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142 lines
6.8 KiB
Text
142 lines
6.8 KiB
Text
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Three, Issue 26, File 7 of 11
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<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
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<> <>
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<> PHONE BUGGING <>
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<> <>
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<> Telecom's Underground Industry <>
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<> <>
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<> By Split Decision <>
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<> <>
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<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
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In today's landscape of insider trading, leveraged buyouts and merger mania,
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it is no great shock that a new underground industry has developed within
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telecom -- eavesdropping.
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Bugs are cheap (starting at $30) and can be installed in as little as 10
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seconds. And you can bet your bottom $1 million that this expense pales in
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comparison to the rewards of finding out your takeover plans, marketing
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strategies, and product developments.
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According to Fritz Lang of Tactical Research Devices (Brewster, NY), there is a
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virtual epidemic of bugging going on in the American marketplace. Counter-
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surveillance agencies like TRD have sprung up all over. They search for
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eavesdropping equipment, then notify the client if they're being tapped. It's
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up to the client to respond to the intrusion.
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Each of TRD's employees is a retired CIA or FBI operative. Formerly, they
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planted bugs for Uncle Sam. Since it's illegal to plant bugs for anyone else,
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these men now engage in counter surveillance work, pinpointing eavesdropping
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devices, and sometimes the culprits who put them there, for TRD's client
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companies.
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Where Do They Put The Bugs?
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Your TELEPHONE, of course, is a convenient place to install an eavesdropping
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device. But this doesn't mean that the illegal tapping will be limited to your
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phone conversations.
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Electronic phones have microphones which are always "live," even when the
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telephone is on-hook. Stick an amplifier and transmitting unit to the
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microphone, and you have constant surveillance of all conversations taking
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place in that room, whether or not the phone is off-hook at the time.
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A device rapidly gaining popularity among today's wire-tappers is a mouthpiece
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containing a tiny bug, which looks exactly like the one of your 2500 set. All
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it takes is one trip to the water cooler or the men's room for the insider to
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surreptitiously make the old switcheroo.
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LOUDSPEAKERS are another favorite location for wire-tappers, because they can
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pick up conversations when not in use. Paging systems, piped in music, and
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telephone systems all employ some variety of amplifier which the culprit can
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use to his advantage.
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LINE INTERCEPTORS allow eavesdroppers more extensive coverage of your
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activities, since they can monitor more than on-line communications from a
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single listening post.
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But really, the number of places you can find a bug is limited only by the
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tapper's imagination. Light switches, plugs, clocks, calculators, legs of
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wooden chairs, staplers, ashtrays, the underside of a toilet bowl -- all of
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these items have proved fertile territory for the little critters.
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Tools For Finding The Bugs
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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TRD's people use a patented Surveillance Search Receiver to locate the bugs.
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The Receiver uses a broad-band radio spectrum, from 25 kHz to 7 gHz.
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If there is an unaccounted-for radio frequency emission on the premises, the
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Receiver will tune it in on a small spectrum monitor. It then traces the
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emission to its inevitable source, the bug.
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For room bugs, they also use a Non-Linear Junction Detector, which can pinpoint
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all electronic circuit diodes or resistors in the architecture of the building.
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The Detector emits a high microwave signal into walls, furniture, et al.,
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causing any circuit hidden within to oscillate. As soon as they oscillate,
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they become detectable.
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Mr. Lang clears up a misconception about the Russians bugging our embassy in
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Moscow. "They didn't riddle the building with actual bugs, instead, they
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buried millions of little resistors in the concrete."
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The embassy, therefore, became a hot bed for false alarms. Whenever the
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American counter-measure people came in with their detectors to look for a bug,
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they'd pick up oscillation readings from the countless resistors and
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capacitors buried in the walls. Finding any real bugs would be infinitely more
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difficult than finding the old needle in a haystack.
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For finding wire-taps along the phone lines, TRD uses a computerized electronic
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Telephone Analyzer. The unit runs 18 different tests on phone lines between
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the CPE block and the Central Office (CO). Resistance, voltage, and line
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balance are just a few of them. Once they locate a tapped line, they send a
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pulse down it with a time-domain reflectometer, which can pinpoint exactly
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where in the line the bug has been affixed.
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Bear in mind that wire-tapping is extremely difficult and time consuming. As
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much as 20 hours of conversations has to be monitored every single business
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day. Because of this, key executives' telephones are usually the only ones
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slated for a wire-tap.
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Catching The Culprit
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Finding a wire-tap is easier than finding the spy who bugged your office.
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Direct hardwire taps can be traced to the remote location where the snoop
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stores his voltage-activated electronic tape recorder. After you've found the
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monitoring post, it's a matter of hanging around the premises until someone
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comes to collect the old tapes and put in fresh ones.
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As for room bugs, your best bet is to make the device inoperable, without
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removing it, and wait for the eavesdropping to come back to fix or replace it.
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Once Is Never Enough
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Some of TRD's clients have their offices checked monthly, some quarterly.
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After the initial sweep, you can have equipment installed on your phone lines
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which constantly monitors any funny stuff.
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As for TRD, they offer a money-back guarantee if they fail to detect an
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existing bug on your premises. Mr. Lang assures us that Fortune 500 company
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has been bugged to a greater or lesser extent. That's how out-of-hand the
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problem is getting.
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Toward the end of our conversation, Mr. Lang pauses. "So you're really going
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to print this, huh? You're really on the up and up?" Then he spills the
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beans.
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It turns out Mr. Fritz Lang is really Mr. Frank Jones (he says), a licensed
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private investigator with a broad reputation in the industry. He used the
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alias because he suspected I was from a rival counter-measure agency, or worse,
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a wire-tapper, trying to infiltrate his operations.
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Which quite possibly I am. You can't trust anybody in this spy business.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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