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+## Using Content Security Policy (CSP)
+
+### What is it?
+
+Modern browsers have recently implemented a new feature providing
+a sort of "selinux for your web page".  If the server sends some
+new headers describing the security policy for the content, then
+the browser strictly enforces it.
+
+### Why would we want to do that?
+
+Scripting on webpages is pretty universal, sometimes the scripts
+come from third parties, and sometimes attackers find a way to
+inject scripts into the DOM, eg, through scripts in content.
+
+CSP lets the origin server define what is legitimate for the page it
+served and everything else is denied.
+
+The CSP for warmcat.com and libwebsockets.org looks like this,
+I removed a handful of whitelisted image sources like travis
+status etc for clarity...
+
+```
+"content-security-policy": "default-src 'none'; img-src 'self' data:; script-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none';",
+"x-content-type-options": "nosniff",
+"x-xss-protection": "1; mode=block",
+"x-frame-options": "deny",
+"referrer-policy": "no-referrer"
+```
+
+The result of this is the browser won't let the site content be iframed, and it
+will reject any inline styles or inline scripts.  Fonts, css, ajax, ws and
+images are only allowed to come from 'self', ie, the server that served the
+page.  You may inject your script, or deceptive styles: it won't run or be shown.
+
+Because inline scripts are banned, the usual methods for XSS are dead;
+the attacker can't even load js from another server.  So these rules
+provide a very significant increase in client security.
+
+### Implications of strict CSP
+
+Halfhearted CSP isn't worth much.  The only useful approach is to start
+with `default-src 'none'` which disables everything, and then whitelist the
+minimum needed for the pages to operate.
+
+"Minimum needed for the pages to operate" doesn't mean defeat the protections
+necessary so everything in the HTML can stay the same... it means adapt the
+pages to want the minimum and then enable the minimum.
+
+#### Inline styles must die
+
+All styling must go in one or more `.css` file served by the same server
+(preferably... you can whitelist other sources in the CSP if you have to).
+
+Inline styles are no longer allowed (eg, "style='font-size:120%'" in the
+HTML)... they must be replaced by reference to one or more CSS class, which
+in this case includes "font-size:120%".  This has always been the best
+practice anyway, and your pages will be cleaner and more maintainable.
+
+#### Inline scripts must die
+
+Inline scripts need to be placed in a `.js` file and loaded in the page head
+section, from the server that provided the page.
+
+Then, any kind of inline script, yours or injected or whatever, will be
+completely rejected by the browser.
+
+#### onXXX must be replaced by eventListener
+
+Inline `onclick` or whatever are kinds of inline scripting and are banned.
+
+Modern browsers have offered a different system called ["EventListener" for
+a while](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/EventListener) which allows binding of events to DOM elements in JS.
+
+A bunch of different named events are possible to listen on, commonly the
+`.js` file will ask for one or both of
+
+```
+window.addEventListener("load", function() {
+...
+}, false);
+
+document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
+...
+}, false);
+```
+
+These give the JS a way to trigger when either everything on the page has
+been "loaded" or the DOM has been populated from the initial HTML.  These
+can set up other event listeners on the DOM objects and aftwards the
+events will drive what happens on the page from user interaction and / or
+timers etc.
+
+If you have `onclick` in your HTML today, you would replace it with an id
+for the HTML element, then eg in the DOMContentLoaded event listener,
+apply 
+
+```
+   document.getElementById("my-id").addEventListener("click", function() {
+   ...
+   }, false);
+```
+
+ie the .js file becomes the only place with the "business logic" of the
+elements mentioned in the HTML, applied at runtime.
+
+#### Do you really need external sources?
+
+Do your scripts and fonts really need to come from external sources?
+If your caching policy is liberal, they are not actually that expensive
+to serve once and then the user is using his local copy for the next
+days.
+
+Some external sources are marked as anti-privacy in modern browsers, meaning
+they track your users, in turn meaning if your site refers to them, you
+will lose your green padlock in the browser.  If the content license allows
+it, hosting them on "self", ie, the same server that provided the HTML,
+will remove that problem.
+
+Bringing in scripts from external sources is actually quite scary from the
+security perspective.  If someone hacks the jquery site to serve a hostile
+payload in addition to the usual scripts, half the Internet will instantly
+become malicious.  However if you serve it yourself, unless your server
+was specifically targeted you know it will continue to serve what you
+expect.
+