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756 lines
38 KiB
Text
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==Phrack Magazine==
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Volume Six, Issue Forty-Seven, File 21 of 22
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****************************************************************************
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International Scenes
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There was once a time when hackers were basically isolated. It was
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almost unheard of to run into hackers from countries other than the
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United States. Then in the mid 1980's thanks largely to the
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existence of chat systems accessible through X.25 networks like
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Altger, tchh and QSD, hackers world-wide began to run into each other.
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They began to talk, trade information, and learn from each other.
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Separate and diverse subcultures began to merge into one collective
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scene and has brought us the hacking subculture we know today. A
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subculture that knows no borders, one whose denizens share the common goal
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of liberating information from its corporate shackles.
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With the incredible proliferation of the Internet around the globe, this
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group is growing by leaps and bounds. With this in mind, we want to help
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further unite the communities in various countries by shedding light
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onto the hacking scenes that exist there. If you want to contribute a
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file about the hacking scene in your country, please send it to us
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at phrack@well.com.
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This month we have files about the scenes in Norway, France, Italy and an
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update from Denmark.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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dfp-1 An orientation on the Norwegian hacking/phreaking scene dfp-1
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Written by the Digital Freedom Phanatic (dfp@powertech.no)
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Brought to you in January, 1995
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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PROLOGUE: It's 1995 and little has been mentioned about Norwegian
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hackers in the media lately. I thought this would be a nice opportunity
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to summarize some of the things that have happened on the scene in
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Norway during the last 5 or so years. For those of you in the Norwegian
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audience not recognizing my name; you shouldn't. I am more or less an
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acquaintance of many of you guys, but I feel that in order to get
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something done on the Norwegian scene right now (it's been fairly quiet
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for a while, nicht wahr?) I cannot reveal my true identity. Hell, let's
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see if I get any responses to this article. Now for the good stuff...
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Unfortunately I entered the scene as late as around 1990, so I'm not
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quite up-to-date on stuff that happened before that. I've been trying
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to gather old articles from newspapers and books. What I have been
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able to come up with is more or less some articles about a couple of
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hackers who managed to get into a local newspaper's computer. Also,
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I have gotten in touch with some of the _real old Norwegian hackers_
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dating back to the '70s. Needless to say, those people today work in
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the telecommunications industry.
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AREAS OF INTEREST FOR HACKERS: First, a little introduction to Norway.
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We are a very, very rich country, mainly due to the enormous amount of
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oil resources which we are pumping from the North Sea. As a result of
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this wealth (I guess), our people are well educated and we have a blooming
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industry. Well, in some cases. Nevermind. Keywords: large corporations,
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very large and respected telecommunications semi-monopoly, expensive
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communications.
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So in theory, there should be a lot of corporate hacking taking place in
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Norway. Well, either the people doing this are doing it real well, or
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nobody is doing it. I don't think anybody is. As I have come to
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understand, most hacking in Norway has really been Internet related.
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Norway was actually one of the first countries apart from USA getting
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connected to the Internet; way back in 1982.
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STATUS OF INTERNET CONNECTIVITY: The universities have been hooked up
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since the dawn of time, and today these are the centers of the Internet
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community and high-speed telecom equipment in general use in Norway.
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Actually, we have four universities and at least three of them are
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currently networked with each other at a speed of 34Mbps. The
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university network's (Uninett) international Internet connection is
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through NORDUnet and has a bandwidth of 2Mbps. Until a couple of
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years ago, one could not gain legitimate access to the Internet except
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by obtaining an account on one of the Uninett connected machines. This
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was impossible, at least for a majority of the hacker community, so
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Uninett, or rather the computers at the University of Oslo, became a Mecca
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for the scene. The big people had accounts there, or borrowed one.
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However, security is pretty stiff there and I fear that there was little
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actual _hacking_ going on, people were merely borrowing legitimate
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accounts through friends.
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What's fun about the University of Oslo computer network is that it
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until recently could be used for dialling out with speeds up to
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14.4kbps. Actually, some of their dialup terminal servers were
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configured to let you connect into them and dial out. Try CONNECT
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USEk.15 after logging in to Net/ONE (the University LAN). I don't think
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this works anymore, nor do I know if this was a "feature" introduced
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when the terminal servers were installed. It could be that some hacker
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reconfigured them. In that case, please let me know! Dialled 820s
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as well (The 900 numbers of Norway).
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Today the Internet situation is very different. We have had an
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extravagant boost in the number of Internet access providers lately:
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Oslonett, PowerTech, EUnet, Vestnett, BigBlue, MoNet, NordNet and PMDData
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are those I can think of right now. Also, a number of companies are
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providing leased-line access: TelePost, EUnet and Datametrix. PowerTech
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is starting to do this soon now (they say), presumably with competitive
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prices, but they are real bad on bandwidth. (Well, they've been the
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cheapest for me so far.) At least we're not far from getting Internet
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trial accounts shovelled up our asses here. Let's hope some souls will
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soon pour some actual value into the net; more information, more
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services. I've seen little of that.
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Until we get more Norwegian fun services on the Net, we might as well
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exploit the services of Norwegian companies with no clue whatsoever when
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it comes to security. Take, for instance, Cinet AS (cinet.no) which has
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a world NFS mountable root disk (rw). BigBlue Systems AS (bigblue.no) uses
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a Linux server which you can log to using accounts named node1, node2 or
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node3. Full shell user access. Or you could try logging in as "-froot"
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to obtain root access. Hm, I think they plugged that. :) Well, ach so.
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There's more out there. Just get hacking. And feel free to tell me what
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you find!
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WHAT WERE THE HACKERS DOING: There used to be a blooming hacking scene
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in Norway earlier. Well, one might not say blooming with bright ideas
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and happenings, but at least there were many people doing the right
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stuff. Using X.25 NUIs to get to QSD, Password spoofing at the local
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DataPak PAD using Pad2Pad, Social Engineering, Hacking calling cards to
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get to the states, finding AT&T Alliance backdoors so as to keep people
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up all night long when there was school the day after.. The good old
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days. We could even do easy blueboxing. 1980s-1992.
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I must admit, though, that QSD isn't much anymore. I liked it better
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when there were a hundred people logged in simultaneously, and when
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there were alliances being held with people from the States, Norway,
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Denmark, Israel, all over the place. Then came the busts. It was
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around October 1992 when the first busts started taking place. We have
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a very interesting timeline there. First, the police teamed up with a
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couple of computer software retailers (BJ Electronics, sounds familiar
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huh?) and busted ten or so of the warez type board sysops. People to
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remember: Gizmo, Enemy :-).
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Soon after that, bigger names were taken down. Mario, Graham Two
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(Vishnu), Edison, RamJet, Peter, Leikarnes etc. Kevin was never busted.
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I wonder who he was. These guys were taken for more serious stuff like
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carding, datapak (x.25), AT&T Alliance conferences, boxing, and general
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abuse of the telephone system. A couple of shorter raid periods followed
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in 1993, and the scene was pretty much dead - except for the k-rad warez
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kids.
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AT&T and the other big guys we used to bluebox off of have all gone for
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CCIS/CCITT #7 so there is little to be done boxing in Norway now. Well,
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as a matter of fact I haven't checked that out lately. An interesting
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thing, though, is that you can temporarily disconnect the complete
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international trunk set between Norway and Iceland by breaking (24+26
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250ms 26 100ms) on the Iceland Direct line. Everybody trying to
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_legitimately_ dial an Icelandic number from Norway for a while after
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that just gets a busy signal. Ha ha. Poor man's fun. Wish I could do
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that with the States... :)
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WHAT'S AHEAD FOR THE NORWEGIAN SCENE: I think we should get organized. I
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have a few projects in mind. There are a lot of security flaws and
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weaknesses yet to be discovered in Norwegian systems and services. We
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need to get all of Norway scanned for automated answering services and
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carriers. We need to get into some Central Offices to check out the
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labels on the modems connected to their Ericsson boxes. We need to get
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trashing. We need to start talking hacking and phreaking at The
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Gathering. We need to find data numbers for C.O.s, banks, corporate
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computers, the local McDonalds', we need to get root access at an Internet
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provider and we need to be able to listen in to phone conversations. We
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will. Get in touch with me if you'd like to join.
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These were just a couple of thoughts of mine that I wanted to share with
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you fellow hackers out there. Hope you've enjoyed them. And for heaven's
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sake, feel free to give me some feedback (via internet: dfp@powertech.no).
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FUN FACTS: Many companies have unconfigured PBXes that you can obtain
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outside dialtone on. There is no flat rate telephony. A 28k8 modem
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goes for a little less than $400. All phone calls are logged, logs are
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erased after a couple of months (presumably). Only ISDN customers can
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get Caller ID. There are three cellular operator companies. All the
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Norway Direct operators are situated in Kongens gate 21, OSLO, Norway.
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The NMT-900 Cellular network doesn't allow calls to Pakistan. All
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Norwegian babes are young, slim and blonde...not :)
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I'll be releasing a couple of files on Norwegian hacking/phreaking areas
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and techniques in the months to come. Here's a list of those I am
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planning, haven't written anything yet but I think I will. If there's
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anything in particular you'd like to add or to get hurried up, or if you
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have information which should be included in these files, then get in
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touch with me.
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(*) COCOTs and Monopoly operated Pay Phones in Norway
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(*) MBBS, the Norwegian BBS System; Backdoors and Security
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(*) Norwegian Telecom; TeleNor. Organization and computer systems.
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(*) The Norwegian State Libraries; BibSys network security
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(*) Telephone Monopoly; current status, what will happen, when?
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Sincerely Yours,
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Digital Freedom Phanatic
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Yola's to (unsorted, people I know or would like to know):
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Gizmo, Enemy, Mario, Graham Two (Vishnu), Edison, Roger RamJet, Peter,
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Gekko, Ozelot, Sicko, Flesaker, Karstad, Arild Leikarnes, Frode1 og
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Frode2 :-), The Dealer, Saron, Digital Phanatic, SCSI (BayernPower!),
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SevenUp (damiano?), UrbanMatrix, OnkelD. Where ARE you guys hiding?
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;-)
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>-=-=-=-=-=-<
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<French Scene>
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>-=-=-=-=-=-<
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By NeurAlien
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The French scene has always been portrayed as weak by both French and
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foreign people. There's a paradox here: France was one of the first
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countries to develop a modern network (in 1981) YET there have been
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few _good hackers_. How is that explained? I DUNNO !
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In fact, stating that France is underdeveloped at a hacker level is
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partly false. In France, hackers have always been isolated or hidden
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in little isolated groups. Whenever a good group formed, everyone was
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quickly busted by DST (the agency in charge of computer fraud). Moreover,
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this agency (DST) is somewhat effective and hacking has been illegal here
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since 1988. The risks when you are caught are VERY HEAVY and the trial
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lasts forever! Usually, it takes 3 years to go to trial and the material
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is ALWAYS seized even if you're not charged with anything!.
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The Videotex initiative that provided France such a breakthrough
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in technology is now an handicap because it can't follow the evolution of
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modems and isn't well adapted for networking with the Internet.
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I- The Videotex aka Minitel
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------------------------
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Minitel has been developed in 1981 by France Telecom. It was excellent at
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the time but it hasn't evolved very much. Let's see what hacking has
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been like in the Minitel world.
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To explain a little what "Minitel hacking" was, I must detail
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a little how Teletel (the network that supports Minitel) works.
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Teletel is based on X25 and provides multiple price levels:
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Teletel 0 (T0) is free for the user, costs a lot for the server.
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Teletel 1 (T1) costs a local call to the user, the price of the X25
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collect connection to the server.
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Teletel 2 (T2) costs the price of a local call + X25 communication
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(6+ cents per minute) to the user.)
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Teletel 3 (T3) costs T2 + a charge that is reversed to the server
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(costs 20 cents to $1 per minute to the user.)
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A lot of servers are accessible only in T3 for the users.
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The principle of hacking Teletel was to find a the X25 number corresponding
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to the T3 CODE in order to log on the T3 server from T2 level.
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Eventually, there could be a password on the T2 access.
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Actually, it's very basic and very dumb hacking since you can only do
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some scanning to find the x25 number of the servers.
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T1 was used for more professional type servers and the hackers
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that used to hack T1 were better than T2 hackers.
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T2 K0d3z were very popular among wannabe hackers, some Special Interest
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Groups about T2 were formed on a lot of servers and there was even a server
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dedicated to T2 codes. The quality of information has always been extremely
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low in this kind of club. Moreover, the kind of k0dez kidz on these SIGs and
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servers were particularly dumb (sorry for them). It got really bad in 1991
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when a lot of T2 guys started to flame each other, accusing them of leeching
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some T2 codes from one server and posting them to another, saying that the
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other guys were ripping everyone off etc... It may be continuing now but I'm
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totally uninterested by these people so I completely left this scene.
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The "good ones" of the T2 K0d3z k1dz stopped T2 (it's not free so it's
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too expensive!). They usually started to Hack T0 which is totally free.
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(it's like a 1-800 for Teletel). The servers of T0 are nearly all of the
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"restricted access" kind. But they have weak protection schemes and can
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be easily bypassed with some experience. The hackers of T0 servers don't
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usually know each other and some of them may form a kind of little "islands".
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(I'm calling them "islands" because it is always placed in an Information
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System on T0, deep within the system. There are perhaps 10 or so "islands"
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that have no connection with other hackers. A typical "island" consists of
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5 to 10 hackers. Some hackers may go on 2 or more "islands" but prefer to
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keep the presence of both "islands" secret. Why? In order not to destroy
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both if one of them is found and shut down!
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One reason most never heard of these person is that there is nearly
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no connection between the Teletel world and the Internet. The only way
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to escape to Internet and Intl X25 is Teletel 1 (T1).
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II- When Teletel goes professional
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-------------------------------
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As I said, the T1 is the only way for a Teletel hacker to evolve
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to hacking Internet or International & ASCII X25. On Teletel 1, you can
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sometimes log on to some interesting Unixes, Vaxes etc.
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T1 is also the only way on Teletel to use the International X25 network.
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You have to get a Transpac NUI to call a foreign address from T1.
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Until 1991, the Transpac NUIs were a 4 to 6 random alphanumeric
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characters. A man called IER had made an NUI Scanner that allowed him to
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find NUIs by scanning out every 4 character NUI. It WAS effective,
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but Transpac changed to a 6 character NUI. (IER was busted and caught.
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No news from him since that day!)
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Many good hackers used T1 a lot to hack systems and to go on the Internet
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and the Intl X25 networks. For example, you may have heard of people
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like Netlink, Furax, Jansky or Synaps. They hacked X25 and Internet but
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it seems that each of them was busted and caught. Some are still alive on
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the Net, but some aren't!!!
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Some French hackers were really good but it seems that no one can hide
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very long from the DST. They are very effective, and with the help of
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France Telecom, they trace back a lot of calls.
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Places like QSD haven't been used very much by the French because of
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their lack of technological knowledge. ahem...
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Moreover, QSD/The Line is tapped by governmental agencies so g00d French
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hackers don't like it.
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IV- The groups
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----------
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Some groups have been formed in France but they've never lived long enough
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to give new hackers the knowledge of the old hackers. Some groups were:
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NICK, Hardcore Hackers, Piratel, TeKila Underground. Many of them
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were hacking systems in Teletel 1.
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A group called CCCF appeared in 1991. It was founded by Jean Bernard
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Condat and in fact it was not really a group. This guy, JBC, is deft
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at maneuvering people into doing what he wants. He organized fake contests
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like "The price of the Chaos" to get more information and then act as
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if he personally discovered the hacks that were given to him.
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He recently started the Chaos newsletter where nothing originates from
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him...it's taken from everywhere and from his personal contacts.
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He has big power because he works for SVP which is a private
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information company that has the goal of providing information to whoever
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wants it, for a large amount of money.
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Nobody knows what JBC really wants but he is definitely a threat to the
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underground. Somebody, I don't recall who, already mentioned that in Phrack.
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V- Phreaking in Phrance
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--------------------
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Phone phreaking became really active in France in 1992 after the
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massive release of a blue box that worked in France. Several months
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later discovery of this caused the death of blue boxing from France.
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The blue box program was running on ST and several people that used it
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formed the TeKila Underground. As far as i know, this was an happy group
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that had a lot of parties and liked smoking... :)
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They weren't very effective: just into using the blue box.
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Then came the movement of the "Horlogers", it was due to the credit you
|
||
|
could gain if you connected in Teletel 3 on some server. The "horlogers" were
|
||
|
staying HOURS and DAYS on a server with blue box just to have more credit
|
||
|
(counted in minute of connection) on those server.
|
||
|
They were staying connected on a place called "L'horloge" (the timer) that
|
||
|
enabled you not to be disconnected by the server when being idle for a long
|
||
|
time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Blue boxing is now very hard in France. The Australian blue box
|
||
|
ceased to work and a lot of phreakers couldn't phreak anymore.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The real problem in France is that nobody (or almost nobody) knows how
|
||
|
the France Telecom phone network works so we can't really use any flaws
|
||
|
in this system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Calling cards have been heavily used in France, placing the country
|
||
|
in the top ten consumers of stolen CC's. When AT&T & MCI saw that,
|
||
|
they contacted France Telecom and now each calling card from AT&T, MCI
|
||
|
can't call back to France.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Moreover, FT's CC called "Carte France Telecom" (CFT or CP) is traced and
|
||
|
recorded: I mean, when the person who owns the CFT receives the bill,
|
||
|
written on the bill is the number of the caller and of the called party.
|
||
|
|
||
|
HARD isn't it?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Recently, some busts were done on AT&T and MCI CC users. They are now
|
||
|
awaiting trial.
|
||
|
|
||
|
VI- Magazines
|
||
|
---------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Back before 1990 a magazine was published twice and sent to every
|
||
|
single university in France. It was called "Hackito" from the
|
||
|
"Hackito ergo sum" motto. (I've never found an issue of it, but if you have
|
||
|
one, send me it to me in email.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
There is also this shitty zine called Chaos...
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Now, a new zine is making the underground react in France:
|
||
|
It's called "N0 Way" and I'm the Editor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This magazine is written entirely in French. The current issue is number 3.
|
||
|
Anyone wanting to submit something to "N0 Way" can send me a message in Email.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Today we are seeing a lot of people in France wanting to know more about
|
||
|
hacking. It seems to have taken off here but not as much as in Holland or
|
||
|
in the USA.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Email me to receive "N0 Way": an133729@anon.penet.fi
|
||
|
|
||
|
++NeurAlien.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Italian Scene
|
||
|
by
|
||
|
Zero Uno
|
||
|
|
||
|
Italy, as you know, is among the industrialized EEC powers. It deserves
|
||
|
this honor only to the work of talented people, not by its government,
|
||
|
which is utterly idiot and totally unable to fulfill the needs of the people.
|
||
|
This characteristic inevitably has conditioned the whole telecommunication
|
||
|
market, both phone and networks, which must make clever long term decisions,
|
||
|
something that Italian government is not able to do. The phone company is
|
||
|
owned by the government through Italy Telecom (IT), the new society formed by
|
||
|
the previous three state-owned firms involved in communications. In the
|
||
|
last five years IT has undoubtedly made good work, but the quality of phone
|
||
|
connections and service was so bad in the past, that many people feel very
|
||
|
upset when comes to talk to IT.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Telephone System
|
||
|
|
||
|
Italy is divided in 220 telephone districts, each with its own unique
|
||
|
prefix: a zero followed by a number (up to three digits). In addition there
|
||
|
are a few special prefixes in order to access cellular phones (0335,0336) or
|
||
|
to reach some 'fake' locations (0769), like many tv programs that use the
|
||
|
telephone to reach people. (Like 555 in the USA) In this way IT protects
|
||
|
itself from line congestions when successful TV-progs are involved. All
|
||
|
kind of modern connections are availabl. This means that payphones, pagers,
|
||
|
cellulars (ETACS and GSM), radio (an old, now unsupported phone for cars in
|
||
|
400 Mhz range) are present. Another strange beast is televoting (0869) a fake
|
||
|
prefix that holds the number of incoming calls for polls. It was used to
|
||
|
test some political decisions, but the hack here was so evident (the redial
|
||
|
button) that now televote is not so well thought of.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Standard Numbering
|
||
|
|
||
|
The numbers that begins with the digit '1' are reserved for special services.
|
||
|
This include all amenities like emergency numbers (113, roughly the equivalent
|
||
|
of American 911), 187 (an all-but-everything number for all requests to IT,
|
||
|
such ordering a new phone, installing a new line and so on) and toll free
|
||
|
numbers 167[0 or 8] xxxxx. As a reminder about IT's long term planning
|
||
|
capacity, the toll free numbers started as 1678-xxxxx, but were so successful
|
||
|
that IT was forced to add the 1670-xxxxx later |-(! All 1678-7xxxx are in
|
||
|
use by foreign phone companies, and heavily scanned |-).
|
||
|
|
||
|
Some pretty numbers:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1678-72341 A promo for a XXX-rated line (in north or south america)
|
||
|
1678-70152 See the following capture
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------------- CAPTURE -------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
|
||
|
ͻ
|
||
|
FAMNET (sm)
|
||
|
|
||
|
AFAS HQ
|
||
|
and
|
||
|
AF FSCs
|
||
|
|
||
|
ͼ
|
||
|
|
||
|
This system is for the use of authorized users ONLY. Individuals using this
|
||
|
computer system without authority, or in access of their authority, are subject
|
||
|
to having all of their activities on this system monitored and recorded by
|
||
|
system personnel. In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using
|
||
|
this system, or in the course of system maintenance, the activities of
|
||
|
authorized users may also be monitored. Anyone using the system expressly
|
||
|
consents to such monitoring and is advised that such monitoring reveals
|
||
|
possible evidence of criminal activity, system personnel may provide the
|
||
|
evidence of such monitoring to law enforcement officials.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Line trace initialized...........................................
|
||
|
|
||
|
We now have your phone number......WE TRACK HACKERS AND ADVISE AUTHORITIES.
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------- END OF CAPTURE --------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unfortunately IT does not support caller ID, so the last sentence is pure
|
||
|
crap.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The above numbers are (obviously) all public. These ones are 'reserved'
|
||
|
for internal use, though many many people play with 'em:
|
||
|
|
||
|
135 BBS to record maintenance procedures
|
||
|
138 BBS or human operator (depend on districts)
|
||
|
1372 Ring-back
|
||
|
1391 Human operator
|
||
|
160 Security service (???)
|
||
|
1414 A yet-to-be-implemented service, that enables a user
|
||
|
to use one phone and bill on their own phone the
|
||
|
subsequent call. Will be implemented |-)?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Not all districts support this, and since they are not public they can change
|
||
|
rapidly. Also present are the country direct numbers in the 1721xxx format.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Country Code
|
||
|
-----------------------------
|
||
|
Argentina 054
|
||
|
Brazil 055
|
||
|
Chile 056
|
||
|
AT&T 011
|
||
|
MCI 022
|
||
|
Sprint 877
|
||
|
|
||
|
Services Offered
|
||
|
|
||
|
With the advent of digital COs, 'new' (new to the Italian market, anyway)
|
||
|
services were provided. The so called STS (additional telephone services)
|
||
|
allowing (obviously paying) the teleconference (three user talking
|
||
|
simultaneously), incoming call signal when you are talking with another
|
||
|
party, and finally calling transfer, useful when you are away from home.
|
||
|
The current pulses billed can be inquired (paying one pulse, obviously!).
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Packet Networks
|
||
|
|
||
|
There is only one packet network provider, ITAPAC (DNIC 2222). As with other
|
||
|
packet networks, the access is available with a PAD that accepts only NUI
|
||
|
accounts (non-reverse charging) and those who accept reverse-charge calls
|
||
|
(in ITAPAC lingo, the 'easy way'). These are heavily hacked because it is
|
||
|
the most widespread network in Italy (and the most unreliable, insecure, *bad*)
|
||
|
and also because some NUI users simply were not aware of the costs of this kind
|
||
|
of service, and they have payed all the phreakers' bills too!
|
||
|
|
||
|
Sometimes, for promotional sales, some NUIs were discharged to the public.
|
||
|
Other were disseminated by phreakers, collected by PAD (only a few NUIs are
|
||
|
valid across different PADs, most aren't). Until some time ago QSD France
|
||
|
was the most 'in' PAD site. Another common activity was surfing across
|
||
|
Packet Networks of different states. Now many common NUIs were deleted from
|
||
|
system, but some still survive. Many times the net is unusable because
|
||
|
has reached its maximum load or because of for system outages. Also, even
|
||
|
if the ports run at 2400 bps, is not uncommon to reach the same speed of a
|
||
|
1200 bps connection. Use it if you don't pay or pay a limited fee for it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The H/P/C/V Scene
|
||
|
|
||
|
Common folklore depicts Italians as adaptable to unfriendly environments in
|
||
|
a clever way. Although these rumors are not completely true, there is an
|
||
|
Italian way of H/P/C/V. Hacking in Italy is not a common activity. There
|
||
|
are several teens who spent lot of effort to learn some tricks, but they
|
||
|
are teens, with all pros and cons. Rarely do these individuals survive the
|
||
|
20 years-old barrier, for one reason or another. Those who survive generally
|
||
|
self-limit their actions to a restricted area, and generally remain anonymous.
|
||
|
The few that remain are the brightest, with lot of know-how and abilities.
|
||
|
I only know two people at this top rank level. Hacking is focused on setting
|
||
|
up unauthorized fsp sites in university computers, removing licenses to pro
|
||
|
warez and gaining illicit access to some resources in internet or in ITAPAC.
|
||
|
ITAPAC is now no longer a key issue since ITAPAC (and Italy in general) has
|
||
|
very few computing resources, and ITAPAC has severe security problems, so it
|
||
|
is predated by hacker wannabees. Also Italy lacks of H/P groups like
|
||
|
LOD,MOD and the CCC. Apart from Omega Team, to my knowledge no other group
|
||
|
has existed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Phreaking used to be fairly common, but now is much less so because of
|
||
|
new digital COs and stricter security. Blue boxing to USA was *very* common
|
||
|
until January 1, 1992. On this date, the software that controls the traffic
|
||
|
over North America was changed, and boxing to USA is no longer possible.
|
||
|
Carding now is the only phreak access, and is used mainly by warez board
|
||
|
sysops. Rumors said that the software update was imposed on ITALCABLE (that
|
||
|
manages international calls) by AT&T due to the *huge* illicit traffic between
|
||
|
Italy-USA. Basically, too many people, even non H/P ones ('friends of
|
||
|
friends') were using blue-boxes even without the faintest idea of how they
|
||
|
worked. Some hackers have sold boxes to normal people, and this probably was
|
||
|
the key to the blocking of illicit calls. Now, to my knowledge, is possible
|
||
|
to box only to Chile, Argentina and some other third-world countries.
|
||
|
|
||
|
True H/P BBS are few. One, Pier Group's BBS was the most famous, in part
|
||
|
because one member, MFB (short for MF the Best, basically the best Italian
|
||
|
phreaker in my opinion), has written a series of humorous stories about
|
||
|
hackers and lamerz, that had a phenomenal success. But since Pier (the
|
||
|
sysop) was also invloved in some other illegal activities apart phreaking
|
||
|
(stolen hardware, carding), and in this kind of activity too much advertising
|
||
|
equals certain arrest, the board went down. Most other BBS are
|
||
|
warez-oriented, with warez from THG, Razor 1911 and other USA crack groups.
|
||
|
Note however that unlike other nations, Italy has no group HQs: what counts
|
||
|
is money, not being part of a group. Many BBS are double-sided: one a ligit,
|
||
|
more or less lame, part of a legal net like FidoNET, the other accessible only
|
||
|
to subscribers, with warez. This has changed however since the Italian Hacker
|
||
|
Crackdown. This is not because the police raided the warez boardz (they are
|
||
|
too ignorant to do this) but because warez sysops, in fear of being caught,
|
||
|
have (temporarily) closed their BBSes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Virusing has some players, though not very publicized, for obvious reasons.
|
||
|
One has recently become famous (Dr. Revenge) for his contributions to
|
||
|
Insane Reality, another H/P/V journal that published some 'secret'
|
||
|
telephone numbers for United Kingdom officials.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Nothing really new in Italy, as you can see. Newspapers are (as are most
|
||
|
people) too ignorant to correctly report these problems, with the result being
|
||
|
that the 'legal' portion of network fanatics fear other unjustified police
|
||
|
raids, and legislators are becoming very unfriendly when dealing with this
|
||
|
kind of communication. Several politicians and media moguls are proposing
|
||
|
laws that forbid anonymous access to the Net, and universities are very
|
||
|
concerned about these subjects. Two students were recently arrested because
|
||
|
they used illicit (but almost public) passwords to surf the net (*only* to
|
||
|
see things, *no* data damage).
|
||
|
|
||
|
Italy may one day become very unfriendly to net people, even if Italians are
|
||
|
generally considered very friendly.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Zero Uno
|
||
|
mc1671@mclink.it *only* using PGP, otherwise no response.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
||
|
Version: 2.3
|
||
|
|
||
|
mQCNAi7zXJ0AAAEEAM3SZQp0+By7fi7ey/oiTU6TT5CdMYdkYnkDeM8f2bZ75Pdp
|
||
|
4mv9C0BTVRP0UrYgJO1I+8YrwvSjZK7+U3hty+c97RJ5lnSYQ0BbF7puSwhUxj4W
|
||
|
AyytlQZVP6j1r4H8ulse1arIVlD9h2+GceXOx09J5uEqqhRG/uo1W3A51ixFAAUR
|
||
|
tBtaZXJvIFVubyA8bWMxNjcxQG1jbGluay5pdD4=
|
||
|
=9GnS
|
||
|
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
THE DANISH SCENE BY LE CERVEAU
|
||
|
|
||
|
In the last issue of Phrack (46) I read an article about the Danish
|
||
|
Computer Underground. Though, I was pleased with the text, a lot of
|
||
|
stuff has happened since which I hope most of you have heard about.
|
||
|
Anyway, here's an update..
|
||
|
|
||
|
In short, most (nearly all..) of the Inner Circle hackers in Denmark
|
||
|
have been busted. It all went down December 1993 where I,
|
||
|
Descore (Zephyr), Dixie (Nitecrawler) were busted at exactly the same
|
||
|
time. After the 3 busts several more followed: WedLock, Netrunner,
|
||
|
Darkman + some others. I had to spend 14 days in isolation while the
|
||
|
others were released (somewhat due to my own stupidity).
|
||
|
|
||
|
The busts were made because all of the universities in DK had been
|
||
|
more or less taken over by hackers and the FBI + CERT & ASSIST
|
||
|
worked together. The police told me that UNI*C was threatened to be
|
||
|
cut off the Internet if the hacking from Denmark didn't stop (don't
|
||
|
think that's the truth though. They bullshit alot..).
|
||
|
|
||
|
So, of course the Danish police had to do something and they asked
|
||
|
the infamous Joergen Bo Madsen for help. And they got it. And the
|
||
|
situation in DK was getting out of control too - the Phone Company
|
||
|
was hacked, DK's main research center hacked. No damage to ANYTHING
|
||
|
was done though, but naturally we had to be stopped. Actually, the
|
||
|
Phone Cmp. screwed up their own system trying to stop us - and now
|
||
|
they blame us!
|
||
|
|
||
|
Now we're all awaiting trial. It might take a while, since they
|
||
|
said they'd start 'breaking' the PGP-encrypted files with UNI*C's
|
||
|
computers ;).... I'd think if they did that, it'd be quite a while
|
||
|
before trials!
|
||
|
|
||
|
Busted in DK: Zephyr aka Descore, Dixie, WedLock, Netrunner,
|
||
|
Darkman, Lazarus, Jackal and me (LC).. + Joshua -
|
||
|
some idiot who might have helped the police a whole lot.
|
||
|
|
||
|
After the bust of Jackal the police says they can't handle anymore so
|
||
|
there won't be any.
|
||
|
|
||
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
BUSTED
|
||
|
BY LE CERVEAU
|
||
|
|
||
|
I've been busted. Why speak out loud? Why not? I'm screwed anyway.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I was stunned. About six-seven months before my bust I succeeded in
|
||
|
breaking into a Pentagon computer (pentagon-emh4.army.mil -->
|
||
|
otjag.army.mil). What actually launched my interest in this computer
|
||
|
was a file about UFOs where it was listed. Now I have realized that had
|
||
|
I found anything top secret about UFO cover-ups I probably wouldn't have
|
||
|
released it. It wants to be free - but the question is to what degree..
|
||
|
I knew of course that it couldn't be one of their top secret computers
|
||
|
(actually, OTJAG=Office of The Judge Attorney General - AFAIR) but I
|
||
|
also knew that it would be the start of something big - one thing
|
||
|
always leads to another.
|
||
|
|
||
|
After a couple of weeks on the system, doing nothing but leeching
|
||
|
all the mail I could get my hands on I discovered that one of the
|
||
|
majors used an Air Force base-server (flite.jag.af.mil - AFAIR). As
|
||
|
I suspected, all I had to find was his login - the password was
|
||
|
exactly the same. And again this had to lead to more and it did.
|
||
|
I found some stupid sergeant who also was a user on TACOM
|
||
|
(Tank Automotive COMmand). Surely, even though stupid he wouldn't
|
||
|
use the same.. - yup, he did. Access to tacom-emh1.army.mil and
|
||
|
all their other machines granted. If you want one of the
|
||
|
largest lists of MilNet sites then grab /etc/hosts from TACOM.
|
||
|
After gaining SU-access on this machine interesting things started
|
||
|
happening. If, for example, an officer was to issue some order (of
|
||
|
course not any orders concerning war) it'd look something like
|
||
|
this:
|
||
|
|
||
|
You have to report at HQ Monday latest. Your travelling plans
|
||
|
for the international conference <blah> <blah> <blah>..
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Signed //
|
||
|
Col. Joe Wilkins
|
||
|
|
||
|
and then some more approved signatures would follow by some
|
||
|
other persons. Of course I grabbed all the mail on TACOM.
|
||
|
|
||
|
After a month or so I was locked out of the Pentagon system -
|
||
|
and it changed it's address to otjag.army.mil. But I didn't
|
||
|
really care. I knew MilNet pretty good so why not I thought..
|
||
|
|
||
|
I started thinking military-systems only - a dangerous thing
|
||
|
to do. I ended up using all my time on it and was therefore
|
||
|
also rewarded. Soon I would have access to more than 30 military
|
||
|
systems around the globe and I knew I was getting in over my head
|
||
|
but I had to keep going - I felt there was no way back. I could
|
||
|
have told myself that having to hide on all of these systems
|
||
|
would be almost impossible. But things seemed to be going just fine.
|
||
|
Just how idiotic can you get?
|
||
|
|
||
|
With access to some CM-5's and a CM-200 at Naval Research Labs
|
||
|
and all the wordfiles in the world no system stupid enough to
|
||
|
let their passwd-file get taken stood a chance - one account with
|
||
|
encrypted passwd was enough. All I had to do was start Crack on
|
||
|
the CM-200 and wait.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I took interest in some of the government machines - they weren't
|
||
|
as hard to hack as the mil's and I soon lost interest. Except in
|
||
|
NASA. I got in on one of their smaller machines (*.gsfc.nasa.
|
||
|
gov) and I knew I just had to wait and it would lead to something
|
||
|
more.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Now 'strange' things started happening. Imagine this: I log in
|
||
|
on TACOM. I log out. When I try to log in again it's impossible
|
||
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from the same site; I have to use another - that's when I knew
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that someone was watching my every step, trying to stop me. Later
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it started happening to me no matter how I accessed the nets. That's
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when I knew the end was near. A month later I was busted by
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the FBI in Denmark - that's the way I feel even though it was the
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Danish police. Actually, the trace was made through *.wwb.noaa.gov
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which I was using a while for cracking.
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That's my story - very shortened! If anyone is interested in details
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mail me at Restricted Access # +45-36703060.
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Last Words: Don't do it - don't do it.. It'll get you into all kinds of
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shit.. Why bother the nice governments and their so trustworthy agencies?
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On second thought: Just do it!
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[Editors note: Along with this file I was sent a capture of one of
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the aforementioned hacks (which I promptly deleted). It looked like
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our Danish friends were in a host at the office of the Judge Advocate
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General. Knowing how the JAG is going to handle cases isn't exactly
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the kind of thing anyone in the military really wants floating around.
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I guess they need better security, eh? ]
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