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137 lines
6.2 KiB
Text
137 lines
6.2 KiB
Text
#### PHRACK PRESENTS ISSUE 15 ####
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^*^*^*^Phrack World News, Part 1^*^*^*^
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**** File 8 of 10 ****
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SEARCH WARRANT ON WRITTEN AFFIDAVIT
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DATE: 7/17/87
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TO: Special Agent Lewis F. Jackson II, U.S. Secret Service or any agent d use
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of access devices, and Title 18 USC 1030 - Computer related fraud.
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WHEN: On or before (10 days) at any time day or night
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------------
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AFFIDAVIT
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"I, Lewis F. Jackson II, first being duly sworn, do depose and state:..."
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[Here he goes on and on about his position in the San Jose Secret Service,
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classes he has taken (none of them having to do with computers)]
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"Other individuals involved in the investigation:
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Detective J. McMullen - Stanford Public Safety/Specialist in computers
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Steve Daugherty - Pacific Bell Telephone (sic)/ Specialist in fraud
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Stephen Hansen - Stanford Electrical Eng./ Director
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Brian Bales - Sprint Telecom./ Security Investigator
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M. Locker - ITT Communications/ Security Investigator
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Jerry Slaughter - MCI Communications/Security Investigator
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4. On 11/14/86, I met with Detective Sgt. John McMullen, who related the
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following:
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a. Beginning on or about 9/1/86, an unknown suspect or group of
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suspects using the code name Pink Floyd repeatedly accessed the Unix and
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Portia computer systems at Stanford University without authorization.
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b. The suspects initially managed to decode the password of a computer
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user called "Laurent" and used the account without the permission or knowledge
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of the account holder. The true account holder was given a new account
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and a program was set up to print out all activity on the "Laurent" account.
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c & d. Mentions the systems that were accessed illegally, the most
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'dangerous' being Arpanet (geeeee).
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e. Damage was estimated at $10,000 by Director of Stanford Computers.
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g. On 1/13/87, the suspect(s) resumed regular break-ins to the
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"Laurent" account, however traps and traces were initially unsuccessful in
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identifying the suspect(s) because the suspect(s) dialed into the Stanford
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Computer System via Sprint or MCI lines, which did not have immediate trap and
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trace capabilities.
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6. On 2/19/87 I forwarded the details of my investigation and a request for
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collateral investigation to the New York Field Office of The U.S. Secret
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Service. (The USSS [I could say something dumb about USSR here]). SA Walter
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Burns was assigned the investigation.
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7. SA Burns reported telephonically that comparison of the times at which
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Stanford suffered break ins [aahhh, poor Stanford] with that of DNR's on
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suspects in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland and California
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showed a correlation.
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8. [Some stuff about Oryan QUEST engineering Cosmos numbers].
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9. On 4/2/87, I was telephoned again by Mr. Daugherty who reported that on
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4/1/87, while checking a trouble signal on the above DNR's [on Oryan's lines],
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he overheard a call between the central figure in the New York investigation
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and [Oryan Quest's real name.] Mr. Daughtery was able to identify and
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distinguish between the three suspects because they addressed each other by
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there first name. During the conversation, [Oryan Quest] acknowledged being
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a member of L.O.D. (Legion Of Doom), a very private and exclusive group of
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computer hackers. [Oryan QUEST never was a member.]
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10. [Mr. Daughtery continued to listen while QUEST tried to engineer some
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stuff. Gee what a coincidence that a security investigator was investigating
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a technical problem at the same time a conversation with 2 of the suspects was
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happening, and perhaps he just COULDN'T disconnect and so had to listen in for
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20 minutes or so. What luck.]
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11. SA Burns reported that the suspects in New York regularly called the
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suspects in California.
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14. From 4/30/87 to 6/15/87 DNR's were on both California suspects and were
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monitored by me.
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[The data from the DNR's was 'analyzed' and sent to Sprint, MCI, and ITT to
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check on codes. Damages claimed by the various LDX's were:
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SPRINT : Oryan QUEST : 3 codes for losses totaling $4,694.72
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Mark Of CA : 2 codes for losses totaling $1,912.57
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ITT : Mark Of CA : 4 codes for losses totaling $639
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MCI : Mark Of CA : 1 code for losses totaling $1,813.62
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And the winner is....Oryan QUEST at $4,694.72 against Mark with $4,365.19.]
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20. Through my training and investigation I have learned that people who
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break into computers ("hackers") and people who fraudulently obtain
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telecommunications services ("freakers") are a highly sophisticated and close
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knit group. They routinely communicate with each other directly or through
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electronic bulletin boards.
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[Note: When a Phrack reporter called Lewis Jackson and asked why after
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his no doubt extensive training he didn't spell "freakers" correctly with a
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'ph' he reacted rather rudely.]
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21.
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22. [Jackson's in depth analysis of what hackers have ("Blue Boxes are
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23. normally made from pocket calculators...") and their behavior]
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24.
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26. Through my training and investigations, I have learned that evidence
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stored in computers, floppy disks, and speed dialers is very fragile and can
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be destroyed in a matter of seconds by several methods including but not
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limited to: striking one or more keys on the computer keyboard to trigger a
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preset computer program to delete information stored within, passing a strong
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magnetic source in close proximity to a computer, throwing a light switch
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designed to either trigger a preset program or cut power in order to delete
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information stored in a computer or speed dialer or computer; or simply
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delivering a sharp blow to the computer. [Blunt blows don't cut it.]
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27. Because of the ease with which evidence stored in computers can be
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destroyed or transferred, it is essential that search warrants be executed at
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a time when the suspect is least likely to be physically operating the target
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computer system and least likely to have access to methods of destroying or
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transferring evidence stored within the system. Because of the rapidity of
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modern communications and the ability to destroy or transfer evidence remotely
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by one computer to another, it is also essential that in cases involving
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multiple suspects, all search warrants must be executed simultaneously.
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