mirror of
https://github.com/fdiskyou/Zines.git
synced 2025-03-09 00:00:00 +01:00
830 lines
45 KiB
Text
830 lines
45 KiB
Text
==Phrack Classic==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 32, File #10 of 12
|
|
|
|
|
|
KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL
|
|
|
|
K N I G H T L I N E
|
|
|
|
Issue 001 / Part I
|
|
|
|
17th of November, 1990
|
|
|
|
Written, compiled,
|
|
|
|
and edited by Doc Holiday
|
|
|
|
KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
Welcome to the 5th year of Phrack and the first edition of KnightLine!
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
SunDevil II: The witch-hunt continues..
|
|
|
|
I hate to start out on such a sour note, but: Inside sources have reported an
|
|
enormous amount of Secret Service activity in major U.S. cities.
|
|
Furthermore, sources claim that new investigations are underway for the
|
|
prosecution of all Legion Of Doom members.
|
|
|
|
The investigations have "turned up" new evidence that could bring about
|
|
the sequel to SunDevil.
|
|
|
|
This information comes from reliable sources and I suggest that all precautions
|
|
should be taken to protect yourselves from a raid.
|
|
|
|
Some good advice to follow:
|
|
|
|
A> Refrain from using "codes", or other means to commit toll fraud.
|
|
|
|
B> Further yourselves from those who are overwhelmed with desire to tell
|
|
you their recent conquests of computer systems.
|
|
|
|
C> Refrain from downloading or storing stolen Unix source code.
|
|
|
|
D> Get rid of anything that might incriminate you or your peers.
|
|
|
|
E> Stay cool, calm, and collected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Conflict has submitted a file to KL about what to do IF YOU ARE raided.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Simple Guidelines To Follow If You Encounter
|
|
Law Enforcement Agents In An Unfriendly Situation
|
|
|
|
The current state of the Computer Underground is an extreme turmoil.
|
|
The recent threat of another series of witchhunt raids has put many
|
|
people into a state of paranoia, and rightfully so. Noone needs to
|
|
deal with all the bullshit associated with a bust. I am offering a
|
|
few guidelines to follow if you encounter a precarious situation
|
|
instigated by a law enforcement agent; of course, it is up to you to
|
|
decide what you want to do. Of the people whom I have spoken with,
|
|
these will be some of the best steps to follow if you receive an
|
|
unexpected visit.
|
|
|
|
Probably the first thing you would want to do if you receive an
|
|
unfriendly visit from Joe Fed is to READ the damn warrant. Find
|
|
out why you have been chosen, and what they are looking for. Also,
|
|
remember that if they have only a search and seizure warrant, they
|
|
are warranted only to confiscate items on your premises; however, if
|
|
they are serving a subpoena, they may take what they need, on or off
|
|
your premises. So, in essence, the clean-house preventive measure
|
|
may or may not be useful to you.
|
|
|
|
An important thing to do when Agent Foley (or one of his lesser
|
|
evil counterparts) comes knocking on your door is to cooperate fully.
|
|
Drop a lot of "Yes sir"/"No sir" answers; respond politely. You're
|
|
in no position to be a smart ass, and being friendly surely can not
|
|
hurt you.
|
|
|
|
Another important thing to remember, although it is almost
|
|
opposite of the aforementioned, has to do with what to say. In
|
|
essence, do not say a fucking thing if you are questioned! Remember,
|
|
anything you say or do can and WILL be used AGAINST you in a court of
|
|
law. Simply reply, "I can not answer any questions without counsel",
|
|
or "I first must contact my attorney." You need not answer a damn
|
|
thing they ask of you without an attorney present, and it would most
|
|
probably be very detrimental to do so.
|
|
|
|
This hint parallels the previous one. No matter what you do,
|
|
do not reply to any question with "I don't know anything", or any
|
|
simple derivation of that phrase. If you do, and you are indicted,
|
|
you will be reamed in court. The presence of that statement could
|
|
greatly damage your defense, unless you are conditionally mental or
|
|
something.
|
|
|
|
In essence, those are all you should need. What I have outlined
|
|
is very simple, but logical. You need to keep a level head at least
|
|
while they are on site with you; get pissed off/psycho later, after
|
|
they leave. If you are currently an active member of the Computer
|
|
Underground, you may wish to lose anything that is important to you,
|
|
at least temporarily. Why? Well, the analogy I was given follows
|
|
that: if you were suspected of racketeering, the feds could execute
|
|
a search and seizure on your property. If they can prove by 51% that
|
|
ANY of the confiscated material COULD have been used in your suspected
|
|
racketeering, it is forfeited (i.e. you lost it, for good). The
|
|
forfeiture stands whether or not you are indicted or convicted! So,
|
|
you would be entirely screwed.
|
|
|
|
All of the aforementioned steps are important. Those are all I really
|
|
have to offer. I suggest that you get clean before the sweep occurs,
|
|
and that you stay clean until after the sweep clears. Exercise
|
|
extreme caution. Keep your head high, and keep your back to the wall
|
|
(otherwise, it would be quite possible to find a knife lodged in it).
|
|
Stay safe, and good luck!
|
|
|
|
The Conflict
|
|
11-13-1990
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
***UPDATE.11/16/90: 3 Hackers are DOOMED to prison
|
|
|
|
Frank Darden (Leftist), Adam Grant (Urvile), and Robert Riggs (Prophet)
|
|
were sentenced Friday. Robert, who was currently on probation before the
|
|
incident was sentenced to 21 months in a federal prison. Frank and Adam were
|
|
received sentences of 14 months. All three were ordered to pay $233,000 in
|
|
restitution.
|
|
|
|
Kent Alexander, an assistant U.S. attorney who prosecuted the case, was
|
|
not available for comment.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
This is not good for the Underground at all. I'm sure the government will
|
|
use the outcome of this to their advantage in speeding up the momentum of
|
|
prosecuting hackers. In their eyes, everyone is in LOD.
|
|
|
|
Dale Boll, a special agent of the Secret Service in Washington, said
|
|
"Telephone companies are preparing for a retaliation from the hacking
|
|
underworld and are beefing up security at all ends of the wire."
|
|
|
|
I can't verify or validate these rumors of retaliation. But I can say if
|
|
you are going to do some sort of retaliation, I would think twice-- It could
|
|
make things worse. This is not a "game" we are playing. No, it's reality.
|
|
And I'm sured Frank, Adam, and Rob are feeling it right now.
|
|
---
|
|
A few words from Erik Bloodaxe on the sentences:
|
|
|
|
"I'm not surprised in the least at the sentencing. However, I'm sure the three
|
|
of them are. I wish I could ask them if all the singing was worth-while in the
|
|
long-run. How can anyone hope to make a deal with federal officals, who with
|
|
in the past year, resorted to such lies and deceit. Everyday I think all this
|
|
will be over and I can get on with my life and possibly use my own computer to
|
|
write a term paper without fear of it's confiscation due to who or what I know
|
|
or have seen or done in the past. Perhaps this will end eventually, but until
|
|
then Mr. Cook will play on the peoples inherient fear of technology and
|
|
exploit everyone in his past on his personal crusade for his own twisted view
|
|
of justus. Are you or have you ever been a member of the Legion of Doom? Tell
|
|
me, do you believe in reincarnation Senator McCarthy?"
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
"The weirdest part of my dream was... when I woke up."
|
|
|
|
And now.... .. ANNOUNCING:
|
|
|
|
The first annual,
|
|
|
|
X M A S C O N '90
|
|
|
|
Where: Houston, TX
|
|
When: December 28th-30th 1990
|
|
Who: All Hackers, Journalists, and Federal Agents
|
|
|
|
Well, it's getting closer.. XmasCon is next month and we plan on having
|
|
the biggest gathering of Hackers & Feds since SummerCon '88!
|
|
|
|
This event was going to be private until word got out. A journalist
|
|
(unnamed) found out about the private event and decided to make it public news
|
|
in the magazine for which he writes. Well, after seeing the words: "XMASCON"
|
|
in a magazine with less readers than Phrack, we decided to announce it
|
|
ourselves. So, here it is-- Your OFFICIAL invitation to the gathering that
|
|
should replace the painful memories of SummerCon'90 (SCon'90? What do you mean?
|
|
there was a SummerCon this year? HA. It surprised me too).
|
|
|
|
Hotel Information:
|
|
La Quinta Inn
|
|
6 North Belt East
|
|
(713) 447-6888
|
|
(Located next to Intercontinental Airport)
|
|
|
|
Fees: $44.00+TAX a night (single)
|
|
$56.00+TAX a night (double)
|
|
|
|
Government Discount (With ID)
|
|
$49.00+TAX a night (single)
|
|
$37.00+TAX a night (double)
|
|
|
|
1-800-531-5900
|
|
|
|
|
|
Call for reservations in advance. Please tell the registar that you are with
|
|
XmasCon'90. Everyone is welcome to attend, and I do mean EVERYONE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Take care & see you at HoHoCon!
|
|
|
|
--DH
|
|
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
F R O M T H E W I R E
|
|
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE Thirteen Arrested For Breaking Into University Computer
|
|
Byline: PAT MILTON
|
|
DATE 08/16/90
|
|
SOURCE The Associated Press (ASP)
|
|
Origin: FARMINGDALE, N.Y.
|
|
(Copyright 1990. The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
* FARMINGDALE, N.Y. (AP) _ Thirteen computer hackers ranging in age from 14 to
|
|
32 were charged Thursday with breaking into the mainframe computer at a
|
|
university in Washington state and causing costly damage to the files. One of
|
|
the suspects is a 14-year-old high school student from New York City who is
|
|
also a suspect in last November's break-in of an Air Force computer in the
|
|
Pentagon, according to Senior Investigator Donald Delaney of the New York State
|
|
Police. The student, who used the name "Zod" when he signed onto the computer,
|
|
is charged with breaking into the computer at the City University of Bellevue
|
|
in Washington in May by figuring out the toll-free telephone number that gave
|
|
students and faculty legitimate access to the system.
|
|
|
|
"Zod," who was not identified because he is a minor, maintained control over
|
|
the system by setting up his own program where others could illegally enter the
|
|
system by answering 11 questions he set up.
|
|
|
|
More than 40 hackers across the country are believed to have gained illegal
|
|
access to the system since May, Delaney said. As a result of the break-in,
|
|
university files were altered and deleted, and consultants must be hired to
|
|
reprogram the system, Delaney said. In addition to the arrests, search
|
|
warrants were executed at 17 locations on Thursday where officers confiscated
|
|
$50,000 worth of computers and related equipment. Three more arrests were
|
|
expected. Two of the 13 arrested were from Long Island and the rest were from
|
|
the New York boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, Manhattan and the Bronx.
|
|
Farmingdale is on Long Island. The 13 were charged with computer tampering,
|
|
computer trespass, unauthorized use of a computer and theft of services. The
|
|
juveniles will be charged with juvenile delinquency.
|
|
|
|
The investigation began two months ago after a technician at the university
|
|
noticed "error message" flashing on the computer screen, indicating someone had
|
|
entered the system illegally. The suspects were traced through subpoenaed
|
|
telephone records. * Many hackers break into private computer systems for the
|
|
pure satisfaction of cracking the code, and also to obtain sometimes costly
|
|
computer programs, Delaney said.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE US Sprint helps business customers battle PBX fraud
|
|
DATE 09/25/90
|
|
SOURCE BUSINESS WIRE (BWR)
|
|
|
|
|
|
KANSAS CITY, Mo.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--US Sprint Wednesday announced its corporate
|
|
security department will help the company's business customers battle PBX
|
|
fraud. After producing significant results in fighting code abuse US Sprint is
|
|
directing their efforts to help their business customers in identifying and
|
|
preventing computer hackers from infiltrating their business customer's owned
|
|
or leased telephone switching equipment. ``Unauthorized use of our
|
|
long-distance service has been greatly reduced through increased detection,
|
|
prevention, investigation and prosecution efforts,'' said Bob Fox, US Sprint
|
|
vice president corporate security.
|
|
|
|
``Now rather than attacking a long-distance carrier's network in * an attempt
|
|
to steal authorization codes, computer hackers are attacking private companies'
|
|
and governmental agencies' Private Branch Exchanges (PBX's). Computer
|
|
hackers break into private telephone switches in an attempt to reoriginate
|
|
long-distance calls, which are then billed to the businesses. Fox says a
|
|
business may not discover its telephone system has been ``hacked'' until their
|
|
long-distance bill is received and then it may be too late. Help is on the way
|
|
however. US Sprint has started a customer support program to help the
|
|
company's business customers to combat the situation. Del Wnorowski, US Sprint
|
|
senior vice president-general counsel said, ``The new program is customers
|
|
about the potential for telecommunications fraud committed through their owned
|
|
or leasesd switching equipment and to assist them in preventing this type of
|
|
illegal activity.'' US Sprint is a unit of United Telecommunications Inc., a
|
|
diversified telecommunications company headquartered in Kansas City.
|
|
|
|
CONTACT:
|
|
US Sprint, Kansas City.
|
|
Phil Hermanson, 816/276-6268
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE Fax pirates find it easy to intercept documents
|
|
DATE 09/10/90
|
|
SOURCE Toronto Star (TOR)
|
|
Edition: METRO
|
|
Section: BUSINESS TODAY
|
|
Page: B4
|
|
(Copyright The Toronto Star)
|
|
|
|
|
|
--- Fax pirates find it easy to intercept documents ---
|
|
|
|
TOKYO (Special) - Considering that several years ago enthusiastic hackers began
|
|
breaking into computer systems worldwide to steal valuable information, it
|
|
could only have been a matter of time before the same problem surfaced for
|
|
facsimile machines. Now, officials of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public
|
|
Corp. report evidence that this has been happening, not only in their own
|
|
country but around the globe. Apparently, anyone with just a little knowledge
|
|
of electronics can tap fax messages being sent from one of these relatively
|
|
unsophisticated machines to another, with the duplication printed out on the
|
|
pirate's facsimile machine. Both the sender and the receiver of the faxed
|
|
document remain completely unaware that they have been bugged. "I shudder to
|
|
think of some of the business documents which only recently moved over my
|
|
company's fax machines being examined by our competitors," one Tokyo executive
|
|
nervously admits when informed that there has been a proliferation of tapping.
|
|
"You don't think the tax people are doing it too?" he then asks in mock terror.
|
|
|
|
It is certainly a frightening thought. The technique involves making a
|
|
secret connection with the telephone line of the party whose fax messages are
|
|
to be intercepted. That is all too easy to accomplish, according to officials
|
|
of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. Apart from a few special cases, very little
|
|
has been done to guard against outside tapping. As a result, one of the most
|
|
vulnerable areas - and one most businessmen and women now should begin to feel
|
|
unsure of - is the privacy or security of the facsimile machine. Technical
|
|
attention to this problem is in order.
|
|
|
|
"The idea that somewhere out there is 'Conan the Hacker' who is reading my
|
|
fax correspondence as readily as I do sends chills up my spine," says one
|
|
American businesswoman here. "There could be a lot of trouble for me and up to
|
|
now I didn't even realize it was possible." It is not only possible, but easy.
|
|
Ordinary components available at any electronics store can be used. With these
|
|
in hand, tappers can rig up a connection that sets off a warning signal,
|
|
without the sender or receiver realizing it, whenever a fax message passes
|
|
along the telephone line. Considering the growing volume of highly
|
|
confidential material being sent and received via fax equipment, the resulting
|
|
leaks can be considered highly dangerous to the security of corporate
|
|
information.
|
|
|
|
In Japan alone it is estimated that there are 3.7 million
|
|
machines in operation. Given the nature of these tapping operations, it would
|
|
appear to be extremely difficult for companies to determine whether they are
|
|
suffering serious damage from this process. In addition, it is clear that a
|
|
great many corporations have yet to realize the extent of the threat to their
|
|
privacy. "If more business executives recognized what is going on," suggests
|
|
one Japanese security specialist, "they would move now to halt the opportunity
|
|
for leaks and thus protect their corporations from this type of violation." He
|
|
went on to note that third parties mentioned in fax messages also can be badly
|
|
hurt by these interceptions. Fortunately, manufacturers are producing machines
|
|
capable of preventing hackers from tapping into the system. In some cases,
|
|
newly developed fax machines use code systems to defend information
|
|
transmitted. But these tap-proof facsimile machines are not yet in general
|
|
use. Makers of the new "protected" facsimile machines predict that once the
|
|
business communities around the globe become aware of the threat they will
|
|
promptly place orders for replacements and junk their old equipment as a simple
|
|
matter of damage control. The market could prove extremely large. Those few
|
|
leak-proof fax machines now in operation depend upon scrambling messages, so
|
|
that even if a pirate taps into the telephone line leading to the unit, the
|
|
intercepted message is impossible to read.
|
|
|
|
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, for example, claims that it would require
|
|
a hacker using a large computer more than 200,000 years to crack the codes used
|
|
in its own pirate-proof fax. This ultimately may prove to be something of an
|
|
exaggeration. Although in Japan and many other countries this kind of tapping
|
|
clearly is illegal, it remains nearly impossible to track down electronic
|
|
eavesdroppers. As far as is known, none of these snoopers have been identified
|
|
and dragged into court. Security specialists in Japan claim that there may be
|
|
thousands of fax hackers who get their kicks out of intercepting and reading
|
|
other people's business mail, with few using the information for illegal
|
|
purposes or actively conveying it to third parties.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE Inmate behind scams
|
|
Byline: JOHN SEMIEN
|
|
DATE 09/11/90
|
|
SOURCE THE BATON ROUGE SUNDAY ADVOCATE (BATR)
|
|
Section: NEWS
|
|
Page: 1-B
|
|
(Copyright 1989 by Capitol City Press)
|
|
|
|
|
|
There wasn't much inmate Lawrence "Danny" Faires couldn't buy, sell or
|
|
steal with a telephone call from his jail cell in Miami when his million-dollar
|
|
fraud ring ran afoul of the U.S. Secret Service in 1989. That was the year
|
|
Faires used a portable computer with an automatic dialing program to "hack out"
|
|
access codes to the long-distance lines of Telco Communications Inc., a Baton
|
|
Rouge-based phone company. Telco officials were alarmed when they spotted
|
|
1,500 attempts at gaining unauthorized access to the company's long-distance
|
|
service in a single 12-hour period in January 1989.
|
|
|
|
Convinced that an organized fraud scheme was at work, Telco called
|
|
Resident Agent Phil Robertson, who heads the service's Baton Rouge office.
|
|
|
|
"They told me they felt they were being attacked by hackers who had discovered
|
|
their long-distance access lines and who were hacking out personal
|
|
identification numbers belonging to their customers," Robertson said Monday.
|
|
|
|
"You are billed based on your pin (access) number. The computer hacker had
|
|
located several of their 800 numbers and had entered digits hoping it would be
|
|
a valid pin number." Using computer records, Robertson said agents were able to
|
|
isolate 6,000 fraudulent Telco calls that were made during a three-week period
|
|
of January. More than a third of those calls were traced to a cell block in
|
|
the Dade County Interim Detention Center that has been home for Faires for the
|
|
past four years. Faires is awaiting trial in Miami on first-degree murder
|
|
charges. "As it turned out, all of the inmates in this cell block are awaiting
|
|
trial," Robertson said. "One of the inmates, Danny Faires, had a computer in
|
|
his cell attached to a modem, and he turned out to be the hacker."
|
|
|
|
"All he had to do was plug his modem in, let it make the calls and check his
|
|
printout for the numbers that came back good," the agent said. In checking out
|
|
the other bogus Telco calls, agents uncovered a massive credit card scam. A
|
|
federal grand jury in Milwaukee, Wis., linked both scams to Faires and alleged
|
|
associates of the inmate across the country in a Feb. 27 indictment of six
|
|
people on federal wire and access device fraud. Fairies, an unindicted
|
|
co-conspirator in the case, last week said he has spent the past three years
|
|
applying his previous experience as a computer systems analyst and programmer
|
|
to a lap-top, portable computer provided by one of the prison guards. He
|
|
describes the results as "doing business with America" at the expense of large
|
|
credit card and telecommunications companies. Faires said he attacked Telco's
|
|
system by chance after receiving one of the company's access numbers in a group
|
|
of assorted access codes acquired by his associates. "It was just their
|
|
misfortune that we became aware that they had a system there that was easily
|
|
accessible," Faires said in a telephone interview.
|
|
|
|
"I was given their access number, along with Sprint and MCI, I guess
|
|
virtually every company in America we got." Faires said he used the stolen,
|
|
long distance phone time and other stolen credit card numbers to access
|
|
networks with credit information from major department stores and mail order
|
|
businesses. "You come up to the door and the door is locked," he said. "You
|
|
have to buy access. Well, I bought access with credit cards from another
|
|
system. I had access codes that we had hacked. "I could pull your entire
|
|
credit profile up and just pick the credit card numbers that you still had some
|
|
credit in them and how many dollars you had left in your account and I would
|
|
spend that," Faires said. "My justification was, I don't know the creditor and
|
|
he had no knowledge of it so he won't have to pay it." However, Faires said he
|
|
now thinks of the trouble the illegal use of the credit cards has caused his
|
|
victims in their efforts to straighten out damaged credit records. "I remember
|
|
I took a course once that was called computer morality about the moral ethics
|
|
to which we're morally bound," he said. "It's like a locksmith. Even though
|
|
he can open a lock, he's morally bound not to if it's not his lock. I violated
|
|
that."
|
|
|
|
The vulnerability of credit card companies to hackers is the subject of an
|
|
unpublished book that Faires said he has written. Faires said his book
|
|
includes tips on how businesses and others can safeguard access to their
|
|
credit, but added that there may be no way to be completely safe from
|
|
hackers. "It's untitled as yet," he said about the book. "We're leaving that
|
|
open. I'm waiting to see if they electrocute me here, then I'm going to put
|
|
something about "I could buy it all but couldn't pay the electric bill.' "
|
|
[This guy is a real toon -DH]
|
|
|
|
While Faires has not been formally charged in connection with the scheme,
|
|
last week he said he was sure charges will be forthcoming because "there is no
|
|
question about my involvement." The other six alleged conspirators are John
|
|
Carl Berger and George A. Hart Jr. of Milwaukee, Wis.; Charles Robert McFall
|
|
and Victor Reyes of San Antonio, Texas; Steven Michael Skender Jr. of West
|
|
Allis, Wis.; and Angelo Bruno Bregantini of Marshville, N.C. All six men are
|
|
charged with conspiracy to commit access device and wire fraud. Berger,
|
|
Skender, Reyes and Bregantini also are charged separately with multiple counts
|
|
of wire fraud.
|
|
|
|
The indictments are the first criminal charges generated by Operation
|
|
Mongoose, an ongoing Secret Service probe of credit card and long-distance
|
|
telephone access fraud. The charges allege that Faires has had access to a
|
|
telephone since his arrest and imprisonment in Miami in 1986, an allegation
|
|
that has prompted a separate probe by Miami authorities. That phone was used
|
|
to make frequent calls to a building on Brookfield Road in Brookfield, Wis.,
|
|
where another alleged unindicted co-conspirator, Fred Bregantini, operates
|
|
various businesses, according to the indictment. The indictment said Faires
|
|
and Fred Bregantini were "at the hub" of the telephone and credit card scam.
|
|
The two men are accused of collecting credit card numbers and telephone access
|
|
codes from other defendants in the case and using the numbers to purchase
|
|
merchandise, services and "other things of value." Robertson said agents
|
|
believe the members of the ring copied many of these stolen numbers from credit
|
|
card receipts retrieved from the trash cans of various businesses. He said the
|
|
practice, commonly called "dumpster diving," is a widely used method in credit
|
|
card fraud. [`dumpster diving' eh? -DH]
|
|
|
|
While some of the defendants helped make purchases on the stolen cards,
|
|
the indictment alleges that others provided addresses used for the shipment of
|
|
the stolen goods. The goods included gold coins, plane tickets, computer
|
|
equipment, tools and stereo equipment. Robertson said agents are still
|
|
tallying the cost of the scam to Telco and other companies but that the damage
|
|
has already climbed past $1 million. Herbert Howard, president of Telco, on
|
|
Friday said the company lost from $35,000 to $40,000 in revenues from illegal
|
|
calls and in additional expenses for researching Faires' use of access codes.
|
|
"It was really a learning experience for us because this is the first time this
|
|
has happened," Howard said about his 2-year-old company. "I think it's a fear
|
|
of all long-distance companies. It's very fortunate that we caught it as
|
|
quickly as we did."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE No, I'm not paranoid, but who is No. 1?
|
|
Byline: DENISE CARUSO
|
|
Column: INSIDE SILICON VALLEY
|
|
DATE 08/21/90
|
|
SOURCE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER (SFEX)
|
|
Edition: FIFTH
|
|
Section: BUSINESS
|
|
Page: D-16
|
|
(Copyright 1989)
|
|
|
|
|
|
THOUGH I didn't plan it that way, this week proved to be a perfect time to
|
|
start renting old episodes of "The Prisoner" - that very dark, very paranoid
|
|
British spy series from the early '60s which foresaw a bleak future in which
|
|
"een-formation" was of paramount importance, no matter whose "side" you were
|
|
on. Every well-paid company representative from every telephone service
|
|
provider in North America earned his or her keep this week, fielding calls from
|
|
blood-thirsty members of the press corps who also wanted "een-formation" about
|
|
whether or not the huge long-distance snafu with AT&T was a "hack" (an illegal
|
|
break-in) or some form of computerized germ warfare.
|
|
|
|
I'm happy that the answer was "no," but of course the event opens a rather
|
|
nasty can of worms: has AT&T's problem tipped off the hacker community that
|
|
the phone network is vulnerable? "That's a very good question," said one
|
|
network engineer I spoke with last week. But, he assured me, his network was
|
|
totally secure and had all kinds of safeguards built in to prevent either
|
|
outside penetration or the introduction of a software virus to the system. I
|
|
hope he's right, but I must admit, I've heard that song before.
|
|
|
|
Here, for example, is an excerpt from an anonymous piece of electronic
|
|
mail I received last week, slightly edited to correct grammatical
|
|
imperfections: "It may be of interest to you to know, if I wanted to have
|
|
"fun," "evil" deeds could be done by remote control, up to and including
|
|
shutting down every ESS (electronic switching station) office in North America.
|
|
|
|
"Less evil and more fun might be to shut down the stock market for a day,
|
|
scramble all transactions, or even send it down in a tail spin! Banks aren't
|
|
immune either. This may sound very darkside, but people must have what is
|
|
needed to fight back if things go bad!" Not disturbing enough? Try this one on
|
|
for size: Back in July of '89, I wrote of a story in the premier issue of the
|
|
magazine Mondo 2000 that detailed how one might set about hacking automatic
|
|
teller machines (ATMs). That story contained everything but the blueprints for
|
|
the device, which the magazine's editors didn't print because they thought it
|
|
would be irresponsible to do so. But now, a student-owned Cornell University
|
|
publication called "Visions Magazine" - for which Carl Sagan is creative
|
|
adviser - has asked the article's author, Morgan Russell, for rights to reprint
|
|
the article in its entirety, including device blueprints.
|
|
|
|
These kinds of stories are disturbing, yet somehow I've always expected
|
|
they would happen, a reaction that's similar to the way I feel when I watch
|
|
"The Prisoner." No. 6, as he's called, cries out at the beginning of every
|
|
episode, "I am not a number! I am a free man!" His will to resist is
|
|
sufficient to fend off the authorities who believe their need for the
|
|
"een-formation" in No. 6's head gives them the right to try to control his
|
|
movements and thoughts, using - of course - only the most impressive
|
|
technology.
|
|
|
|
Of course, the science-fiction fantasy of impressive technology in the
|
|
'60s, when "The Prisoner" was created, was as authoritarian and centralized as
|
|
the governments using it. Not many faceless authorities back then were
|
|
predicting a near-future where all classes of people had access to, could
|
|
afford and knew how to use powerful technology. (I'm sure it would have ruined
|
|
their supper if they had.) Neither did they envision today's growing class of
|
|
technological sophisticates - whether self-taught PC hackers or trained
|
|
computer scientists - who, by virtue of their knowledge, could cripple,
|
|
disable, or otherwise confound the system which spawned them. Have any opinion
|
|
you'd like about the right or wrong of it. Fact is, whether it's the phone
|
|
network or a bank teller machine, the more we rely on technology, the less we
|
|
can rely on technology.
|
|
|
|
Though this fact can make life unpleasant for those of us who are
|
|
victimized by either the machines we trust or the people who know how to fidget
|
|
with them, there is something strangely comforting about knowing that, after
|
|
all, a computer is still only as trustworthy as the humans who run it. Write
|
|
|
|
CONTACT:
|
|
Denise Caruso, Spectra, San Francisco Examiner
|
|
P.O Box 7260
|
|
San Francisco, CA 94120. (Denise
|
|
|
|
MCI Mail (Denise Caruso) - CompuServe (73037,52) - CONNECT (Caruso)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE US Sprint to Supply Soviet Venture With Switches
|
|
DATE 09/17/90
|
|
SOURCE WALL STREET JOURNAL (WJ)
|
|
|
|
|
|
WASHINGTON -- US Sprint Communications Corp. said it obtained U.S. government
|
|
approval to supply a Soviet joint venture with packet switches that can greatly
|
|
improve telecommunications services between the Soviet Union and other
|
|
countries. The imminent shipment of these switches was announced by William
|
|
Esrey, chairman and chief executive officer of United Telecommunications Inc.,
|
|
shortly after completing a visit to the Soviet Union with Commerce Secretary
|
|
Robert Mosbacher and the chief executives of other U.S. companies. United
|
|
Telecommunications is the parent of US Sprint.
|
|
|
|
The export license that US Sprint expects to obtain as early as this week
|
|
will be the first license for telecommunications equipment granted by the U.S.
|
|
under the new, relaxed regulations for shipping technology to the Soviet Union,
|
|
Esrey said. * The Soviet venture, Telenet USSR, will be owned by a US Sprint
|
|
subsidiary, Sprint International, and the Soviet Ministry of Post and
|
|
Telecommunications and the Larvian Academy of Sciences, a Soviet research
|
|
group. The Commerce Department doesn't discuss details of individual license
|
|
applications, but Mosbacher has publicly supported technology tie-ups between
|
|
the U.S. companies represented in his traveling group and potential Soviet
|
|
partners. US Sprint appears to be leading the race among American
|
|
telecommunications companies to establish solid ties in the Soviet Union. An
|
|
earlier proposal by U S West Inc. to lay down part of an international
|
|
fiber-optic line across the Soviet Union was rejected by U.S. authorities
|
|
because of the advanced nature of the technology.
|
|
|
|
US Sprint's packet switches, however, appear to be within the new
|
|
standards for permissible exports to the Soviet Union. The switches are used
|
|
to route telephone calls and control traffic in voice, facsimile and
|
|
digitalized data transmission. These eight-bit switches are one or two
|
|
generations behind the comparable systems in use in Western countries, but are
|
|
still good enough to sharply improve the ability of Sprint's Soviet customers
|
|
to communicate with other countries, Esrey's aides said. The company declined
|
|
to discuss the value of its investment or to disclose how many switches will be
|
|
sold. US Sprint said its venture will operate through new, dedicated satellite
|
|
lines that will augment the often-congested 32 international lines that
|
|
currently exist for Moscow-based businesses. Esrey said he expects the venture
|
|
to be in operation before the end of this year.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE BT Tymnet Introduces Additional XLINK Services
|
|
DATE 09/09/90
|
|
SOURCE DOW JONES NEWS WIRE
|
|
|
|
SAN JOSE, Calif. -DJ- BT Tymnet Inc. said XLINK Express, a family of new,
|
|
bundled, port-based, synchronous X.25 (XLINKs) services, is available. The
|
|
XLINK service offers customers lower cost X.25 host access to its TYMNET
|
|
network, the company said in a news release. XLINKs are leased-line private
|
|
access port services for X.25 interfaces at speeds up to 19.2 bits per second
|
|
and supporting up to 64 virtual circuits.
|
|
|
|
XLINK Express includes port access, leased line, modems, software, and free
|
|
data transmission. Prior to XLINK Express, customers requiring a
|
|
9.6-bit-per-second leased line for standard X.25 host connectivity would
|
|
typically pay about $1,500 monthly for their leased line, modems and interface.
|
|
With XLINK, customers can now be charged a monthly rate of $900, the company
|
|
said.
|
|
|
|
BT Tymnet Inc. is a unit of British Telecom plc.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE Hacker may be taunting the FBI; Whiz suspected of invading U.S. army
|
|
computer
|
|
Credit: PENINSULA TIMES TRIBUNE
|
|
DATE 04/10/90
|
|
SOURCE Montreal Gazette (GAZ)
|
|
Edition: FINAL
|
|
Section: NEWS
|
|
Page: F16
|
|
Origin: PALO ALTO, Calif.
|
|
(Copyright The Gazette)
|
|
|
|
--- Hacker may be taunting the FBI; Whiz suspected of invading
|
|
U.S. army computer ---
|
|
|
|
PALO ALTO, Calif. - The computer prodigy wanted on suspicion of invading a
|
|
U.S. army computer may be taunting FBI agents by defiantly talking to his
|
|
hacker buddies on electronic bulletin boards while he eludes a manhunt,
|
|
authorities said. The mysterious Kevin Poulsen, a former Menlo Park, Calif.,
|
|
resident described by many as a computer genius, is outsmarting the FBI and
|
|
apparently has the savvy to make this game of hide-and-seek a long contest.
|
|
|
|
No, investigators are not getting frustrated, FBI official Duke Diedrich
|
|
said. "It's just a matter of time. We've got our traps and hopefully one day
|
|
we'll be able to get the mouse." Authorities have issued an arrest warrant for
|
|
the former SRI International computer expert. He has been at large since at
|
|
least Jan. 18, when federal officials revealed allegations of a sensational
|
|
computer conspiracy. The FBI says Poulsen, 24, is the mastermind of a complex
|
|
computer and telephone-system invasion that included breaking into an
|
|
unclassified army computer network, snooping on the FBI and eavesdropping on
|
|
the calls of a former girlfriend. FBI agents believe he may be in southern
|
|
California, but because he is apparently still hooked up to a national network
|
|
of hackers, he could be using his friends to hide just about anywhere, Diedrich
|
|
said. Poulsen is adept at manufacturing false identification and knows how to
|
|
use the phone system to cover traces of his calls.
|
|
|
|
Agents believe his hacker talk on electronic bulletin boards is perhaps "a
|
|
way of taunting law enforcement officials," Diedrich said. Poulsen may be back
|
|
to his old tricks, but "he's not hiding with the usual bunch of hackers," said
|
|
John Maxfield, a computer security consultant and former FBI informant.
|
|
|
|
Maxfield, known nationally as a "narc" among young hackers, said he had
|
|
underground sources who said Poulsen was rumored to be living alone in a
|
|
southern California apartment. Poulsen's computer chatter could lead to his
|
|
downfall, Maxfield said. Many hackers are electronic anarchists who would be
|
|
happy to turn in a high-ranking hacker, thereby pushing themselves up the
|
|
status ladder, he said. But Poulsen probably has access to a steady flow of
|
|
cash, so he doesn't have to get a job that might lead to his arrest, Maxfield
|
|
said.
|
|
|
|
With his expertise, Poulsen could easily crack the bank computers that
|
|
validate cash transactions and then credit his own accounts, Maxfield said.
|
|
The FBI isn't desperate, but agents have contacted America's Most Wanted, a
|
|
television show that asks viewers to help authorities find fugitives.
|
|
|
|
Poulsen's mother, Bernadine, said her son called home just after police
|
|
announced there was a warrant for his arrest, but he had not called since.
|
|
During the brief call, "He just apologized for all the stress he was causing
|
|
us." The fugitive's motivation baffles Maxfield.
|
|
|
|
The self-described "hacker tracker" has conducted investigations that have
|
|
led to dozens of arrests, but the Poulsen-contrived conspiracy as alleged by
|
|
the FBI is strange, he said. Most teen-age hackers are thrill seekers, he
|
|
explained. The more dangerous the scam, the bigger the high. But Poulsen is
|
|
24. "Why is he still doing it?" Maxfield asked.
|
|
|
|
Poulsen, alias "Dark Dante" and "Master of Impact," was a member of an
|
|
elite hacker gang called Legion of Doom. [Poulsen was never a member of the
|
|
group -DH]
|
|
|
|
The 25 or so mischievous members are now being arrested one by one, Maxfield
|
|
said. They consider themselves misfits, but smart misfits who are superior to
|
|
the masses of average people who have so labelled them, he said. [Baha,
|
|
Maxfield really cracks me up -DH]
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Kevin recently had a 15 minute television debut on NBC's "Unsolved
|
|
Mystries". The program showed renactments of Kevin breaking into CO's and
|
|
walking around his apartment filled with computers and other 'listening'
|
|
devices (as the show called them).
|
|
|
|
I personally got a kick out of the photographs he took of himself holding
|
|
switching equipment after a break-in at a CO.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
HEADLINE Amtrak Gets Aboard SDN
|
|
Byline: BETH SCHULTZ
|
|
DATE 10/25/90
|
|
SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS WEEK
|
|
Issue: 267
|
|
Section: PN
|
|
Page: 58
|
|
(Copyright 1989 CMP Publications, Inc. All rights reserved.)
|
|
|
|
WASHINGTON - Amtrak, always looking for ways to reduce the amount of government
|
|
funding it takes to keep it on track, has switched its long distance traffic
|
|
onto a virtual private network-taking advantage of an AT&T promotion that saved
|
|
the railroad $250,000. Though Amtrak realized the cost-savings potential of
|
|
AT&T's Software Defined Network (SDN) as early as May 1987, it took until last
|
|
spring for the company to move full-speed ahead with implementation of that
|
|
virtual private network service. "We had led the horse to water, but we
|
|
couldn't make it drink," said Jim West, an AT&T national systems consultant.
|
|
|
|
But in April of this year, AT&T removed the last obstacle in the
|
|
railroad's way, said Amtrak's chief network engineer Matt Brunk. At that time,
|
|
AT&T began running a special promotion that waived the installation fee for
|
|
connecting sites to the SDN. Until then, Amtrak, based here, could only afford
|
|
adding locations piecemeal.
|
|
|
|
Plagued by network abuse, Amtrak began tracking the potential of SDN as a
|
|
means of solving that problem as soon as AT&T announced its SDN rates in
|
|
December 1986. Describing the severity of its toll-fraud problem, Brunk told
|
|
of a seven-day stint in 1985 during which hackers tallied $185,000 in
|
|
unauthorized charges. By the end of that year, toll fraud on Amtrak's network
|
|
reached in excess of $1 million.
|
|
|
|
Before the days of the virtual private network, the only way to clean up
|
|
this abuse was through a toll-free "800" service configuration and PBX remote
|
|
access, which Amtrak implemented at the end of 1985. "We changed the policy
|
|
and procedures for all users, limiting the capabilities of remotaccess," Brunk
|
|
said.
|
|
|
|
But Amtrak needed to further patrol its network, and after studying AT&T's
|
|
SDN, as well as competitive offerings, the railroad ordered in May 1987 the
|
|
first portion of what would this year become a 300-site SDN. The initial order
|
|
included AT&T Accunet T1.5 circuits for just two stations, one in Chicago and
|
|
one here. Used to replace the 800 service, these 1.544-megabit-per-second
|
|
direct connections were used to "provide secure remote access to on-net numbers
|
|
for numerous users," Brunk said.
|
|
|
|
Equally important, Amtrak also signed up for the Network Remote Access
|
|
Fraud Control feature, which gives it a single point of control over the
|
|
network. "What Amtrak ordered then was not really a network, because it was
|
|
feature-specific," said AT&T national account manager Sharon Juergens.
|
|
|
|
The company has not billed back or dropped any toll fraud since it began
|
|
using the SDN remote access feature, Brunk said. "Anyone with PBX
|
|
remote-access capability and :heavy! volume not using SDN as a vehicle is
|
|
doing their company a disservice."
|
|
|
|
Originally a beta-test site for the SDN's security-report feature, Amtrak
|
|
has since come to rely heavily on that option, too. With the exception of some
|
|
group codes, a warning is sent if spending on any user code exceeds $60 per
|
|
month. "We begin investigating immediately," Brunk said. "We are now
|
|
proactive, instead of reactive."
|
|
|
|
Today, 40 Amtrak locations have switched-access connections to the SDN;
|
|
260 sites are linked through dedicated means, whether through voice-grade
|
|
analog circuits or high-speed T1s. "The users' traffic is discounted, on a
|
|
single billing statement, and in effect, :the SDN! links them to the company.
|
|
This is our corporate communications glue," Brunk said. "But this is only the
|
|
beginning. Not only have we provided a service, but also we have provided a
|
|
bright future. We have set ourselves up for competitive gain." Spending
|
|
Stabilized And the company has stabilized telecommunications expenditures. In
|
|
1985, Amtrak spent $26 million on telecom equipment and services. Four years
|
|
later, Brunk estimated the railroad will spend just $1 million more. He said
|
|
contributing factors to this will be the SDN, upgrading from outdated analog
|
|
PBXs to digital PBXs and replacing some PBX installations with local
|
|
Bell-provided centrex service. Network savings resulting from reduced
|
|
call-setup time alone, Brunk added, will reach $74,000 this year.
|
|
|
|
"In a nutshell, we have improved transmission quality, network management
|
|
and maintenance, and reduced costs," Brunk said. "The users have gained a
|
|
single authorization code accessing multiple applications, improved quality and
|
|
support."
|
|
|
|
Cost savings aside, Amtrak also took into consideration applications
|
|
available off the SDN. "At the time, of what was available, we really liked
|
|
everything about SDN," Brunk said.
|
|
|
|
The Amtrak network is supported by the dedicated access trunk testing
|
|
system. This system lets Amtrak test access lines, thus aiding the company in
|
|
activating and deactivating authorization codes. And Amtrak is testing the
|
|
AT&T Alliance dedicated teleconferencing service.
|
|
|
|
With the teleconferencing service, Amtrak can reduce internal travel
|
|
expenditures: Users can access the system remotely via an 800 number, or on
|
|
demand. Amtrak operators can connect teleconferencing calls at any time. "The
|
|
quality is fantastic, but the cost is even better because it's all connected to
|
|
the SDN," said Brunk.
|
|
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|