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285 lines
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Text
285 lines
15 KiB
Text
==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume One, Issue Six, Phile 11 of 13
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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*-=+^ Phrack World News ^+=-*
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Issue Five/Part 3
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Compiled and Written By
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Knight Lightning
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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Cracking Down On Abuse
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----------------------
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This article is from the January issue of MCI World, a monthly newsletter
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published by MCI for it's employees.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The nationwide attack on telephone fraud got a boost recently when the U.S.
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Secret Service joined the effort to curb the crime that costs the industry
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millions in lost revenue annually.
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The Secret Service used new jurisdiction over the telephone fraud for the first
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time to arrest five individuals in raids on four illegal "Call-Sell" operations
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in New York City last November.
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The five suspects are awaiting trial in federal court on charges based on a
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Secret Service investigation conducted in cooperation with MCI and other
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members of the long distance telephone industry.
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The defendants were charged with violation of a law on Fraud In Connection With
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Access Devices which carries maximum penalties of 15 years imprisonment and a
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fine of $50,000, or twice the value of the fraudulent activity.
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Several other investigations are under way and future arrests are expected,
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according to a Secret Service spokesman.
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MCI cooperated in the investigation as a company and through membership in the
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Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA), made up of some 35 telephone
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industry firms.
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"Because it's an industry-wide problem, we have organized to crack down on all
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kinds of fraud, from the isolated 'hacker' to more organized schemes to use
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long distance lines illegally," said Everick Bowens, senior manager of MCI
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security investigations and president of CFCA.
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The Secret Service said that in the New York cases, the defendants operated
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Call-Sell businesses out of their homes and charged "customers" a flat fee for
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making long distance calls. They used "Blue Boxes" and stolen or compromised
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authorization codes or credit card numbers to use the long-distance networks
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of several companies.
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Blue Boxes are electronic tone-generating devices used to bypass billing
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systems and gain access to company networks. They can be assembled from
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generally available electronic parts or they can be purchased ready-made
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through illegal sources.
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In the New York raids, agents seized unauthorized cods and credit card numbers,
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four Blue Boxes and more than 20 telephones.
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It is estimated that in 1984, fraud in the telecommunications industry totaled
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$500 million nationwide, and approximately $70 million in the New York City
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area.
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CFCA members are primarily inter-exchange carriers, such as MCI, but resale
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carriers and some Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) are also members, along with
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representatives of computer services and credit card companies.
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Bowens says CFCA is intensifying efforts to stop the spread of fraud. Among
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other things, CFCA is developing educational packages for carriers and the
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public to promote widespread understanding of telephone fraud and ways to
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counter the crime.
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"Our aim is jointly to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute any
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fraudulent use of our long-distance networks," Bowens said.
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Authorization codes are obtained by theft from individuals and by "hackers" who
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randomly try combinations of numbers by telephone or through computer scanning
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of number combinations until a working code is "hit." Illegally obtained codes
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are fraudulently used by "boiler room" telemarketing operations, for example,
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or are passed along for use by individuals.
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MCI had developed software to detect illegal entry into its network and it is
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expected that the spread of dial 1 service, in which authorization codes are
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not used, will help reduce the incidence of telephone fraud.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Comments from the Bootleg:
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You reckon they mean us???????????????
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What's wrong with them, can't they take a joke???????????
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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The Many Faces Of Fraud
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-----------------------
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The following is an article from the January issue of MCI World, a monthly
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newsletter published by MCI for it's employees.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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This new year will see a stepped up MCI attack on telephone fraud--illegal use
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of the long distance network through access by stolen authorization codes or
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electronic devices. The offensive is led by Everick Bowens, senior manager of
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MCI's security investigations department and president of the industry-wide
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Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA). Success in curbing this theft
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of service has earned MCI security investigators a reputation as super sleuths
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at headquarters and in the divisions.
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New teeth were added to the attack on telephone fraud when the U.S. Secret
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Service was assigned to augment continuing investigative efforts by the FBI and
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other law enforcement agencies.
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Because telephone fraud is outright theft from the company, MCI is determined
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to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute any illicit use of its network.
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To learn more about how MCI conducts its anti-fraud campaign, MCI World talked
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with Bowens.
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MCI World: Is it true that MCI has systems that can detect fraudulent activity
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while it is occurring?
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Bowens: Yes, our fraud systems detect abnormal usage and hacking. The systems
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also help us to track down offenders even when we have only the
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authorization code he or she is abusing. Because we can profile
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abusers and trace phone calls, it is easier for us to prepare cases
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for prosecution.
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MCI World: Abuses involving computer "hacking" to get authorization codes seem
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to attract public attention. But there are other types of fraud
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equally damaging to the telecommunications industry. Would you
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identify some of these?
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Bowens: The primary form of abuse is by "hackers," who use computer programs to
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derive customers' authorization codes. These codes can be widely
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disseminated via electronic bulletin boards. Because many of these
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boards are public, the codes fall into the hands of anyone with access
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to the boards. We also encounter electronic toll fraud, which involves
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tone-generating devices that allow offenders to place fraudulent calls.
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MCI World: Is one type of fraudulent activity more prevalent than another?
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Bowens: Nationwide, fraud most frequently originates from military posts,
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college campuses, and prisons--places where there are numbers of people
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far from home, or who have little else to do but manipulate the
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telephone. This type of abuse prompts the bulk of our investigations.
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MCI World: Who is most likely to commit fraud? Is there a general profile of
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the common offender?
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Bowens: Computer crime typically occurs in affluent, metropolitan suburbs
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and involves juveniles. Electronic fraud also occurs in major
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metropolitan areas. Other abusers, such as high-pressure
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tele-marketeers, usually follow the coast lines. California and
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Florida, for "boiler room" operations in which phone service is used
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illegally to sell merchandise. However, fraud can't be totally
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attributed to any specific group at any particular time.
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MCI World: How can you keep up with code abuse and fraud? Don't offenders
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change frequently?
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Bowens: Interestingly enough, the patterns don't change much. Those who commit
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fraud form a finite community that doesn't expand a great a great deal
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over time. Casual offenders, individuals who may take advantage of a
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"hot" toll free number, will use the number only when it's hot. Once
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the number no longer works, they're not likely to repeat the offense.
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On the other hand, repeat offenders are dedicated to getting something
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for nothing. They're somewhat easier to identify because they commit
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the same offense over and over.
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MCI World: How does MCI know when it is the target of fraudulent activity?
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Bowens: Our systems generally alert us, or an employee or a customer informs
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us. People know the MCI name. When they recognize something happening
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illegally with an authorization code, they'll get in touch with us.
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People generally feel that a cheat is a cheat, a crook is a crook, and
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if they have to pay full value for a phone call they see no reason why
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someone else shouldn't. There also are professional tipsters who go
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from one company to another offering information for a price. However,
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we rarely deal with them.
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MCI World: Which MCI people, by the nature of their jobs, are most likely to
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detect or at least suspect, fraudulent activity?
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Bowens: Our switch technicians have been very instrumental in detecting abuse.
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They're in a position to identify extensive busy signals on circuits,
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abnormal calling patterns, and code use. They've identified many
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hackers just by reviewing their daily call statistics. Employees in our
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billing department are also good at spotting unusually large bills and
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abnormal patterns. Though most fraud is detected by the systems we
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have in place, the human eye continues to be extremely helpful.
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MCI World: In addition to working with internal people to help detect
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fraudulent activity, you also rely on the expertise of external
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agencies. Which outside agencies assist you with investigations.
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Bowens: When fraudulent activity involves the theft or illicit use of
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authorization codes or credit calling cards, MCI and the Secret Service
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work together to investigate the case. If other activity is involved,
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such as the use of our service in furtherance of other crime, MCI works
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with the FBI. When the U.S. Postal Service is manipulated in a fraud
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case, MCI and postal inspectors investigate together. Additionally,
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Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) often provide hard evidence in cases
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that MCI prosecutes.
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MCI World: When you are alerted to suspected fraudulent activity, what steps do
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you take to open and pursue the case?
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Bowens: Security investigators contact the customer whose code is being abused,
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advise them of MCI's suspicions, and attempt to confirm them. If the
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response confirms their suspicion of fraud, they open the case.
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Normally, an investigation entails much research into toll records to
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identify abusers, unusual call patterns and the parties who might be
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involved in illicit activity. We also interview parties receiving the
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calls and document their statements. Once we collect sufficient
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evidence, we decide whether a case should be pursued as a criminal or
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civil action.
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MCI World: How long does it normally take MCI's investigators to "crack" a
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case?
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Bowens: Typically, investigators can crack a case within hours. Identifying
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fraud suspects is the easy part. Amassing the evidence--dotting all
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of the legal i's and crossing the t's--is tougher. Gathering evidence
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may take weeks and large cases involving many parties can take months
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to solve.
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MCI World: With fraudulent activity knowing no geographical restrictions, how
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do you segment the problem divisionally?
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Bowens: The security investigations department acts primarily in an advisory
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capacity, helping investigators in the divisions with procedural
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matters. The divisions generally take responsibility for investigating
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fraudulent activity within their jurisdictions and corporate
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investigators pursue cases that are large in scope or require specific
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expertise. Corporate also takes on cases involving offenders operating
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in more than one division.
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MCI World: Can you elaborate on MCI's goals for reducing the level of
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fraudulent activity?
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Bowens: We want to reduce fraud to the lowest possible level. One of MCI's
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goals is to cut fraud by more than half in 1986. We want to be the
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industry leader in curbing this illegal activity.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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Broadway Hacker Turned Fed Informant? June 2, 1986
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-------------------------------------
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Broadway Hacker recently called Phreakers Quest and left feedback to the
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sysop of that system (Shawn) saying, "I do believe that some of this
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information here is illegal." Shawn called Dark Creeper and reported this to
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him who then later told it to me.
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Sometime later, Broadway Hacker called Knight Bandit to voice validate him for
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The Radio Station. He claimed he was some sort of fed and that KB would be
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hearing from someone in Bell Security.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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The Radio Station is down because Broadway Hacker has sold his computer, his
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disks, and everything else and is moving to his new job at an unknown
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destination. When I spoke with him, he went on that he sold his user log, but
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would not comment on that any further. He wanted me to print that he was a fed
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and that all of his former users would soon be receiving visits from the FBI.
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This is exactly what he told Phantom Phreaker and several others which started
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a mass riot in the phreak world. One result was the takedown of Alliance for
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fear of its safety. It since has been put back up.
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Broadway justified his actions by saying that by telling rodents he was a fed,
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it would keep them off his board. Later he said that since he is leaving the
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phreak world and no one knows where he is going, "To hell with the phreak
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world, let it fall apart and die for all I care." So this fed scare is an
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attempt to do just that. Was it a joke? Did he mean that really? I don't
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know. Maybe he did mean it then but now has changed his mind...
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No one should be worried about this, everything is ok, and Broadway is not
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working with the FBI. He now claims that he needed his line free for business
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calls and all of the above were attempts to get people not to be calling him as
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he didn't have the time or patience. Use your own judgement.
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Broadway Hacker still has his Vic 20 and an old modem and is attempting to get
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back on boards. He has also stated that the Radio Station BBS will be put back
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up at the end of the summer. Where it will be run from is unknown although,
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Broadway speculated that when it returns it would be run off of an Amiga.
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Information Provided by
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Broadway Hacker/Dark Creeper/Knight Bandit/Phantom Phreaker
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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