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==Phrack Magazine==
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Volume Four, Issue Forty-Four, File 10 of 27
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****************************************************************************
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[Editor's Note: This file is reprinted with permission of InterPact
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Press. The actual document contains many pictures, charts, and tables
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that due to our format, we were unable to reproduce. We encourage the
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reader to contact InterPact Press at 813-393-6600 and order a hard copy
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of the document for $25.00]
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Protective Measures Against Compromising Electro Magnetic Radiation
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Emitted by Video Display Terminals
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by Professor Erhart Moller
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University of Aachen, Aachen, Germany
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0. Introduction
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Compromising electromagnetic radiation emitted by machinery or
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instruments used in data processing or communication engineering can be
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received, decoded and recorded even across large distances. It is also
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possible to recognize the data or information which was processed and
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transmitted by the emitting instrument as text in clear. Compromising
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emitted electromagnetic radiation thus jeopardizes the protection and
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security of data.
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The Laboratory for Communication Engineering at the Fachhochschule
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Aachen is developing protective measures against compromising emission
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of radiation. However, these protective measures can only be effective
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if they are derived from the characteristics, the effects, and risks of
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compromising emitted electromagnetic radiation. Therefore we first
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consider only the forms of appearance and the characteristics of
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compromising emitted electromagnetic radiation.
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1. Compromising Emitted Electromagnetic Radiation
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In this context one often refers only to the so-called computer
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radiation. But this is only one form of compromising emitted
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electromagnetic radiation. There are three types of such emissions.
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1.1. Types of Compromising Emitted Electromagnetic Radiation
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Figure 1.1 shows an n example of an arbitrary electric device with various
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electric connections: a power supply line, a high frequency coaxial
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transmission line, and a coolant line with in- and outflux. This device
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emits three types of compromising electromagnetic radiation:
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1. electromagnetic radiation in form of electric and magnetic fields
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and electromagnetic waves;
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2. electromagnetic waves on the outer surface of all coaxial metallic
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connections (shell waves);
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3. electric interference currents and interference voltages in power
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lines connected to the device.
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Each of the three types can be transformed into the other two. For
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instance, shell waves can be emitted as fields or waves. On the other
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hand, electromagnetic waves can be caught by a nearby conductor and can
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propagate on it as shell waves. These phenomena are the reason for the
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difficult control of compromising electromagnetic radiation, and they
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imply that one must deal with all and not just one form of compromising
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electromagnetic radiation. Also, electromagnetic protection against
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compromising emitted radiation must deal with all forms of it.
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1.2. Examples of Compromising Emitted Electromagnetic Radiation
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To exemplify the three types of compromising electromagnetic radiation
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we consider the monitor depicted in figure 1.2.
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1.2.1. Compromising Electromagnetic Radiation
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Figure 1.3. shows the experimental set-up. The video display
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terminal is connected via the power line to the power supply. The
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power line is surrounded by absorbers so that the terminal can only emit
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electromagnetic radiation. The absorbers prevent the generation of
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shell waves on the power line. The dipole antenna of the television
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receiver is 10 m from the video terminal. Figure 1.4. shows the screen
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of the television receiver after it received and decoded the signal.
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Not only is the large FH=AC well readable but also the smaller letters.
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This demonstration yields the following results:
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* The video display terminal emits electromagnetic radiation;
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* Despite being within (standards committee) norms the emitted
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electromagnetic radiation can be received and decoded across a certain
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distance;
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* The electromagnetic radiation emitted by the terminal can be decoded
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into readable information and symbols on a television screen.
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Therefore, this emitted radiation is compromising.
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1.2.2. Compromising Surface or Shell Waves
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The video display terminal and the television receiver are positioned as
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in figure 1.5. The power line of the terminal is surrounded by a
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current transformer clamp which absorbs the shell waves. The television
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screen shows again the picture seen in figure 1.4. The quality of the
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picture is often better than in the previous case. Another experiment
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would demonstrate that secondary shell waves can form on a nearby
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conductor. The emitted radiation is then caught by nearby conductors
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and continues to propagate as shell waves. These emissions also give
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good receptions but are almost uncontrollable along their path of
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propagation.
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1.2.3. Demonstration of Compromising Emitted Radiation Through the
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Power Line
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Figure 1.6 shows the experimental set-up for the proof of compromising
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power supply voltages. The video display terminal acts as a generator
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whose current and voltage is entered into the power supply. Using a
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capacitive line probe, the entered signal can be retrieved and fed into
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the television receiver.
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This form of transmission is the known basis for intercom systems or
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so-called babysitter monitors where the signals are transmitted from
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room to room via the energy supply lines in a home. As in the case
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of electromagnetic radiation or shell waves, one obtains the same
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picture quality as in figure 1.4.
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2. Facts About Compromising Emitted Radiation
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Protective measures against compromising emitted radiation are not only
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determined by the above-mentions\ed three types of compromising
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emissions but also by taking into account the following data:
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# level of intensity and spectral distribution;
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# frequency (emission frequency) and frequency range;
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# directional characteristics of the radiation.
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These data can then be used to derive the damping and the
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amplitude-frequency response for the protective measure and its
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location.
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2.1. Emission Spectrum and Level of Intensity
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The spectral distribution of compromising emitted radiation depends on
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the frequencies used to generate the picture on a screen. The regular
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repetition of dots and lines gives rise to the video and line frequency
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which is found in the spectrum. However, the emission of video or line
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frequencies is not compromising since their knowledge does not yet give
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access to processed data. If the lines are covered regularly by
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symbols, a symbol frequency is obtained which is also detectable in the
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spectrum. A single symbol consists of a dot or pixel matrix.
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The dot matrix of the symbol @ is also known in figure 2.1 The electron
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beam scans the individual dots or pixels line-by-line and keys them
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bright or dark. This keying is done using the so-called dot or pixel
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frequency. For instance, the highest keying frequency is obtained by
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scanning the center of the @ symbol since there one has a long sequence
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of successive bright and dark pixels. It also follows from figure 2.1
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that the keying is slower, i.e., the keying frequency is lower, along
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the upper part of the @ symbol because of a long sequence of only dark
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or bright pixels. It follows that the emissions due to the keying
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frequency are highly compromising since they give direct information
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about the structure of the picture.
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Until recently, the frequencies in the following table were used:
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video frequency 45 Hz - 55 Hz
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line frequency 10 kHz - 20 kHz
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symbol frequency 2 MHz - 5 MHz
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dot or pixel frequency 15 MHz - 20 MHz.
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The pulses for the electron beam are formed in the video part, i.e., the
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video amplifier, of the monitor. Therefore, the cathode-grid of the
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picture tube and the video amplifier are the main emitters of radiation.
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The upper diagram in figure 2.2 shows the calculated spectrum for the
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cathode-keying. It represents a sequence of dots from the center of the
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@ symbol using a dot-sequential frequency of 18 MHz. The diagram in the
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center of figure 2.2 shows the measured spectrum at the keyed cathode of
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the picture tube. The agreement between the calculated and measured
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spectrum for the frequency is clearly visible. However, the calculated
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and measured spectral representation differ in the form of the envelopes.
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In the measured spectrum one finds an amplitude increase between 175 MHz
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and 225 MHz. This increase is usually found in the same or similar form
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in monitors. The reasons for this amplitude increase are design,
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construction parts, and dimensions of the video display terminal. In
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the lower part of figure 2.2 we see the compromising radiation emitted by
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the terminal as measured at a distance of 10 m. The spectrum of the
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radiation emitted by the terminal is superimposed by broadcast, radio
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and interference spectra since the measurement took place on open
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ground. Despite this interference one can recognize the typical form of
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the cathode spectrum. The increase in the amplitude between 175 MHz
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and 225 MHz presents a particular risk since the television transmitters
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for Band III operate within this frequency range and all television sets are
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tuned to it (see figure 2.2).
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A comparison of the intensity level of the television transmitter with the
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level of the compromising radiation in figure 2.2 shows their agreement.
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It is therefore not very difficult to receive the compromising radiation in
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proximity of the emitter using only a regular television set with normal
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sensitivity.
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Figure 2.3 shows the spectral distribution of compromising shell waves
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emitted by the video display terminal. Here again one recognizes the
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particular form of the dot or pixel frequency. The height of the shell wave
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spectrum is much lower at higher frequencies than the height of the
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radiation spectrum. The shell waves have lower intensity in the range of
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broadcast television but higher intensity in the range of cable television.
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To receive the shell waves a television set must be cable-ready.
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Figure 2.4 shows the spectrum for the third type of emission: the
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compromising currents and voltages entering the power supply lines. It
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is very similar to the shell wave spectrum. The height of this spectrum at
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higher frequencies is even smaller than the shell wave spectrum. In
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order to receive any signal a cable-ready television set must be used.
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The intensity of the currents and voltages is so high that they can
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easily be received using a regular television set with normal
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sensitivity.
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2.2. Frequency and Frequency Range
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It follows from figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 that the best reception for
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the three types of emissions is for the following frequencies:
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compromising radiation approx. 200 MHz;
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compromising shell waves approx. 60 MHz;
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compromising voltages approx. 20 MHz.
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The video information of the picture on the monitor has a frequency
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range of half a spectral arc. The frequency range of the receiver must
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therefore be 10 MHz for all three types of emission.
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2.3. Directional Characteristics of the Radiation
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Figure 2.5 shows the directional characteristics for compromising
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radiation emitted by a video display terminal inside a plastic casing.
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According to this diagram the lateral radiation dominates. The field
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intensity along the front and back direction is about 30% of the lateral
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intensity. The power of the emitted radiation along these directions is
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only about 10% of the power emitted laterally. The range for the
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emitted radiation along the front and back direction is therefore also
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reduced to 30%. This phenomenon suggests for the first time a
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protection against compromising radiation, namely proper positioning of
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the device.
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The compromising shell waves and power line voltages propagate according
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to the configuration of the lines. There is no preferred direction.
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2.4. Range
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The range of compromising radiation emitted from a video display
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terminal is defined as the maximum distance between the emitting
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terminal and a television receiver and readable picture.
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The range can be very different for the three types of emitted
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radiation. It depends on the type of emitter and the path of
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propagation.
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The spectacular ranges for emitted ranges are often quoted - some of
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which do not always come from the technical literature - give in general
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no indication just under which conditions they were obtained. It is
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therefore meaningful to verify these spectacular ranges before using
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them.
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2.4.1. The Range of Compromising Emitted Radiation
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The dependence of the field intensity on distance is illustrated in
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figure 2.6.
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The dependence of the range on the receiver used is shown at 25 m, 40 m,
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and 80 m. The field intensity at 25 m is just strong enough to receive
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a picture with an ordinary television receiver using the set-up in figure
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1.3. If one uses a narrow-band television antenna or a noiseless antenna
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amplifier than the field intensities at 40 m and 80 m, respectively, are
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still strong enough to receive a legible picture.
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The flattening out of the curve at large distances suggests that the
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range can be increased to several hundred meters by using more sensitive
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antenna or better receivers. The range can also be increased through a
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high altitude connection, for instance, if both emitter and receiver are
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in or on a high rise. This was verified by an experiment involving two
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high rises separated by over 150 m. A very clear picture was received
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using a relatively simple antenna with G = 6 db.
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2.4.2. Range of Compromising Shell Waves
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Measurements have shown that shell waves can propagate across a large
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area without any noticeable damping if only the surrounding metallic
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conductors extend also across the entire area.
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The propagation is reduced considerably by a metallic conductor that
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crosses metallic surfaces such as metal walls or metallic grids such as
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reinforcements in concrete walls.
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Dissipative building materials also damp shell waves. Lightweight
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construction such as the use of dry walls or plastic walls in large
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buildings increases the range of shell waves to about 100 m without the
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picture becoming illegible.
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2.4.3 Range of Emissions Through Power Supply Lines
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In this case the conditions are even less clear than in the previous
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cases. It must be assumed that inside a building the compromising
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currents and voltages can be received through the phase of the power
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supply lines feeding the video display terminal . The possibility of
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receiving the signal through other phase lines by coupling across phases
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in the power supply line cannot be excluded.
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The range depends very much on the type of set-up and the instruments
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used. It is conceivable that a range of about 100 m can be obtained.
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3. Protective Measures
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Protective measures fall into three categories:
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- modification of devices and instruments by changing procedures
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and circuitry;
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- heterodyning by noise or signals from external sources;
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- shielding, interlocking, and filtering.
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3.1. Instrument Modification
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The instrument modifications consist of changing the signal processing
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method and the circuitry of the instrument. It is the objective of
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these measures to alter the spectral distribution and intensity of the
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emitted radiation in such a way that the reception by television sets or
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slightly modified television sets is no longer possible.
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For instance, a change of procedure could consist of a considerable
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increase in the dot or pixel frequency, the symbol and line frequencies.
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A reduction in the impulse amplitude and impulse slope also changes the
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reduction in the impulse slope also changes emission spectrum so that
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reception is rendered more difficult. However, the subsequent
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modification of the video display terminal has serious disadvantages of
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its own: First of all, the user of video display terminals does in
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general not possess the personal and apparative equipment to perform the
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modifications. To complicate things further, the so-modified
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instruments loose their manufacturer's warranty and also their permit of
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operation issued by governmental telecommunication offices. A subsequent
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instrument modification by the user is for these reasons in general out
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of question.
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3.2. HETERODYNING STRATEGY
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We refer to a protective measure as a heterodyning strategy whenever the
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compromising emitted radiation is superimposed by electromagnetic noise
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of specific electromagnetic signals.
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The television set receives the compromising emitted radiation together
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with the superimposed noise of spurious signal. The noise or the
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spurious signal are such that a filtering out or decoding of the
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compromising emitted radiation by simple means is impossible.
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Since the noise and the spurious signal not only interfere with the
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television receiver of the listener but also with other television sets
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in the vicinity the heterodyning strategy is by all means in violation
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with the laws and regulations governing telecommunications. As far as
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is known, this is a protective measure only used under extremely
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important circumstances involving high government officials.
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3.3 Shielding
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In contrast to the previously considered protective measures, shielding
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has two important advantages:
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* shielding protects not only against compromising emitted radiation
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but also against electromagnetic emissions which can enter data
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processing devices from the outside and cause interference;
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* furthermore, shielding neither violates the laws governing the use
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of telecommunications nor does it jeopardize the manufacturer's
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warranty.
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The term shielding is used here to describe, shielding, interlocking,
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and filtering.
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3.3.1. Shielding Data
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The requirements on a shield are described by the shield damping. The
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shield damping is twenty times the logarithm of the ratio between the
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electric or magnetic field intensity inside the shield and outside the
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shield.
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Actual applications and individual situations may require different
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values for the shield. The shield data are derived from the so-called
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zone model. In the zone model one considers the type and intensity of
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the emitted radiation, the composition of the path of propagation, and
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the local accessibility for the receiver.
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The shield data not only influence the shield damping but also the
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frequency range of the shield's effectiveness. Figure 3.1 shows a
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diagram listing different types if shields according to regulations MIL
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STD 285 and 461B, NSA 656, and VG norms 95 375.
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3.3.2. Applicability of Shielding
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Electromagnetic shielding can be used on emitting or interfered with
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instruments, on building and rooms, and on mobile cabins.
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3.3.2.1. Shielding of Instruments
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The shielding of instruments though it can often be done very quickly
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and effortlessly is not without problems.
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In general but especially after subsequent installation, it can lead to
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a loss in design and styling of the shielded device. Openings in the
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shield, for instance for ventilation or control and operating elements,
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cannot always be sealed off completely. In this case they are emission
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openings with particularly high emission rates.
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Trying to maintain ergonometric conditions - good viewing conditions for
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the users - renders the shielding of screens especially difficult. If
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the casing of the instruments is not made of metal but of plastic, the
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following shielding materials are considered: metal foils, metal cloth,
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metal-coated plastics, electrolytical layers and coats of metallic paint
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or paste. Recently, the plastics industry is also offering metallized
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plies of fabric. Such glasses are for instance offered by VEGLA,
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Aachen. Ventilation openings are sealed off with metallic fabric of
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honey-comb wirings.
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Interlocking systems and filters on all leads coming out of the
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instrument prevent the emission of compromising shell waves and power
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supply voltages.
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3.3.2.2. Building and Room Shielding
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There are some advantages in shielding buildings and rooms. The
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building and room shielding lies solely in the competence of the user.
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Minor restrictions dealing with the static of the building and local
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building regulations only occur with external shielding. Building and
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room shielding offers a protection that is independent of the instrument
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or its type. It is a lasting and effective protection. Maintenance is
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minimal, and subsequent costs hardly exist. Interior design and room
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lay-out are not changed.
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If one requires better shielding values or a building and room design
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which emphasizes better comfort than greater expenses and thus higher
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costs will occur.
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3.3.2.3. Cabin Shielding
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Cabin shielding has all the advantages of building and room shielding.
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In addition, cabin shielding is not affected by the static of the
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building or local building regulations. Furthermore, cabin shielding
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requires less expenses and costs than building or room shielding.
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However, shielded cabins do not offer the same comfort or interior
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design as shielded buildings or rooms.
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3.3.3. Shielding Components
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Electromagnetic shielding consists of three components:
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# the actual shield together with various structural elements as a
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protection against emitted radiation;
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# the interlocking of all non-electric and electric supply lines to
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protect against shell waves;
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# electric filters at all supply lines to protect against compromising
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power supply voltages.
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3.3.3.1. The Electromagnetic Shield
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The shield consists of the hull and the shielding structural elements.
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3.3.3.1.1. Shield Hull - Method and Construction
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In general, one uses metal sheets or metal foil to construct
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electromagnetic shields for buildings and rooms. If one lowers the
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requirements on the shield damping and the upper limit frequency then
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screen wire, metallic nets, and - if properly constructed - even the
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reinforced wire net in concrete can be used; the obvious disadvantage
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is that the settlements or movements of the building can cause cracks
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that will render the shield ineffective.
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Therefore, only metal shields or strong wire netting is used for the
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construction of electromagnetically shielded cabins.
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The building or room shield can be built using several construction
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principles. Figure 3.2 above shows the essential construction principles.
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For the Sandwich construction, the shield is between the outer and inner
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layer of the wall. A new type of construction uses the Principle of
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the Lost Form. The shield itself which consists of 3 to 5 mm thick
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sheet iron is used as an inner layer in the manufacturing of concrete
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walls. The sheets touch one another and have to be welded together at
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the contact points. If the building or room shields he\ave to satisfy a
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special purpose then they have to be grounded at only one point; they
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have to be assembled in such a way that they electrically insulate
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against the building or room walls. The so-called inner shields offer
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this protection. In simple cases, the inners shield is placed on top of
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the walls maintaining insulation by using a special underneath
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construction. However, this space-saving and simple construction has a
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disadvantage; the part of the shield that faces the wall such as
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corrosion, settling or moving of the building, or damages due to work on
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||
the exterior of the building can no longer be detected. The use of
|
||
non-corrosive shield material or sufficient back ventilation of the
|
||
shield protects against corrosion in these cases. The self-supporting
|
||
inner shield is suspended from a supporting grid construction. This
|
||
construction can be similar to a cabin construction. In the case
|
||
of large rooms, such as halls, one should use a truss for statistical
|
||
reasons. The self-supporting inner shield has the advantage of
|
||
accessibility, although the usable room volume has been decreased.
|
||
|
||
In rooms where the shield is exposed to only slight mechanical wear and
|
||
tear and not required to shield completely, shielding metal foil is
|
||
glued directly to the wall and welded at the contact points.
|
||
|
||
The floor construction is almost the same for all four construction
|
||
principles. It is important that the floor onto which the shield is
|
||
placed is protected from humidity and is even. In the case of
|
||
electrically insulating layers of, for instance, laminated paper or PVC
|
||
are first put on the floor. The ceiling construction depends on the
|
||
specific requirements and necessities. The ceiling shield can be a
|
||
suspended metallic ceiling or a self-supporting ceiling construction.
|
||
|
||
3.3.3.1.2. Shield Construction Elements
|
||
|
||
Construction elements which seal off viewing openings or access openings
|
||
are called shield construction elements. Access openings are doors, gates,
|
||
and hatches. Viewing openings are windows.
|
||
|
||
The shielded doors, gates, and hatches serve two purposes: first to
|
||
close off the room, and second to shield the room.
|
||
|
||
The door, gate, or hatch shield is in general made of sheet iron.
|
||
Passing from the door or gate shield to the room shield causes
|
||
shield-technical problems. A construction which is due to the company
|
||
of TRUBE & KINGS has proven to be especially effective for this kind of
|
||
problem (see figure 3.3).
|
||
|
||
The set-on-edge door shield, the so-called knife, is moved into a
|
||
U-shape which contains spring contacts. The difference between this and
|
||
other available constructions is that the knife is not moved into the
|
||
spring upward. This construction reduces the wear and tear of the
|
||
transition point between door and room shield and thus increases the
|
||
durability of the construction which implies a better protection and
|
||
higher reliability. This construction by TRUBE & KINGS satisfies the
|
||
highest requirements on shield damping.
|
||
|
||
Windows in shielded room are sealed off with the shielding glass or
|
||
so-called honey-comb chimneys. It si understood that these windows are
|
||
not to be opened. Figure 3.4 shows the cross-section of a glass
|
||
especially developed by VEGLA for data processing rooms. The glass
|
||
consists of multiple layers which are worked into a very fine metallic
|
||
net and an evaporated metallic layer. The thickness of the wire is in
|
||
the range of a few micrometers so that the net is hardly visible. This
|
||
glass can also be manufactured so that it is rupture- and fire-resistant
|
||
and bullet-proofed.
|
||
|
||
Using glass one can reach shield dampings in the medium range (refer to
|
||
figure 3.1). Specially manufactured glass reaches even higher shield
|
||
dampings.
|
||
|
||
Figure 3.4 also shows the so-called honey-comb chimneys as manufactured
|
||
by SIEMENS. Visibility and the comfort of light are highly restricted.
|
||
But the advantage is that this type of shielding satisfies the
|
||
requirements for highest shield damping.
|
||
|
||
3.3.3.2. Interlocking
|
||
|
||
All non-electric supply lines leaving a shielded room must be
|
||
interlocked in order to protect against the propagation of shell and
|
||
surface waves. Water pipes, heating pipes, pneumatic and hydraulic
|
||
pipes are connected via rings to the metallic shield. Depending on the
|
||
required frequency range, the pipe diameter is also subdivided by filter
|
||
pieces. At high frequencies on can achieve dampings of up to 100dB
|
||
using such interlocking devices.
|
||
|
||
The ventilation of shielded rooms may cause problems. Problems will
|
||
occur if shield dampings up to the highest frequencies are required. In
|
||
this case one has to use two-step ventilation filters. The first step
|
||
consist of adding concave conductor filters which work for the
|
||
frequencies up to 200 GHz, the second step of adding absorber filters
|
||
which protect against compromising emitted frequencies above 200 GHz.
|
||
|
||
Figure 3.5 shows the set-up for the above-described ventilation lock
|
||
which is due to the SCHORCH.
|
||
|
||
3.3.3.3. Electric Filters
|
||
|
||
Filters must be put on electric power supply lines, telephone wires, and
|
||
data processing supply lines at the room exit point. The filters have
|
||
to be installed at the shield.
|
||
|
||
The filters used here are the same as the ones shown in the area of
|
||
electromagnetic compatibility.
|
||
|
||
4. Summary
|
||
|
||
Electric devices used in data processing, data transmission and data
|
||
handling emit electromagnetic radiation, electromagnetic shell and
|
||
surface waves, and currents and voltages in power supply lines,
|
||
telephone wires, and data supply lines.
|
||
|
||
If this emitted radiation carries actual data or information from the
|
||
data processing device then it is compromising.
|
||
|
||
Using a television receiver, it is very easy to receive, decode and make
|
||
these compromising emissions legibly. Several possibilities present
|
||
themselves as protective measures against compromising emissions from
|
||
data processing and data transmitting equipment. The use of shielding
|
||
in the form of room shields, interlocking of supply lines, and filters
|
||
for electric lines is the best protection for the user of data
|
||
processing, data transmitting, and data handling equipment. |