mirror of
https://github.com/fdiskyou/Zines.git
synced 2025-03-09 00:00:00 +01:00
584 lines
32 KiB
Text
584 lines
32 KiB
Text
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 14 of 15
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXXVIII / Part Two of Three PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled by Dispater & Friends PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Special Thanks to Datastream Cowboy PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
What's Wrong With The Computer Crime Statute? February 17, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Thomas A. Guidoboni (ComputerWorld)(Page 33)
|
|
|
|
"Defense and prosecution agree the 1986 Computer Fraud
|
|
and Abuse Act is flawed but differ on how to fix it."
|
|
|
|
It has become an annual ritual, since the birth of the Internet worm, for
|
|
Congress to consider amendments to the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At
|
|
this point, the U.S. Department of Justice can be expected to advocate three
|
|
things: an expansion of the federal role in the investigation and prosecution
|
|
of computer crimes, the creation of new categories of offenses, and harsher
|
|
penalties, including perhaps the current darling of the department, forfeiture
|
|
of property.
|
|
|
|
Since the law is of recent origin, was substantially revised in 1986 and proved
|
|
more than adequate to prosecute and convict Robert T. Morris, there seems
|
|
little justification for expansion of its coverage.
|
|
|
|
Nevertheless, if Congress is determined to review and revise the provisions of
|
|
the act, there are several narrow, but significant, amendments that are clearly
|
|
warranted. Of primary importance is the definition of terms. The core of the
|
|
law suffers from a lack of clarity. Offenses are described by reference to
|
|
"authorized" or "unauthorized access," yet these terms are not defined
|
|
anywhere.
|
|
|
|
Perilously Vague
|
|
|
|
In a universe that consists of broad computer networks, bulletin boards, E-mail
|
|
and anonymous file-transfer protocols, and one in which permissions and rights
|
|
are established by custom, usage and private understandings, a person is left
|
|
to speculate at his peril as to what conduct is permitted and what is
|
|
prohibited by this vague language.
|
|
|
|
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act should be amended to give precise content to
|
|
the concepts of "access" and "authorization," thereby providing fair warning of
|
|
illegal conduct.
|
|
|
|
A second change for the better regarding the act would be to create a
|
|
distinction between those computer intruders who unintentionally cause a
|
|
monetary loss and those who maliciously cause such harm.
|
|
|
|
The present law, as interpreted in the Morris case, recognizes no such
|
|
distinction. This is contrary to long-standing notions of fairness in our
|
|
system of criminal law, which acknowledges that between two persons who cause
|
|
the same harm, the one who intended that result is more culpable than the one
|
|
who did not.
|
|
|
|
A third part of the statute that needs revision relates to computerized medical
|
|
records. It is too broad because it includes as felonious conduct the
|
|
unauthorized access to such records that "potentially modifies or impairs"
|
|
medical treatment or care. Virtually every unauthorized access to computers
|
|
containing medical records carries this potential. A better solution would be
|
|
simply to make any "unauthorized access" of computerized medical records data a
|
|
misdemeanor, with the intentional modification or destruction of such data
|
|
designated as a felony.
|
|
|
|
Amend, But Don't Expand
|
|
|
|
These slight but important amendments would serve to clarify and improve a
|
|
basically sound law without stifling the creativity of persons akin to those
|
|
who have been responsible for many of the advances in computer technology in
|
|
this country. More expansive revisions are ill-advised, as they may
|
|
unnecessarily encroach on evolving privacy and free-expression interests.
|
|
|
|
A broadening of federal involvement is also inappropriate. Nearly every state
|
|
has enacted laws against computer fraud and abuse and, as Congress recognized
|
|
in 1986, federal jurisdiction should be limited to cases where there is a
|
|
compelling federal interest. This might include instances where computers
|
|
belonging to the federal government or to financial institutions are involved,
|
|
or cases where the crime itself is interstate in nature. Furthermore, other
|
|
computer crimes should be left to prosecution by the individual states, as is
|
|
presently the case.
|
|
|
|
In sum, the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act would benefit from some
|
|
clarification, but expansion of its coverage and wholesale revisions are both
|
|
ill-advised and unnecessary.
|
|
|
|
Note: Thomas A Guidoboni is an attorney with Bonner & O'Connell in Washington,
|
|
D.C. He represented Robert T. Morris in the Internet virus case.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Private Social Security Data Sold to Information Brokers February 29, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By R.A. Zaldivar (San Jose Mercury News)
|
|
|
|
Washington, D.C. -- The privacy of 200 million Americans with records at the
|
|
Social Security Administration is threatened by an illegal trade in pilfered
|
|
computer files. Computerization has dramatically improved our ability to serve
|
|
the public," Social Security Deputy Commissioner Louis Enoff told a Senate
|
|
panel. "However, it has also made confidentiality more difficult."
|
|
|
|
Two executives of Nationwide Electronic Tracking, a Tampa, Florida, company,
|
|
pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges in January for their part in a national
|
|
network selling Social Security records. Twenty-three people, including agency
|
|
employees and police officials, have been indicted in the case -- the largest
|
|
known theft of government computer data. "Information brokers" will pay Social
|
|
Security employees $25 for a person's earnings history and then sell the data
|
|
for as much as $300. Their growing list of customers includes lawyers, private
|
|
investigators, employers, and insurance companies.
|
|
|
|
Social Security records contain a mother lode of information that includes not
|
|
only a person's past earnings but names of employers, family history and even
|
|
bank account numbers of people who receive benefits by direct deposit. The
|
|
information can be used to find people or to make decisions on hiring, firing,
|
|
suing or lending, said Larry Morey, deputy inspector general of the Health and
|
|
Human Services Department.
|
|
|
|
"Here we have a large-scale invasion of the Social Security system's
|
|
confidentiality," said Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., chairman of the
|
|
Social Security subcommittee.
|
|
|
|
Information from other government data bases with records on individuals --
|
|
such as the FBI's National Criminal Information Center -- is also available on
|
|
the underground market. All a broker needs is the cooperation of a clerk at a
|
|
computer terminal.
|
|
|
|
Congress may revise privacy laws to increase penalties for illegally disclosing
|
|
information in the private files of individuals.
|
|
|
|
Enoff said Social Security is studying ways to improve computer security, as
|
|
well as keeping closer tabs on employees with access to files, and stressing to
|
|
its workers that unauthorized disclosure of information is a federal crime.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Related articles can be found in Phrack World News, Issue 37, Part One:
|
|
|
|
Indictments of "Information Brokers" January 1992
|
|
Taken from The Privacy Journal
|
|
|
|
SSA, FBI Database Violations Prompt Security Evaluations January 13, 1992
|
|
By Kevin M. Baerson (Federal Computer Week)(Pages 1, 41)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Back to Act I March 3, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 2)
|
|
|
|
"Supreme Court Lets Stand Ruling That FCC Ban On Indecency Is Unconstitutional"
|
|
|
|
FCC's 24-hour ban on indecent programming is unconstitutional, U.S. Supreme
|
|
Court ruled in refusing to consider unanimous U.S. Appeals Court, D.C.,
|
|
decision. Supreme Court action also effectively overruled December 1988 rider
|
|
to Senate appropriations bill directing FCC to ban all indecent programming.
|
|
Last summer, en banc Appeals Court had refused to reconsider May decision by
|
|
unanimous 3-judge panel that FCC ban is unconstitutional.
|
|
|
|
FCC, with support of Justice Department, had asked Supreme Court to reconsider
|
|
case. Coalition of 14 intervenors, including Action for Children's TV (ACT),
|
|
had opposed FCC in Appeals Court and Supreme Court. En banc Appeals Court said
|
|
that none of 13 judges who participated "requested the taking of a vote" on
|
|
whether to rehear case. On Supreme Court, Justices Sandra O'Connor and Byron
|
|
White voted to reconsider case. FCC's definition of indecency: "Language or
|
|
material that depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
|
|
contemporary community standards . . . sexual or excretory activities or
|
|
organs." Agency has fined several stations for indecent programming in the
|
|
last year.
|
|
|
|
With loss in Supreme Court, FCC official told us "we don't have any choices
|
|
left" but to permit such programming to be broadcast. "We're back to Act I."
|
|
Source predicted, and other FCC officials agreed, that agency soon will issue
|
|
rulemaking to make a ban on indecent programming later than 8 p.m. Same
|
|
sources expect Congress once again to take up issue.
|
|
|
|
ACT President Peggy Charren said: "It's very exciting for ACT to have won one
|
|
for the First Amendment. We always knew it's preposterous for the FCC to try
|
|
to ban speech at 3 o'clock in the morning to protect children . . . It's very
|
|
satisfying to have this particular [conservative] Supreme Court agree with us."
|
|
NAB (which also was intervernor in case) Associate General Counsel Steve
|
|
Bookshester said Supreme Court "correctly" acted in not reviewing lower court
|
|
decision: "Now, it's up to the Commission to adopt new procedures to determine
|
|
when such material is permitted to be broadcast." Washington attorney Timothy
|
|
Dyk, who represented intervenors, said: "I think it's a very happy result . . .
|
|
The Court of Appeals decision is exactly where it should be in terms of a safe
|
|
harbor."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Drug Enforcement Data Are Vulnerable Through Phone Lines March 4, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 5)
|
|
|
|
Classified information in computers of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is
|
|
at risk, General Accounting Office (GAO) said in a report. It said DEA doesn't
|
|
provide adequate protection of classified information because too many people
|
|
have access to computers that store data, and computers with classified
|
|
information are hooked into nonsecure telephone lines, making them vulnerable
|
|
to outside intrusion.
|
|
|
|
Report, Computer Security: DEA Is Not Adequately Protecting National Security
|
|
Information (GAO/IMTEC-92-31), said it found several instances of lax physical
|
|
and electronic security at DEA computers in several locations. Although there
|
|
are no known instances of security breaches, "these disturbing security
|
|
weaknesses pose serious risks that could potentially hinder DEA's mission and
|
|
threaten the lives of federal agents," the report said. The report found that
|
|
DEA isn't complying with standard security guidelines outlined by National
|
|
Security Agency.
|
|
|
|
In preliminary findings, GAO was so concerned with security weaknesses that it
|
|
called in Department of Justice on January 9 and furnished it with a "limited
|
|
official use" version of its report to give DEA time to correct problems, said
|
|
Rep. Wise (D-W.Va.), chairman of House Government Operations Subcommittee, who
|
|
ordered the investigation. He said other government agencies should be wary of
|
|
sharing information with DEA until security problems have been eliminated.
|
|
Calls to DEA on progress of follow-up security procedures weren't returned.
|
|
Findings are "indicative" of typical "apathetic security attitude" that the
|
|
government has, said David Banisar, security expert for Computer Professionals
|
|
for Social Responsibility.
|
|
|
|
GAO investigators found DEA couldn't adequately identify what computers used
|
|
classified information. "DEA cannot ensure that adequate safeguards are in
|
|
place for protecting national security information," report said. In spite of
|
|
federal guidelines, GAO found that DEA hasn't "completed a risk analysis" of
|
|
computer system. Some classified computers were found to be operated in areas
|
|
where contractors -- with no security clearances -- moved around with no
|
|
restrictions. No computers were found to be "tempest" hardened, meaning
|
|
electronic emissions from keyboards can't be picked up.
|
|
|
|
In light of concern on outside intrusion from "hackers," GAO found several DEA
|
|
computers were connected by phone lines "that are not encrypted" -- which it
|
|
described as clear violation of national security guidelines. The report said
|
|
"unauthorized individuals can intercept or monitor information emanating from
|
|
and transmitted by" the agency without being detected. Classified information
|
|
was found to be stored on hard disks in an "inadvertent" manner, allowing for
|
|
the possibility that computers, when resold, still might hold data. One such
|
|
occurrence, recorded by GAO in its report, occurred last year when sensitive
|
|
grand jury information on informants was left on surplus computers sold by DoJ
|
|
at a public auction.
|
|
|
|
The report said that DEA has acknowledged weaknesses "and is taking action to
|
|
correct them."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
BBS Controversy Brews Close To Home March 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Puget Sound Computer User
|
|
Special Thanks: Peter Marshall in Telecom Digest
|
|
|
|
In a case before the Public Utility Commission of Oregon, US West is
|
|
maintaining three phone lines connected to a free-access BBS in a residence
|
|
should be billed at business rates. Because of the similarities in tariffs
|
|
>from state to state and US West's position in the case, many are predicting
|
|
that if US West prevails, the company will be authorized to raise all Oregon
|
|
BBS lines to business rates and try to raise rates for BBS lines in US West's
|
|
remaining 13 states.
|
|
|
|
The case started when Tony Wagner, a Portland system operator, received a
|
|
letter from US West in October, 1991. In the letter, Communications Consultant
|
|
Sandi Ouelette said "Bulletin board services are considered a business,
|
|
therefore, subject to business rates ..."
|
|
|
|
One Seattle attorney interested in telecommunications said these attempts by
|
|
the phone companies to raise rates for BBSes are "just another attempt to swipe
|
|
people's communication."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
1-800-54-PRIVACY March 10, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily
|
|
|
|
American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) President Cathleen Black asked
|
|
American Paper Institute to support the newspaper industry's fight against
|
|
RHCs, warning that the market for paper could drop if phone companies are
|
|
allowed to expand activities into information services. Increased electronic
|
|
classified ads and other services could lead to cutbacks in demand for
|
|
newsprint, Black said. Newspaper producers, traditionally allied with ANPA,
|
|
said they would study the matter.
|
|
|
|
Meanwhile, full-page newspaper ads placed by ANPA and allied Consumer
|
|
Federation, Graphic Communications International Union, National Newspaper
|
|
Association, and Weatherline have generated thousands of calls to an 800 number
|
|
>from readers concerned about potential invasions of privacy by telephone
|
|
companies. The latest ad ran in the March 7 Washington Post, under the
|
|
headline: "Unless they're stopped, the Bells will know more about you than
|
|
even the IRS." The ad advised callers to dial 1-800-547-7482, referred to in
|
|
the telephone message as "1-800-54-privacy."
|
|
|
|
Gary Slack, of the Chicago PR firm Slack, Brown & Myers, which is coordinating
|
|
the 800 campaign, said that the angle in the ad has become an effective weapon
|
|
against RHCs because "there are a lot of people concerned about privacy."
|
|
Callers are sent a 4-page letter signed by Black and "action guidelines" for
|
|
asking legislators to support bills by Representative Cooper (D-Tenn.)
|
|
(HR-3515) and Senator Inouye (D-Hawaii) (S-2112) that would restrict RHC entry
|
|
into information services. ANPA has argued that, through data on telephone
|
|
bills, information can be collected about callers.
|
|
|
|
RHCs didn't have the incentive to use that data before, but now with the
|
|
ability to offer information services, they do, ANPA said. ANPA generally
|
|
doesn't pay for ads, but offers them to newspapers to run when they have space,
|
|
a spokesman said. Pacific Telesis Vice-President Ronald Stowe said ANPA ads
|
|
"show desperation and questionable ethics." He said ANPA is using some of same
|
|
tactics it has accused RHCs of using, including collecting information on
|
|
subscribers. ANPA ads are "really sewer-level stuff," Stowe said: "There are
|
|
enough legitimate issues that ought to be debated."
|
|
|
|
*** Editor's Note: For more information on this story, please see "Standing Up
|
|
To Fight The Bells" by Knight Lightning in this issue of Phrack.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Missouri Bulletin Board Case Settled March 24, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 6)
|
|
|
|
Southwestern Bell in Missouri has filed a new tariff with the Missouri Public
|
|
Service Commission (PSC) to allow computer bulletin board (BBS) operators to
|
|
use residential lines. The tariff would take effect April 10 if there are no
|
|
complications. Under proposal, the BBS operators at homes would be allowed to
|
|
continue to use residence lines if they don't "solicit or require any
|
|
remuneration, directly or indirectly, in exchange for access" and use 4 or
|
|
fewer residential lines priced at flat rates.
|
|
|
|
BBSes that don't meet those requirements would be required to use business
|
|
lines. The tariff, negotiated between SWB and representatives of BBS
|
|
operators, defines a BBS as "a data calculating and storage device(s) utilized
|
|
as a vehicle to facilitate the exchange of information through the use of
|
|
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company facilities." BBS language is part of a
|
|
high-grade Information Terminal Service originally aimed at business users with
|
|
computers, but interpreted by BBS operators as targeted at them. SWB
|
|
originally had wanted to make the new service mandatory for computers with
|
|
modems, but the new proposal, submitted March 11, makes it optional.
|
|
|
|
*** Editor's Note: For more information, please see the numerous articles on
|
|
this topic in Phrack World News, Issue 37, Part 3.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
In a surprising turn of events, the April 14, 1992 issue of Communications
|
|
Daily reports that U.S. West in the state of Washington has decided not to
|
|
follow the example of Oregon attempt to raise rates for electronic bulletin
|
|
board (BBS) hobbyists.
|
|
|
|
Patsy Dutton, consumer affairs manager for Washington Utilities &
|
|
Transportation Commission (WUTC), asked U.S. West about its policy after
|
|
receiving request from BBS operators.
|
|
|
|
In a letter dated March 31 to system operator Bruce Miller, Dutton said she had
|
|
reviewed U.S. West tariff and had talked with company representatives as to
|
|
current and future plans for BBS service: "The company indicates it has no
|
|
intention of changing its current procedure." Residential service would be
|
|
available for hobbyists, with business rates applying under other conditions.
|
|
|
|
An Oregon PUC law judge is currently considering complaint against U.S. West
|
|
for raising rates of bulletin board operators there.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Congress Explores Dropping Subsidy of Federal Science Network March 13, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 6)
|
|
|
|
"Fairness For All Is Urged"
|
|
|
|
In hearing, Representative Boucher (D-Va.) questioned National Science
|
|
Foundation (NSF) on its management policies and future direction of NSFnet,
|
|
national research network. He said it's "essential" that NSFnet be structured
|
|
so all commercial providers of network services "receive equal treatment" and
|
|
that government policy for managing the network "not favor any provider" or set
|
|
of providers.
|
|
|
|
The current process of using federal money to subsidize NSFnet is "obsolete"
|
|
said Mitchell Kapor, representing Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX)
|
|
Association, a consortium of commercial network services suppliers. Although
|
|
federal money was necessary in the "early stages," when technology for building
|
|
the network still was "experimental," now that the network is in place,
|
|
government subsidy should stop, Kapor said. He said CIX members can provide
|
|
"any level of service" needed by the same community served by NSFnet --
|
|
research and education. Kapor said CIX members could build and service
|
|
national backbones with "off-the-shelf" technology; however, he said, because
|
|
federal money goes to support the current network backbone, NSFnet users are
|
|
allowed on the network free and don't have an incentive to use commercial
|
|
services.
|
|
|
|
William Schrader, president of Performance Systems International (PSI), said
|
|
government could level the playing field by providing money directly to
|
|
individual universities and letting them choose, on a "free-market" basis,
|
|
which network service provider to use. That system, he said, would provide
|
|
incentive for several suppliers to upgrade networks in efforts to corral most
|
|
customers. Kapor said it also would "push the envelope" of technology to an
|
|
even greater level. With the current system in place, the technological level
|
|
of the network will evolve more slowly because there would be no incentive to
|
|
provide a higher level of service, he said.
|
|
|
|
Current users of NSFnet spoke against changing the status quo. Michael
|
|
Roberts, VP-networking for Educom, a task force of 48 universities, said that
|
|
removing funding for the network would be "horrendous." By requiring
|
|
individual universities to seek out their own service providers, he said,
|
|
government would have to institute another level of bureaucracy, creating
|
|
"thousands of entitlements," which would be impossible logistically. Douglas
|
|
Van Houweling, speaking for NSFnet manager Merit, said removal of funding most
|
|
likely would upset the networks' level of stability, leading to disruption in
|
|
service that "millions of users" have become accustomed to. By letting "any
|
|
number" of commercial providers supply network services, there would be no
|
|
guarantee of level of service, which is a "vital" mission of research labs,
|
|
universities and federal agencies now using the network, Van Houweling said.
|
|
|
|
Federal agencies would rather have a stable network than improved service, said
|
|
Stephen Wolff, director of NSF's Networking & Communications Division. He told
|
|
Boucher that federal agencies didn't want the network open to competition
|
|
because they feared it would degrade the quality of service. Wolff said NSF
|
|
would proceed with its plan to commercialize network "within 5 years" as
|
|
requested under the recently voted High-Performance Computing Act. He also
|
|
said he had presented to universities the idea of providing them with federal
|
|
money and letting them purchase network services in the free market. The
|
|
proposal was "soundly rejected," he said, because universities didn't feel they
|
|
were able to make such decisions. Instead, they supported NSF's current
|
|
proposal of rebidding network management so that 2 network providers would be
|
|
in place. The new system would operate on model of government's FTS 2000
|
|
program. NSF would grant awards for network services to 2 companies and have an
|
|
independent 3rd party act as "traffic manager" to ensure one network provider
|
|
wasn't favored over another.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
MCI and Sprint Take Steps To Cut Off Swindlers April 1, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Kent Gibbons (The Washington Times)(Page C1)
|
|
|
|
MCI and Sprint are cracking down on telephone fraud.
|
|
|
|
The two long-distance carriers are tackling different kinds of swindles,
|
|
though:
|
|
|
|
* MCI said it will stop sending out bills for pay-per-call operators who
|
|
promise help getting a loan, credit, a credit card or a job.
|
|
|
|
* Sprint said it will offer large business customers a form of liability
|
|
insurance against unauthorized use of corporate switchboard lines.
|
|
|
|
MCI Communications Corporation of the District said it wanted to protect
|
|
consumers who might be gulled into overpaying for some "900-number" services
|
|
during economic troubles.
|
|
|
|
But long-distance carriers are also guarding their own bottom lines by
|
|
tightening up pay-per-call standards, said telecommunications analyst James
|
|
Ivers.
|
|
|
|
"They're acting fiscally responsibly because traditionally, these were the
|
|
types of programs that created a high level of uncollectible" bills when
|
|
ripped-off consumers refused to pay, said Mr. Ivers, senior analyst with
|
|
Strategic Telemedia, a consulting firm in New York.
|
|
|
|
Last September, Sprint Corporation, of Kansas City, MO, told more than 90
|
|
percent of its 900-number customers it would no longer do their billing. Long-
|
|
distance firms cannot refuse to carry pay-per-call services, but most 900-
|
|
number operators do not want the expense and trouble of doing their own
|
|
collections.
|
|
|
|
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., of New York, said it has set up strict
|
|
guidelines for all 900-number firms, such as disclosing in advertising any fees
|
|
charged for credit processing.
|
|
|
|
AT&T spokesman Bob Nersesian said: "We still think there are legitimate
|
|
providers of this kind of service and our guidelines keep the dishonest guys
|
|
off the network."
|
|
|
|
Sprint's switchboard-fraud liability protection is aimed at big customers,
|
|
whose Sprint bills are more than $30,000 per month.
|
|
|
|
For an installation fee (up to $5,000) and a monthly charge (also up to
|
|
$5,000), Sprint will absorb fraudulent phone charges above $25,000 per
|
|
switchboard. The customer pays the first $25,000. Sprint's liability ends at
|
|
$1 million.
|
|
|
|
Large and medium-sized companies can rack up huge bills if their private
|
|
switches, known as private branch exchanges or PBXes, are broken into and used
|
|
to make calls to other countries.
|
|
|
|
In a recent case, more than 20,000 calls were made on a company's PBX over a
|
|
weekend, with the charges estimated at more than $1 million, said M.R. Snyder,
|
|
executive director of Communications Fraud Control Association, a Washington
|
|
trade group.
|
|
|
|
"It is certainly a fraud target that is ripe for being abused," Ms. Snyder
|
|
said, especially since telephone carriers have improved their ability to spot
|
|
unauthorized credit-card calls more quickly.
|
|
|
|
Overall, telecommunications fraud costs phone carriers and customers an
|
|
estimated $1.2 billion per year, although the figure is really just a
|
|
"guesstimate," Ms. Snyder said.
|
|
|
|
Company PBXes often have features that allow traveling employees, or distant
|
|
customers, to call in and tap an outgoing line. With computer programs,
|
|
hackers can randomly dial numbers until they hit security codes.
|
|
|
|
Sometimes the codes are only four digits, so hackers don't even need a
|
|
computer, said Bob Fox, Sprint's assistant vice president of corporate
|
|
security.
|
|
|
|
Along with the fees, customers must agree to take certain precautions. Those
|
|
include using security codes at least eight digits long and eliminating the
|
|
ability to tap outside lines through voice mail. In return, Sprint will also
|
|
monitor PBX use every day, instead of the five days per week currently done
|
|
free for customers, Mr. Fox said.
|
|
|
|
MCI spokesman John Houser said his company will be watching Sprint to see if
|
|
the program is a success. Spokesman Andrew Myers said AT&T offers fraud
|
|
protection to some corporate customers, but is not considering extending that
|
|
to cover PBX abuse.
|
|
|
|
AT&T is currently involved in several lawsuits over disputed PBX charges that
|
|
total "many millions" of dollars, Mr. Myers said. Sprint officials said they
|
|
have not sued any customers to collect on PBX fraud bills.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Sprint Offers Liability Limit For Corporate Phone Fraud April 1, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Edmund L. Andrews (New York Times)(Page D4)
|
|
|
|
The Sprint Communications Company, the nation's third-largest long-distance
|
|
carrier, said that it would limit the liability of large corporate customers
|
|
for the huge bills rung up by phone-service thieves who manipulate a company's
|
|
telephone switching equipment and voice-mail systems.
|
|
|
|
Typically, such thieves call into a company on one of its toll-free "800"
|
|
numbers and then figure out the codes necessary to obtain an outgoing line that
|
|
can be used to call anywhere in the world. These telephone "hackers" often
|
|
sell plundered telephone codes to illegal operators who then sell overseas
|
|
calls to hundreds of people at a time. Sprint officials said this sort of
|
|
fraud approached $1 billion a year.
|
|
|
|
The new Sprint plan would be available to companies that signed two-year
|
|
contracts to buy at least $30,000 of international long-distance service a
|
|
month and agreed to adopt a series of protective measures. These include
|
|
installing longer telephone codes that are harder for thieves to crack and new
|
|
limits on the ability of voice-mail systems to obtain outgoing lines.
|
|
|
|
In exchange, customers would be held responsible for no more than $25,000 in
|
|
stolen calls for each round of break-ins, and a maximum limit of $1 million a
|
|
year. Although that is still a substantial sum, it is much less than many
|
|
companies have lost in recent years from theft of service by telephone hackers.
|
|
|
|
A Point of Contention
|
|
|
|
Thieves broke into the switchboard of Mitsubishi International in New York in
|
|
1990, for example, and ran up $430,000 in overseas telephone calls. Procter &
|
|
Gamble lost $300,000 in a similar incident in 1988. Had either company been
|
|
operating under the new Sprint plan, its liability would have been limited to
|
|
$25,000.
|
|
|
|
Long-distance carriers and their corporate customers have long argued over who
|
|
should bear responsibility for the huge bills caused by service theft. The
|
|
carriers have maintained that their customers are responsible for these bills,
|
|
even if fraud is undisputed, arguing that the thieves took advantage of
|
|
weaknesses in the customers' equipment, rather than in the weaknesses of the
|
|
long-distance network itself.
|
|
|
|
But some corporate victims have argued that they had no idea their systems were
|
|
vulnerable, while others contend that they incurred big losses even after
|
|
adopting special security procedures.
|
|
|
|
MCI Moves Against '900' Fraud
|
|
|
|
In a separate issue involving telephone fraud, MCI Communications Corporation
|
|
said it would no longer provide billing services for companies that use "900"
|
|
numbers to offer credit cards, and that it would place tough new restrictions
|
|
on the use of 900 numbers to sell job-placement services, contests and
|
|
sweepstakes.
|
|
|
|
The long-distance company said its decision was based on numerous complaints
|
|
about abusive and fraudulent sales practices. Companies that provide
|
|
information through the use of telephone numbers with the 900 area code charge
|
|
callers a fee each time they call the number. MCI and other long-distance
|
|
companies carry these calls and bill customers on behalf of the company that
|
|
provides the information service.
|
|
|
|
Pam Small, an MCI spokeswoman, declined to say how much revenue the company
|
|
would lose because of the suspension. But she said the 900 services that would
|
|
be affected represented a small part of its pay-per-call business.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|