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491 lines
30 KiB
Text
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume 0x0e, Issue 0x44, Phile #0x10 of 0x13
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|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
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|=----------------------=[ Lines in the Sand: ]=-------------------------=|
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|=-----------=[ Which Side Are You On in the Hacker Class War ]=---------=|
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|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
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|=-------------------------=[ by Anonymous ]=----------------------------=|
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|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
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---
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With dramatically growing hacker and leaker activity paralleling the
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revolutionary upheavals around the world, we are increasingly hearing the
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rhetoric of "cyberwar" thrown around by governments attempting to maintain
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legitimacy and exercise more police-state powers. In talking about the
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FBI's priorities ten years after 9/11, FBI director Robert Mueller stated
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in a recent speech at the International Association of Chiefs of
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Police(IACP) conference that "the next threat will be cyber-based ...
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self-radicalized individuals using online resources and individuals
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planning cyber attacks" [21]. Although hackers made a mockery of Mueller
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and the IACP during the conference by defacing their websites, it is hard
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to believe that hackers are a bigger threat than the "terrorists". Still,
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this logic is being used to send many more billions of dollars into white
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hat pockets at private military and intelligence contracted corporations to
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develop better defensive and offensive technology. The US is also proposing
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several changes to the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, providing
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increased sentences (including mandantory minimums) as well as RICO Act
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classifications for computer hacking. For the most part, the increased
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hacker busts have largely targeted small-time defacers and DDoS kids
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allegedly affiliated with Anonymous - hardly the "foreign terrorist threat
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to critical infrastructure" used to justify the proposed increased
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penalties for hackers and increased cashflow to the security industry. But
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there's more than small timers at play: attacks against high profile
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institutions including law enforcement, military and corporate targets have
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escalated, becoming both more destructive as well as more politically
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articulate. We're experiencing the opening stages of the next Hacker Class
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War, and with many factions at play each operating with their own agenda
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and strategies, with more and more hackers breaking into shit for the rev
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or selling out to the military intelligence industrial complex, the
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question is asked "which side are you on"?
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U.S. military officials, eager to talk about how the Pentagon has boosted
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its computer defenses, often remain quiet when asked about its offensive
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Internet capabilities. A list of cyber capabilities-- available only to
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policymakers-- is described as ranging from planting a computer virus to
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bringing down electric grids [1]. This would not be possible if it were not
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for the assistance of computer hackers working directly or indirectly for
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the Department of Defense, as well as the tendency in our communities to
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support or tolerate those who choose to do so. Unfortunately, this
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mentality is frequently espoused by figureheads commonly quoted in
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mainstream news articles, where they claim to speak on behalf of the hacker
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community. Conversely, there has always been resentment from black hats and
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the criminally minded for the corporate sellouts who claim to be hackers
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but instead choose to protect systems against those who actually break into
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them. Much has been written about the corrupt white hats who work to
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protect vital infrastructure against other, more fun-loving hackers. Many
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lulz have been had over the years every time these big shots get owned and
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all of their emails and passwords are released in nicely formatted .txt
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files. Besides FBI collaborating fucks and security "professionals", it is
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time to call out the other emerging threat to the integrity of our scene:
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the US military's active effort to train and recruit hackers into aiding US
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cyber "defense" systems.
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With the passage of the 2012 Defense Authorization bill, the DoD has
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"express authority to conduct clandestine military activities in cyberspace
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in support of military operations". Reuters reports that "the Pentagon has
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put together a classified list of its offensive cyber capabilities so
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policymakers know their option". To what extent the US has already engaged
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in offensive electronic attacks is for the most part speculative. It is
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widely speculated that the US or Israeli military, or both cooperating,
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developed STUXNET to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities [2].
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To fill the need for skilled security people, the military operates several
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schools and training classes designed to turn young enlisted computer
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enthusiasts into skilled hackers. The US Military Academy in West Point, NY
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has an ACM SIGSAC chapter which teaches special classes on remote intrusion
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techniques and periodically hosts several live hacking competitions to
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"train and engage enlisted military, officer, or government-affiliated
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civilians". Last April, the West Point team was victorious over "veteran
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hackers from the NSA" at the 2011 Cyber Defense Exercise. Other military
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hacker teams such as ddtek (as led by Lt. Cmdr Chris Eagle who regularly
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speaks at DEFCON and Blackhat) also compete in civilian hacker tournaments
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such as DEFCON's CTF, usually dominating the competition by bringing dozens
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of Navy cybersecurity graduates [3][4]. No doubt many of these people will
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eventually be working at USCYBERCOM or other clandestine military hacker
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operations to launch attacks on behalf of the rich ruling class.
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The US government must not have too much faith in their enlisted hackers,
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because they collaborate with a variety of private companies and
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individuals to defend their networks as well as profiling, infiltrating and
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attacking their enemies. After LulzSec owned and leaked emails for the CEO
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of military-contracted security firm Unveillance and Infragard member Karim
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Hijazi, he was exposed to have been working with the DoD and the White
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House to not only profile "main hacking groups in Libya and their
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supporters" but also take the offensive and "map out Libya's Oil companies
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and their SCADA system's vulnerabilities" [5]. Even after Karim was owned
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and exposed he was willing to pay cash and offer his botnet to LulzSec to
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destroy his competitors, further revealing the white hat's corrupt and
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backstabbing nature as well as revealing how desperate and vulnerable the
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most powerful military in the world really is.
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Then there's Aaron Barr, the former CEO of HBGary Federal, who was served
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with swift and fierce justice-- being exposed for engaging in
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counter-intelligence operations attempting to disrupt both WikiLeaks (where
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he suggests "cyber attacks against the infrastructure to get data on
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document submitters") and Anonymous (where he cooperated with the FBI
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attempting to profile "key leaders") [6]. The leaked emails also reveal a
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bid to develop "persona management software" for the US military which is
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another COINTELPRO-type tool to spread propaganda by creating an army of
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fake twitter, facebook, blog, forum accounts to subvert democracy and
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manipulate public opinion. Although Barr/HBGary and
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Karim/Unveillance/Infragard have been exposed and humiliated, the
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implications of what has been released involving their work demonstrate a
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frightening and possibly illegal conspiracy between private security
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corporations collaborating with government and military to silence and
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disrupt their political opponents.
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Despite the obvious failures of their affiliates, the military continues to
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try to draw talent from independent hackers. DARPA made a public offering
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to hackerspaces in the US to do "research designed to help give the U.S.
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government tools needed to protect against cyberattacks". The program
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Cyber-Insider (CINDER) is headed by Peiter "Mudge" Zatko [7] who-- like
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many of us-- used to be a teenage hacker associated with the Cult of the
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Dead Cow and old-school hacker space l0pht. Peiter eventually "went
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straight" when they formed security consulting firm @Stake which was later
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acquired by Symantec. Now he's completed the vicious circle from teenage
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hacker to "security professional" to full blown military employment,
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serving as an example to aspiring hackers as what NOT to do. Mudge has now
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been speaking at hacker conferences like Schmoocon as well as various DARPA
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Industry Day events in an attempt to recruit more hackers into the DARPA
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fold. Hackerspaces, which are becoming a growing trend not only in the US
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but also internationally, are often strapped for cash to pay rent or
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purchase equipment, and because of unique problem-solving skills and a DIY
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hacker ethic are being looked at by employers in both private and
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government fields. Unfortunately, many hackerspaces are "non-political"
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and are mostly composed of people more interested in a career than the
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hacker ethic, making many especially vulnerable to pressure to do research
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for the military or inform on other hackers to law enforcement.
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Hackerspaces aren't unique for being wishy-washy and apathetic in this
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regard: hackers in the US have a long history of big names going federal.
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Adrian Lamo, once known as the "homeless hacker" after turning himself in
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for breaking into several high profile news websites, is now universally
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hated as the dirty snitch who turned in alleged WikiLeaks leaker Bradley
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Manning. Despite this, Adrian still openly affiliates with 2600-- running
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their facebook group, making occasional appearances on IRC, and most
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recently being invited to speak on a panel at the 2010 HOPE convention.
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Then there's Kevin Mitnick-- whose social engineering skills somehow
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qualify him as some sort of spokesperson for hackers-- who has resigned
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himself (like so many others) to the "industry" doing professional security
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consulting and making big bucks giving speeches and signing books at
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conferences (and like so many others he has become a target of black hats
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who have repeatedly owned his servers and released his private emails and
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passwords) Jeff "The Dark Tangent" Moss, who for more than a decade headed
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the "largest underground hacking convention" DEFCON and the
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grossly-misnamed Black Hat Briefings ended up working for the Department of
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Homeland Security. Then Oxblood Ruffin from the "underground" group Cult
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of the Dead Cow (which was also owned hard by black hats) runs his mouth on
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Twitter claiming "ownership" of the term "hacktivism" while repeatedly
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denouncing other hackers(specifically "black hats" and "anonymous") who
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break into and attack systems, going so far as to sign a joint statement by
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cDc, 2600, l0pht, CCC and others condemning Legion Of The Underground's
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attacks against the Iraqi government for human and civil rights abuses [8].
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Another more recent example of treachory in the hacker community is the
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case of 'security consultant' Thomas Ryan (aka frogman) who infiltrated and
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released internal mailing list communications for the NYC Occupy Wallstreet
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protesters. For months he worked his way in, gaining access and trust,
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while at the same time forwarding protest plans to the FBI and several news
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organizations, eventually dumping everything to right-winger Andrew
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Breitbart's website as "proof" of "illegal anarchist activities". In the
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same files he released he accidentally included his own correspondence with
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the FBI and news organizations (some "security professional"). Thomas
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Ryan's white hat and right-wing leanings were rather well known in hacker
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circles, as well as his social engineering exploits (he previously spoke at
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the "black hat briefings" about his experiences tricking dozens of
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government employees and security cleared professionals by using a fake
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profile of an attractive and skilled woman named "Robin Sage":
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unfortunately he did not dump any private or embarassing information on his
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white hat brethren). Certainly the primary point of failure for OWS was
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poor security culture, trusting an already well-known reactionary white hat
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to their internal communications and protest details (a weakness of an
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open-source movement as opposed to closed private collectives composed of
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vouched-in members). However when this betrayal falls from our own hacker
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tree, we need to take responsibility and discourage future treachory (like
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how Aaron Barr was served by Anonymous).
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Then there's 2600 which is composed of several separate communities
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including the local meetups, the magazine, Off The Hook, and the IRC
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community. To be fair, Eric Corley is somewhat friendly to the interests of
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hackers, supporting digital rights, criticizing the police state, and being
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generally left-leaning. But upon closer inspection you'll find a very
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disturbing militaristic anti-wikileaks, anti-EFF and straight up
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anti-hacker mentality held by many of the people involved: half the ops on
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2600net have no problem openly bragging about working for the military or
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collaborating with law enforcement. Just like ten years ago in their
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condemnation of LoU, 2600 released a statement in December condemning
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Anonymous ddos attacks against the banks and credit card corporations that
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were ripping off WikiLeaks [9] (a tactic that is nothing more than a
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digital version of a sit-in, a respected tradition of civil disobedience in
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US politics). Using the 2600 name to condemn Anonymous actions not only
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undermines our work but creates the false impression that the hacker
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community does not support actions against PayPal in support of Wikileaks.
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More than six months later, the FBI carried out raids at the homes of
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several dozen alleged Anonymous "members" who were purportedly involved
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with carrying out the LOIC attacks against PayPal. In light of how dozens
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of people (who may not even have been involved at all) may be facing
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decades in prison for some bogus trumped up federal conspiracy charges,
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what kind of credibility should be given to 2600 who clearly has no regard
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for practicing solidarity with hackers facing unjust persecution?
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The 2600net IRC network itself is run by a DoD-cleared, Infragard-trained
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"r0d3nt" named Andrew Strutt who works for a military-contracted company
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and has in the past openly admitted to working with law enforcement to bust
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people he claims were running botnets and distributing child porn. Andrew
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Strutt's interview for GovExec.com [10] read: "'I've had to work hard to
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build up trust,' Strutt adds that he doesn't disclose his identity as a
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hacker to the people he refers to as his handlers. And he doesn't advertise
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to hackers that he works for the .mil or .gov community either". Most
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recently, r0d3nt voluntarily complied with a grand jury subpoena where he
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gave up the shell server "pinky" to the feds and kept quiet about it for
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months [11]. The shell server had several hundred accounts from other
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members of the 2600 community who now have the displeasure of knowing that
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law enforcement forensics are going through all their files and
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.bash_history logs. Strutt kept this a secret from everybody for months
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(complying with a clearly illegal "gag order") and has since been very
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vague about details, refusing to answer questions as to the specifics of
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the investigation except that law enforcement was looking for "a certain
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user"'s activity on the box. Of course it is reckless and stupid to use a
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community shell server to carry out attacks putting other users on the box
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in danger, but this is something you should be prepared for well ahead of
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time if you put yourself in such a place. Many ISPs that host websites and
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listservs for radicals and hackers not only have a clearly defined privacy
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policy reducing the amount of personally identifiable information on the
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box, but also have a "will not comply" statement that says they will never
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voluntarily give up the box. This was demonstrated in November 2009 where
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IndyMedia.us received a similar gag order and subpoena asking for log files
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on the server (which never existed in the first place). The folks there
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immediately got the EFF involved and publicly announced the government's
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unjust fishing expedition, saying they had no plans on complying. In the
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end, nothing was given up and the gag order was found to be
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unconstitutional [12].
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Why do many of the big name hackers that are seen as role models end up
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being feds and corporate sellouts, and why are these people still welcomed
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and tolerated in the scene? Eric Corley of 2600 estimated that a quarter of
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hackers in the US are FBI informants [13], which is unfortunately an
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astonishingly high figure compared to other fields. Experienced criminals
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who have done prison time will tell you that the code of the street is
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don't trust anybody and don't rat. If you ask many younger hackers,
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they'll casually joke about breaking into systems in their youth but if
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they ever grow up or get busted they'll be working for the government.
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Dealing with the devil never ends up well for anyone involved: all they
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want to do is bust other hackers, and in the end after using and abusing
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their informants they often kick them to the curb.
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Albert Gonzales (aka "soupnazi", "cumbajohnny", and "segvec") became an
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informant after he was busted in NYC for credit card fraud and was paid
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$75,000 to infiltrate carding websites like ShadowCrew. Despite his
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cooperation with the Secret Service where he sent several dozen hackers and
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fraudsters to prison as part of Operation Firewall, the feds STILL indicted
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Gonzales on some fresh credit card fraud charges of his own and sent his
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rat ass away for several decades. Unfortunately one of the people roped
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into Gonzales' web of deception was the notorious black hat Stephen Watt
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"the unix terrorist" who helped write old school zines like el8 and left a
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trail of mail spools, ownage logs, and rm'd servers of the most respected
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"security professionals" in the industry. Watt was never even charged with
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participating in any of Gonzales' money schemes but simply wrote some
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common packet sniffing code called 'blabla' which was supposedly used to
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help intercept credit card transactions in TJX's networks, demonstrating
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how depraved and desperate the feds are to make quotas and inflate the
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threat of hacker fraud artists in the media [14].
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While many support our fallen hacker comrades like the Unix Terrorist, we
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still hear a startling line of thought coming out of the infosec community.
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Ask around at your 2600 meeting or hackerspace and you'll hear a
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condemnation of imprisoned hackers as being nothing more than criminals
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along with a monologue comparable to politicians, police officers and the
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media: don't break into other people's systems, don't ddos, don't drop dox
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and if you find a vulnerability, "please please report it to the vendor so
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it could be patched." To think this mentality is being perpetuated by
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people who wave the hacker flag is disgusting and undermines the work that
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many legit hackers have fought and went to prison for.
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Because so many who claim to represent hackers end up working for the very
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corrupt and oppressive institutions that other hackers are fighting
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against, it is time to draw lines in the sand. If you are military, law
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enforcement or informant, work for a DOD contracted company or a private
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security firm hired to bust other hackers or protect the infrastructure we
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aim to destroy, you are no comrade of ours. This is 2011, the year of leaks
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and revolutions, and every day we hear about riots around the world, and
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how major corporations and government systems are getting owned by hackers.
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The papers have been describing recent events as a "cyberwar" (or more
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accurately, a "hacker class war") and the way the attacks have become more
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frequent and more damaging, this is not much of an exaggeration.
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It is impossible to talk about contemporary hacktivism without mentioning
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Anonymous, LulzSec and Antisec. Responsible for dramatically raising the
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stakes of this "war," they have adopted an increasingly explicit
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anti-government and anti-capitalist stance. The decentralized model in
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which Anonymous operates parallels every successful guerrilla warfare
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campaign waged throughout revolutionary history. In just a few months, they
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have taken aim at the CIA, the United States Senate, Infragard, Sony, NATO,
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AT&T, Viacom, Universal, IRCFederal, Booz Allen, Vanguard Defense
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Industries, as well as Texas, Missouri, Alabama, Arizona, Boston, and other
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police departments -- dropping massive username/password lists,
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confidential law enforcement documents, personal email correspondence and
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more. The latest campaign -- "Operation Antisecurity" -- is designed to
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unite other hacker groups, tipping their hats to old school antisec days
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while bringing more attention to anti-government black hat politics as has
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never before seen [15]. Although the attack methods being utilized have
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been relatively primitive-- ranging from common web application
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vulnerabilities like RFI/LFI and SQL injection, to brute force DDOS and
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botnet attacks-- there are signs that their attack methodology is becoming
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more sophisticated, especially as talent from allied hacker crews becomes
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involved. Additionally choice of targets are going after our bigger
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enemies: while past incarnations of antisec have humiliated many well-known
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sellouts in the computer security industry, today's blackhats are not
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scared to hit higher profile figures in law enforcement, military, and
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governments most notably by mercilessly dropping usernames, passwords, home
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addresses and phones, and social security numbers to tens of thousands of
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police and military officials.
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As hackers continue to expose and attack corruption, law enforcement will
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desperately continue to try to make high-profile arrests regardless of
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actual guilt or association. Especially as politicians continue to try to
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classify hacktivism as an act of cyber-terrorism (which can be retaliated
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against as traditional acts of war [16]), the threat of prison is very real
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and people should be well prepared ahead of time for all possible
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repercussions for their involvement. We should not, however, let the fear
|
||
|
of government repression scare us into not taking action; instead, we
|
||
|
should strengthen our movement by practicing better security culture and
|
||
|
working to support other hackers who get busted in the line of duty. Even
|
||
|
though there are plenty of guides out there on how to become "anonymous",
|
||
|
many mistakes have already been made: trusting the mentally unstable 19
|
||
|
year old Ryan Cleary to run the LulzSec IRC server, for example. Even
|
||
|
before he was actively cooperating with the feds after being arrested in a
|
||
|
joint US-UK operation, Ryan was already known to double-cross other
|
||
|
hackers, having posted IP information of hundreds of anonops IRC users
|
||
|
[17][18]. Although it's righteous to out snitches and movement traitors to
|
||
|
the public, doxing other hackers involved in the struggle is only making
|
||
|
law enforcement's job easier to identify and prosecute our comrades. Now
|
||
|
more than ever should folks unite and practice solidarity with each other,
|
||
|
setting aside our differences to go after our common enemies.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The events over the past few months have been compared to the glory days of
|
||
|
the 90s, complete with IRC wars and major website defacements. As breaking
|
||
|
into computer systems becomes popularized and a new batch of young bloods
|
||
|
are emerging on the scene, many questions remain. Is government going to
|
||
|
make more arrests and pass more draconian laws? Would they be doing the
|
||
|
same thing anyway-- even if hackers weren't striking back? Is Anonymous
|
||
|
actually damaging the white-hat military and intelligence security
|
||
|
industries with the ownings, defacements, and leaks, or are they just
|
||
|
bringing heat on the underground while providing justification for more
|
||
|
government financing of our enemies? Is this just another script kiddie
|
||
|
scene thriving on sqlmap and milw0rm exploits or is there old school talent
|
||
|
behind the scenes owning shit to keep the antisec flame alive? Most
|
||
|
importantly, how can those fighting the hacker class war better coordinate
|
||
|
their work with street-level resistance movements?
|
||
|
|
||
|
As attacks intensify, no doubt governments will try to put more money into
|
||
|
defending their infrastructure, holding more internal security trainings,
|
||
|
and passing more laws increasing penalties for computer hacking as well as
|
||
|
censoring and invading our privacy. The government propaganda machine will
|
||
|
no doubt blame hackers as some sort of cyber-Al Queda to demonstrate the
|
||
|
need for heightened security. Don't get it twisted: they have always wanted
|
||
|
to pass these laws in the first place and would have done so with or
|
||
|
without using the hacker threat as scapegoat, just as they wanted to go
|
||
|
invade Afghanistan and Iraq and pass the PATRIOT Act before 9/11 ever
|
||
|
happened. Don't be scared by ridiculous statements like FBI deputy
|
||
|
assistance Steven Chabinsky who announced regarding the anonymous PayPal
|
||
|
arrests, "We want to send a message that chaos on the Internet is
|
||
|
unacceptable, [even if] hackers can be believed to have social causes, it's
|
||
|
entirely unacceptable to break into websites and commit unlawful acts".
|
||
|
Yes, the feds will continue to paint us as terrorists whether we act or not
|
||
|
and will continue to make sweeping arrests regardless of guilt or innocence
|
||
|
in an attempt to demonstrate that they aren't losing the cyberwar after all
|
||
|
when all signs show that they are. It's widely speculated that the
|
||
|
unexpected resignation of US-CERT director Randy Vickers is related to the
|
||
|
dramatic increase in high-profile internet attacks against government
|
||
|
institutions [20].
|
||
|
|
||
|
Another sign of success is how the threat of being targeted by Anonymous
|
||
|
and other anti-censorship activists could possibly scare the companies into
|
||
|
not going forward with their plans, which is exactly what happened to
|
||
|
Australian ISP Telstra [20]. A practice that seems to have been revived
|
||
|
from old school black hat days is the targeting of security professionals
|
||
|
and hackers who choose to sell out and work for corporations and
|
||
|
governments to protect their systems. This is an effective strategy
|
||
|
because not only are they ridiculously incompetent and corrupt low-hanging
|
||
|
fruit, but they likely hold private information on the cyberwar activities
|
||
|
of the military. Additionally, hitting them hard and repeatedly will serve
|
||
|
as a warning to others who would follow their lead and sell out their
|
||
|
skills to the enemy: think twice before you find yourself in the
|
||
|
crosshairs. What would happen when the government invests all this money to
|
||
|
hire more hackers to protect their systems, but no one showed up?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hackers may brag about their antics instantly getting international news
|
||
|
coverage but the offensive cyber operations of the US military are
|
||
|
considerably quieter. Not only does this keep their enemies from knowing
|
||
|
their capabilities but also because much of the work being done is likely
|
||
|
illegal. As the saying goes, those who make the laws are allowed to break
|
||
|
them. When teenagers hack into high profile systems, they're considered
|
||
|
criminals and even terrorists; the governments and militaries of the world
|
||
|
do the same at greater magnitudes while hiding behind the guises of
|
||
|
national security or "spreading democracy." It might be a while before we
|
||
|
ever hear about some of the operations hackers working for the military are
|
||
|
involved in. Then again, it might not-- maybe they'll be the next ones
|
||
|
owned, having their private data plastered all over the Internet.
|
||
|
|
||
|
---
|
||
|
|
||
|
[1] "President lays out cyberwar guidelines, report says"
|
||
|
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-20073314-17/president-lays-out-cyberwar-
|
||
|
guidelines-report-says/
|
||
|
|
||
|
[2] "Stuxnet apparently as effective as a military strike"
|
||
|
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/stuxnet-apparently-as-
|
||
|
effective-as-a-military-strike.ars
|
||
|
|
||
|
[3] "Eagle Soars to Top of NPS"
|
||
|
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=2886
|
||
|
|
||
|
[4] "Poke in the Eye to SANS and CISSPs in Defcon 18 CTF Announcement"
|
||
|
http://sharpesecurity.blogspot.com/2010/04/poke-in-eye-to-sans-and-cissps-
|
||
|
in.html
|
||
|
|
||
|
[5] "Fuck FBI Friday Pretentious Press Statement"
|
||
|
http://LulzSecurity.com/releases/fuck_fbi_friday_
|
||
|
PRETENTIOUS%20PRESS%20STATEMENT.txt
|
||
|
|
||
|
[6] "How One Man Tracked Down Anonymous And Paid a Heavy Price"
|
||
|
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/anonymous/all/1
|
||
|
|
||
|
[7] "Hacker 'Mudge' Gets DARPA Job"
|
||
|
http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10450552-245.html
|
||
|
|
||
|
[8] "Joint Statement Condemning LOU Cyberwar"
|
||
|
http://www.2600.com/news/view/article/361
|
||
|
|
||
|
[9] "Press Release - 2600 Magazine Condemns Denial of Service Attacks"
|
||
|
http://www.2600.com/news/view/article/12037
|
||
|
|
||
|
[10] "Hiring Hackers"
|
||
|
http://www.govexec.com/features/1110-01/1110-01s1.htm
|
||
|
|
||
|
[11] "Statement regarding Seizure of pinky.ratman.org shell server."
|
||
|
http://foster.stonedcoder.org/~r0d3nt/statement.txt
|
||
|
|
||
|
[12] "From EFF's Secret Files: Anatomy of a Bogus Subpoena"
|
||
|
https://www.eff.org/wp/anatomy-bogus-subpoena-indymedia
|
||
|
|
||
|
[13] "One in Four Hackers in the U.S. is an FBI Informant"
|
||
|
http://publicintelligence.net/one-in-four-hackers-in-the-u-s-is-an-fbi-
|
||
|
informant
|
||
|
|
||
|
[14] "TJX Hacker Was Awash in Cash; His Penniless Coder Faces Prison"
|
||
|
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/watt/
|
||
|
|
||
|
[15] "50 Days of Mayhem: How LulzSec Changed Hacktivism Forever"
|
||
|
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2387716,00.asp
|
||
|
|
||
|
[16] "Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War"
|
||
|
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/us/politics/01cyber.html
|
||
|
|
||
|
[17] "Teenage 'Cyber Hacker' Son is Accused of Bringing Down 'British FBI'
|
||
|
Site"
|
||
|
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2007345/Ryan-Cleary-Hacker-accused-
|
||
|
bringing-British-FBI-site.html
|
||
|
|
||
|
[18] "LOL ANONOPS DEAD"
|
||
|
https://sites.google.com/site/lolanonopsdead/
|
||
|
|
||
|
[19]"Agency Chief Tasked With Protecting Government Networks From Cyber
|
||
|
Attacks Resigns"
|
||
|
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/25/chief-protecting-government-
|
||
|
networks-resigns_n_909116.html
|
||
|
|
||
|
[20] "Anonymous and LulzSecs Existence Scares ISP into Halting Web
|
||
|
Censorship"
|
||
|
http://www.zeropaid.com/news/93950/anonymous-and-LulzSecs-existence-scares-
|
||
|
isp-into-halting-web-censorship/
|
||
|
|
||
|
[21] "FBI Director Mueller Explains FBI Priorities 10 Years after 9/11"
|
||
|
http://theiacpblog.org/2011/10/25/fbi-director-mueller-explains-fbi-
|
||
|
priorities-10-years-after-911/
|
||
|
|
||
|
[ EOF ]
|