
|
||
|
hacker.
|
||
|
ES: Really.
|
||
|
JM: Oh yeah and every now and then I figure out who it was and I call them back
|
||
|
and that kind of shakes up a little bit.
|
||
|
ES: There was this reporter here that was being harassed like crazy in the news
|
||
|
department here by a hacker who had a computer that was ringing the phone.
|
||
|
He was ringing the phones like crazy and I didn't know about. Finally the
|
||
|
reporter asked what I could recommend. I made a phone call and the
|
||
|
Illinois Bell Security did what it had to do and then the Chicago Police
|
||
|
were brought in and one night when I was on the air the officers went to
|
||
|
guys home, knocked on the door, and this kid was shocked! He was a
|
||
|
telemarketing representative for a major magazine and apparently he was
|
||
|
working at home he had some of their equipment at home including a rapid
|
||
|
dialer. He's got two detectives at the front door and he had literally
|
||
|
just gotten off the phone. We've got all the data and so now comes the
|
||
|
decision what do you want to do. Take him to court? Lock him up? Go to
|
||
|
his boss? I went back to the reporter in our news room and asked him what
|
||
|
he wanted to do about it?
|
||
|
JM: What did he say?
|
||
|
ES: Write a 500 word essay on why he was never going to do it again.
|
||
|
JM: Ha Ha! We had one 14 year old one hacker who was on the bulletin boards
|
||
|
and posting messages about how to make pipe bombs, different types of
|
||
|
poison, long distance codes, and computer passwords, etc. On the bulletin
|
||
|
boards he would come across like Ghengis Khan or or Joseph Stalin or
|
||
|
something. I mean his language was all four letter words and yet face to
|
||
|
face he was a very meek, mild mannered, well behaved youngster. However,
|
||
|
get him behind the keyboard and he just sort of changes personality. What
|
||
|
do you do to a 14 year old? He is much too young to really be put through
|
||
|
any of the the serious criminal prosecutions so his penalty was that he had
|
||
|
to read out loud to his parents all of the messages that he'd posted on the
|
||
|
bulletin boards, four letters words and all. And that cured him... hahaha.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In most of the cases I've worked on it's rare that someone goes to jail. I
|
||
|
think the longest sentence that I've been involved with was probably like
|
||
|
30 days. I think there was one fellow down in Virginia, if I recall
|
||
|
correctly, that got 90 days. You don't necessarily want to put these
|
||
|
folks in jail because then they'll meet the real crooks and teach them all
|
||
|
these nifty tricks.
|
||
|
ES: God help us. Lets grab a call real quick here from Gordon. Hello Gordon,
|
||
|
where are you calling from?
|
||
|
G: Hello, I'm calling from DeKalb, Illinois.
|
||
|
ES: You have a question for our panel...go ahead.
|
||
|
G: Yeah I do. I'm a graduate student in Criminology up here at Northern
|
||
|
Illinois University and I'm kinda involved in some field research with the
|
||
|
types of people that you're discussing tonight. I've heard a lot of terms
|
||
|
flying back and forth between phreakers and hackers and things like that.
|
||
|
I'd like to hear some input from the people on the panel as far as how they
|
||
|
define these types of activities, if they draw and distinctions between the
|
||
|
two, and secondly, if anybody can add any insight into maybe just how many
|
||
|
people are currently active in this type of activity.
|
||
|
JM: I could take that because one of my specialties is identification and
|
||
|
gathering data about how many perpetrators there are. To answer the first
|
||
|
question, a computer hacker would be someone who concentrates mainly on
|
||
|
breaking into computer systems. The phone phreak would be someone who,
|
||
|
like Anna we heard earlier tonight, just makes long distance calls for
|
||
|
free. The problem is you can't really separate them. The hacker needs to
|
||
|
know the phone phreak tricks in order to break into computers in other
|
||
|
states or other countries. Certainly the phone phreak perhaps needs some
|
||
|
computer aids in obtaining stolen codes. It is hard to separate them. You
|
||
|
can call them phreakers or you can call them hackers or you can just call
|
||
|
them criminals.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As to how many, this is a tough one because at what point to you draw the
|
||
|
line? Do you say somebody that makes fifteen thousand dollars worth of
|
||
|
calls in a year is a phone phreak and somebody that makes $14,900 is not?
|
||
|
The problem is that its been a tradition to rip off the phone company ever
|
||
|
since day one. There has been phone phreaks for twenty-five or thirty
|
||
|
years at least. Ever since we've had long distance dialing.
|
||
|
BG: The phone companies not the only one under siege either.
|
||
|
JM: There are thousands of hackers, I would say just in the state of Illinois
|
||
|
there are several thousand active computer hackers.
|
||
|
G: Those hackers are the active ones? Would you say that most of them are
|
||
|
involved in communicating via the bulletin board systems and voice
|
||
|
mail-boxes and things like that or is this pretty much a solitary activity.
|
||
|
JM: There are a few solitary hackers, in fact the beginnings of hacking, 25-30
|
||
|
years ago, it was a solitary activity. The bulletin boards have changed
|
||
|
all that. Now the hackers no longer really operate in solitude.
|
||
|
AA: One thing also about the criminal element here, the hacker and the
|
||
|
phreakers, my experience has been that we have had very few "clean" if you
|
||
|
will, computer frauds. We have had some people who are only into
|
||
|
multi-level marketing of codes, which ends up being enormous sums of money,
|
||
|
but very often we've found that hackers are involved in other things too.
|
||
|
For example, credit card frauds, we have done search warrants and found a
|
||
|
reasonable quantities of illegal substances, of weapons, of other evidence
|
||
|
of other offenses. We have probably easily 50% of our warrants turn up
|
||
|
other things besides computer fraud. Which I think is an interesting point
|
||
|
to keep in mind.
|
||
|
ES: Very good point.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Break For Commercial and re-introductions)
|
||
|
|
||
|
R: Hello, I just wanted to call up and clarify something concerning computer
|
||
|
hackers. I'm a hacker, but I'm not a criminal.
|
||
|
ES: We'll be the judge of that Bobby.
|
||
|
R: I think you will be. The reason I say that is, you're confusing things.
|
||
|
The hacker is term that you could apply or compare more or less to "ham."
|
||
|
It's a computer hobbyist, whether he does it just on his machine at home or
|
||
|
he accesses legitimate services throughout the country and pays for his
|
||
|
services he's a hacker. There are a lot of people who are irresponsible,
|
||
|
mostly teenagers, who are quite impressed with the power of this machine
|
||
|
and get carried away with it and do criminal acts. They happen to be
|
||
|
hackers, but they're also criminals. I think that distinction.
|
||
|
CM: I think the point is well taken I think originally the hacker was a very
|
||
|
positive term historically and for whatever reasons the word hacker has
|
||
|
taken on some negative connotations.
|
||
|
R: Yes and that is unfair because I know legions of people who are hackers.
|
||
|
JM: I consider myself to be a hacker, but I'm certainly not a computer criminal
|
||
|
(No, at least not a COMPUTER criminal). I mean my business is catching the
|
||
|
criminal hackers. If we go back to 1983 when hackers made headlines for
|
||
|
the first time, that was the Milwaukee 414 gang, they called themselves
|
||
|
hackers and so right away the good term, hacker being someone who could do
|
||
|
wonderful things with a computer got turned into someone who could do
|
||
|
criminal things with a computer.
|
||
|
ES: I remember back to a time a few years ago when there was a group of
|
||
|
criminals that got busted for coming up with a device called a black box
|
||
|
which they used to circumvent paying the tolls you know on long distance
|
||
|
phone charges. Was that kind of the beginning of this computer
|
||
|
misbehavior? I mean was that a computer device?
|
||
|
JM: There are several boxes; the black box, blue box, red box, silver box, etc.
|
||
|
I must confess that back when I was a teenager, over thirty years ago,
|
||
|
there were not any computers to play around with, but there was this
|
||
|
wonderful telephone network called the Bell System. I was one of the
|
||
|
original inventors of the device known as the black box and another device
|
||
|
known as the blue box (Yeah right, YOU invented these). In those days the
|
||
|
phone network was such that you could manipulate it with very simple tone
|
||
|
signals.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A black box essentially allows all calls to your phone to be received free
|
||
|
of charge to the caller. In other words if somebody called you from a
|
||
|
payphone they got their dimes back and if someone dialed you direct long
|
||
|
distance they never got a bill.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The blue box was a little more insidious. It allows you to actually take
|
||
|
over the long distance lines and dial direct anywhere in the world.
|
||
|
I got into it just out of curiosity as a true hacker and I found out that
|
||
|
these things were possible and I told a friend of mine at the phone company
|
||
|
about what I could do with their circuits and of course he turned me into
|
||
|
the security people.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It never really got started, but I do have sitting here in front of me a
|
||
|
device that makes some of those tones. You could call it a blue box. I
|
||
|
guess this is legitimate piece of test equipment, but let's see if it will
|
||
|
pick up. (Beeeep!)
|
||
|
ES: Came through loud and clear.
|
||
|
JM: The blue box today is obsolete, it really doesn't work anymore. There,
|
||
|
there are a few circuits that still us those kind of signals, but back
|
||
|
25-30 years ago that was the way to make your free phone calls. You didn't
|
||
|
have Sprint and MCI to abuse.
|
||
|
S: I'm a consulting engineer now but, I have been a communications manager for
|
||
|
three Fortune 500 companies. One of the reasons I was hired was to put a
|
||
|
stop to some long distance calling that had cost that company over a
|
||
|
million and a half dollars in 27 months. We found the person that was
|
||
|
doing it and he got a suspended sentence of six months. Then we turned
|
||
|
around and sued him in civil court.
|
||
|
ES: We've got to start treating these criminals like criminals. Suspended
|
||
|
sentences are unacceptable, hard jail time is absolutely mandatory and
|
||
|
unfortunately, and I think that sergeant you probably will agree with me,
|
||
|
it must be very frustrating to spend all the hours you do chasing people
|
||
|
and even when you get them to plead guilty seeing how easy sometimes they
|
||
|
get away.
|
||
|
AA: Oh sure.
|
||
|
S: How many people do you have assigned to your unit here in this state sarge?
|
||
|
AA: You're talking to 50% of the unit.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Break for commercials and re-introductions)
|
||
|
|
||
|
ES: Okay Ray, go ahead.
|
||
|
R: You would not believe how long I've been trying to get in touch with you.
|
||
|
Since I was 14 years old, every time I've called, you've been busy.
|
||
|
ES: So how old are you tonight?
|
||
|
R: 18
|
||
|
ES: Four years!? What's on your mind?
|
||
|
R: I used to pirate games when I was younger. As a matter of fact when I was
|
||
|
14. I mean my Dad had just bought me a computer and modem and I was
|
||
|
pumped. People are always complaining about it, but it's so easy for a 14
|
||
|
year old kid to do this, don't you think that they should make it a little
|
||
|
bit harder? Do you understand what I'm trying to say?
|
||
|
ES: Yes, but Ray it's easy to steal a car. If your neighbor leaves his car in
|
||
|
the driveway with the key in the ignition does that give you the right to
|
||
|
take it?
|
||
|
R: I know I did wrong, but there is no way I can give it back. Its just
|
||
|
stupid because when you get older you feel guilty about things.
|
||
|
ES: What did you used to do?
|
||
|
R: I used to call up certain places and I would like break in and take their
|
||
|
games and then just keep them for myself.
|
||
|
BG: It was more entertainment for you?
|
||
|
R: It kept me occupied and it was so easy that I began to think that maybe it
|
||
|
was meant to be easy so they could get publicity.
|
||
|
JM: There is perhaps a difference because when you copy a a computer program
|
||
|
you can't tell it from an original, but if you make a copy of a tape or a
|
||
|
record it doesn't sound quite the same.
|
||
|
CM: When you're 14 years old it's something new, right?
|
||
|
R: I got the biggest pump out of it.
|
||
|
CM: I think you did something for your ego and it gave you a sense of power.
|
||
|
ES: Okay Ray
|
||
|
R: Bye
|
||
|
ES: I've really enjoyed this program, but we're out of time. John, I want to
|
||
|
thank you for staying up and I have a feeling that we'll do more radio
|
||
|
because you're an interesting guy.
|
||
|
JM: Thank you. It's been interesting talking with you. By the way, I think I
|
||
|
know who Anna is, but we'll keep that a secret from our listeners.
|
||
|
ES: Oh. Well why don't you just tell the FBI?
|
||
|
JM: The Secret Service, yes.
|
||
|
ES: Right and I want to thank everyone else for being on the show tonight.
|
||
|
Everyone: Its been our pleasure. Lets do it again some time.
|
||
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|