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384 lines
18 KiB
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384 lines
18 KiB
Text
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---[ Phrack Magazine Volume 8, Issue 52 January 26, 1998, article 14 of 20
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-------------------------[ The International Crime Syndicate Association
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--------[ Dorathea Demming
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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= ICSA =
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= International Computer Security Association =
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= or =
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= International Crime Syndicate Association? =
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= by =
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= Dorathea Demming =
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= (c) Dorathea Demming, October, 1997 =
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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This is an article about computer criminals. I'm not talking about the fun
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loving kids of the Farmers of Doom [FOD], the cool pranksters of the Legion of
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Doom [LOD], or even the black-tie techno terrorists of The New Order [TNO].
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I'm talking about professional computer criminals. I'm talking about the
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types of folks that go to work every day and make a living by ripping off
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guileless corporations. I'm talking about the International Computer Security
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Association [ICSA]. The ICSA has made more money off of computer fraud than
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the other three organizations mentioned above combined.
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ICSA was previously known as National Computer Security Association [NCSA].
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It seems that they finally discovered that there are networks and gullible
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corporations in countries other than the United States.
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In this article I will inform you of the cluelessness and greed of ICSA.
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Instead of telling you, I will let them tell you in their own words.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Lets look at what the NSCA has to say about it's history:
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"the company was founded in 1989 to provide independent and
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objective services to a rapidly growing and often confusing
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digital security marketplace through a market-driven, for-profit
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consortium model."
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This is where the ICSA differs from real industry organizations like the IEEE.
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Non-profit organizations like the IEEE can provide independent and objective
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services, for-profit organizations like ICSA cannot be trusted to do so.
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The goal of the NSCA is profit, nothing more and nothing less.
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Profit is a desirable goal in a business. However, the ICSA pretends to be
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an industry association. This is a complete and total fabrication. ICSA is
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not an industry association -- it is a for-profit enterprise that competes for
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business directly with the companies it pretends to help.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at the ICSA's knowledge of computer security:
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"Early computer security issues focused on virus protection. "
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This is where the ICSA accidentally informs us if their true history. No one
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with half of a clue would claim that "Early computer security issues focused
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on virus protection." In reality, early computer security issues focused on
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the protection of mainframe systems. Virus protection did not become a
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concern until the 1980's. We can only conclude that no one at the ICSA has a
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background in computer security outside of personal computer security. These
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folks seem to be Unix illiterate -- not to speak of VM, MVS, OS/400, AOS/VS,
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VMS or a host of other systems where corporations store vast amounts of data.
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Focusing primarily on PC security will not benefit the overall security
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posture of your organization.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at another baseless claim of the ISCA:
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"ICSA consortia facilitate an open exchange of information among
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security industry product developers and security service
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providers within narrow, but well defined segments of the
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computer security industry."
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According to the "security industry product developers and security service
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providers" that I have spoken with, this is complete hogwash. The word on the
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street is that the ICSA folks collect information and then give nothing useful
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in return. My response is "How could they?" No one at ICSA has any
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information to offer. You would do as well to ask your 12 year old daughter
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for information about computer security -- and you might even do better, if
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your daughter reads Phrack.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at what the ICSA has to say about their Web Certification program:
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"The ICSA Web Certification materially reduces web site risks
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and liability for both operator and visitor by providing,
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verifying and improving the use of logical, physical and
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operational baseline security standards and practices."
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"Comprised of a detailed certification field guide, on-site
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evaluation, remote test, random spot checks, and an evolving set
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of endorsed best practices, ICSA certification uniquely
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demonstrates management's efforts to assure site availability,
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information protection, and data integrity as well as enhanced
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user confidence and trust."
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What really happens is that ICSA sends out a reseller to your site. The
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reseller then asks you if you have set up your site correctly. You tell the
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reseller that you have, and then the reseller tells ICSA that you have set up
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your site correctly. Very few items are actually verified by the reseller.
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ICSA then runs ISS (Internet Security Scanner) against your web server. If ISS
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cannot detect any security vulnerabilities remotely, you receive ICSA Web
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Certification.
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For grilling your staff with a series of almost meaningless questions, the
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reseller receives $2,975 US dollars. For running ISS against your web server,
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ICSA receives $5,525. For $19. 95, you can buy a copy of Computer Security
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Basics by Deborah Russell and G.T. Gangemi Sr. (ISBN:0-937175-71-4) and save
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your company almost $8,500.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at the ICSA's Reseller Training:
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ICSA states that every reseller that delivers their product is trained in
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computer security. In practice, however, this training is actually _sales_
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training. The ICSA training course lasts for less than one day and is
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supposed to be conducted by two trainers, one sales person and one technical
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person. One recipient of this training told me that the technical person did
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not bother to show up for his training, while another recipient of this
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training told me that ICSA instead sent _two_ sales people and _no_ technical
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people to his training.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at what ICSA says about change in the "digital world" of
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firewalls:
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"The digital world moves far too quickly to certify only a
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particular version of a product or a particular incarnation of a
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system. Therefore, ICSA certification criteria and processes are
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designed so that once a product or system is certified, all
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future versions of the product (or updates of the system) are
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inherently certified."
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What does this mean to you? It means that ICSA is certifying firewalls
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running code that they have never seen. It means that if you purchase a
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firewall that has been ICSA certified -- you have no way of knowing if the
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version of the firewall product that is protecting your organization has ever
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been certified.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at how ICSA defends itself from such allegations? ISCA has
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three ready made defenses:
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"First, the ICSA gains a contractual commitment from the
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product vendor or the organization that owns or runs the
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certified system that the product or system will be maintained
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at the current, published ICSA certification standards. "
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So that's how ICSA certification works, the firewall vendors promise to write
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good code and ICSA gives them a sticker. This works fine with little children
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in Sunday school, but I wouldn't trust the security of my business to such a
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plan.
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"Secondly, ICSA or it's authorized partners normally perform
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random spot checking of the current product (or system) against
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current ICSA criteria for that certification category. "
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Except, of course, that an unnamed source within ICSA itself admitted that
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these spot checks are not actually being done. That's right, these spot
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checks exist only in the minds of the marketing staff of the ICSA. ICSA
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cannot manage to cover the costs of spot checking in their exorbitant fee
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structure. They must be spending the money instead on all of those free
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televisions they are giving away to their resellers.
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"Thirdly, ICSA certification is renewed annually. At renewal
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time, the full certification process is repeated for the current
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production system or shipping products against the current
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criteria. "
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Well here we have the final promise -- our systems will never out of
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certification for more than 364 days. If our firewall vendor ships three new
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releases a year -- at least one of them will go through the actual ICSA
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certification process. Of course, all of them will have the ICSA certification
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sticker.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's looks at what ICSA has to say about their procedures:
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"The certification criteria is not primarily based on
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fundamental design or engineering principles or on an assessment
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of underlying technology. In most cases, we strive to use a
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black-box approach. "
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Listen to what they are really saying here. They are admitting that their
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certification process does not deal with "fundamental design or engineering
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principles" or on an "assessment of underlying technology". What else is left
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to base a certification upon? Do they certify firewalls based upon the
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firewall vendors marketing brochures? Upon the color of their product boxes?
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Upon the friendliness of their sales staff? Or maybe they just certify anyone
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who gives them money.
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When you are clueless, every computer system must look like a "black-
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box" to you.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at how the ICSA web certification process deals with CGI
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vulnerabilities:
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"The Site Operator attest that CGIs have been reviewed by
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qualified reviewers against design criteria that affect
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security. " (sic)
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Let's take a close look at this. The #1 method of breaking into web servers
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is to attack a vulnerable CGI program. And the full extent that the ICSA
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certification deals with secure CGI programming is to have your staff attest
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that they have done a good job. What sort of employee would respond "Oh no,
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we haven't even looked at the security of those CGI bins?" The ICSA counts on
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employees trying to save their jobs to speed the certification process along
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to it's conclusion.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at what ICSA has to say about it's own thoroughness:
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"Because it is neither practical nor cost effective, ICSA does
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not test and certify every possible combination of web sites on
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a web server at various locations unless requested to, and
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compensated for, by Customer. "
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We all know that security is breached at it's weakest link, not it's
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strongest. If we choose to certify only some of our systems, we can only
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assume that attackers will them simply move on and attack our unprotected
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systems. Perhaps if ICSA did not attempt to extort $8,500 for a single web
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server certification, more customers could have all of their web sites
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certified.
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at how much faith ICSA puts in their own certifications:
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"Customer shall defend, indemnify, and hold ICSA harmless from
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and against any and all claims or lawsuits of any third party
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and resulting costs (including reasonable attorneys' fees),
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damages, losses, awards, and judgements based on any claim that
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a ICSA-certified server/site/system was insecure, failed to meet
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any security specifications, or was otherwise unable to
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withstand an actual or simulated penetration.
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In plain English, they are saying that if you get sued, you are on your own.
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But wait, their faithlessness does not stop there:
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at how the ICSA sees it's legal relationship with it's
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customers:
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"Customer, may, upon written notice and approval of ICSA, assume
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the defense of any claim or legal proceeding using counsel of
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it's choice. ICSA shall be entitled to participate in, but not
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control, the defense of any such action, with it's own counsel
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and at it's own expense: provided, that if ICSA, it its sole
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discretion, determines that there exists a conflict of interest
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between Customer and ICSA, ICSA shall have the right to engage
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separate counsel, the reasonable costs of which shall be paid by
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the customer. "
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What you, the customer, agree to when you sign up for ICSA certification is
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that you cannot even legally defend yourself in court until you have "written
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notice and approval of ICSA. " But it's even worse that that, ICSA then
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reserves the right to hire lawyers and bill YOU for the expense if it feels
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that you are not sufficiently protecting it's interests. Whose corporate
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legal department is going to okay a provision like this?
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Let's look at how much the ICSA attempts to charge for this garbage:
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===========================================================
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| Web Certification |
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| 1 Server $8,500 |
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| 2-4 Servers $7,650 |
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| 5 or more Servers $6,800 |
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| 6-10 DNS $ 495 |
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| 11 or more DNS $ 395 |
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| Perimeter Check |
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| up to 15 Devices $3,995 |
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| additional groups of 10 Devices $1,500 |
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| bi-monthly reports $1,000 |
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| monthly reports $3,500 |
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| War Dial |
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| first 250 phone lines $1,000 |
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| additional lines $3/line |
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| Per Diem |
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| Domestic $ 995 |
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| International $1,995 |
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===========================================================
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Certifying one web server will cost you $8,500. I have seen small web servers
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purchased, installed, and designed for less than that amount.
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If you tell the ICSA that you have 15 network devices visible on the Internet
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and they discover 16 devices, they will bill you an additional $1,500. This
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is what you agree to when you sign a ICSA Perimeter Check contract. In
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effect, when you sign up for an ICSA Perimeter Check, you are agreeing to pay
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unspecified fees.
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To dial an entire prefix the ICSA will charge you $30,250. I wonder if these
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folks are using ToneLoc. I wonder if these fools are even using modems...
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I will leave judgement on the per diem rates to the reader. How much would
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you pay for a clown to entertain at your daughters birthday party? Would you
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give the clown a daily per diem of $995? Why would you feel the ICSA clowns
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might deserve better? How do you spend $995 a day and still manage to put in
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some work hours?
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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These are just a few excerpts from some ICSA documentation I managed to get my
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hands on. I do not feel my assessment has been any more harsh than these
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people deserve. I am certain that if I had more of their literature, there
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would be even more flagrant examples of ignorance and greed.
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ICSA feeds on business people who are so ignorant as to fall for the ICSA
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propaganda. By masquerading as a legitimate trade organization, they make
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everyone in the data security industry look bad. By overcharging the
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clientele, they drain money from computer security budgets that could better
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be spent on securing systems and educating users. By selling certifications
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with no actual technical validity behind them they fool Internet users into a
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false sense of security when using e-commerce sites.
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ISCA is good for no one and it is good for nothing.
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Dorathea Demming
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Mechanicsburg, PA
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10 Oct, 1997
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----[ EOF
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