This fixes clients being able to connect with a certicate that was not
signed by the configured CA when SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT is set.
The issue only appeared when a client connects via IP address directly and
not use a hostname.
When the hostname was used to connect, the SNI 'callback lws_mbedtls_sni_cb'
overwrote the invalid verfiy mode of
MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL with MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED by
calling SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Danzberger <daniel@dd-wrt.com>
mbedtls seemed to realize that they went overboard with the privacy stuff
on v3.0 and removed some of it. Introduce support for those members that
are only private on exactly v3.0 and unprotected before and after.
Ensure we still work with mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() as well as
mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() if that's what we have got.
Make sure mbedtls tls validation is noisy and fast.
Disable Xenial + mbedtls in sai, it fails but not when the same
tests are run from the commandline. Very few people will be
using Xenial (2016 Ubuntu release) with mbedtls.
mbedtls validation was broken by an earlier patch on main... fix it and add
a CI test also using the wrong CA cert so this can be caught straight away
from now on.
Adapt mbedtls support for compatibility with v3, while maintaining
compatibility with v2.
Notice v3 has removed the ability to encrypt with pubkey and
decrypt with privkey. Openssl still has it, atm with v3 these
fall back to encrypt with privkey and decrypt with pubkey.
> The RSA module no longer supports private-key operations with the
> public key or vice versa. As a consequence, RSA operation functions
> no longer have a mode parameter. If you were calling RSA operations
> with the normal mode (public key for verification or encryption,
> private key for signature or decryption), remove the
> MBEDTLS_MODE_PUBLIC or MBEDTLS_MODE_PRIVATE argument. If you were
> calling RSA operations with the wrong mode, which rarely makes sense
>from a security perspective, this is no longer supported.
Add support for dynamically determining the CAs needed to validate server
certificates. This allows you to avoid instantiating > 120 X.509 trusted
CA certs and have them take up heap the whole time.
Works for both openssl and mbedtls.
See READMEs/README.jit-trust.md for the documentation
You likely want the next patch for http redirect enhancements as well.
Mbedtls does not have the same concept as openssl about preloading the
system trust store into every SSL_CTX.
This patch allows you to simulate the behaviour by passing in a context
creation-time filepath that all client SSL_CTX will be initialized from.
This is a huge patch that should be a global NOP.
For unix type platforms it enables -Wconversion to issue warnings (-> error)
for all automatic casts that seem less than ideal but are normally concealed
by the toolchain.
This is things like passing an int to a size_t argument. Once enabled, I
went through all args on my default build (which build most things) and
tried to make the removed default cast explicit.
With that approach it neither change nor bloat the code, since it compiles
to whatever it was doing before, just with the casts made explicit... in a
few cases I changed some length args from int to size_t but largely left
the causes alone.
From now on, new code that is relying on less than ideal casting
will complain and nudge me to improve it by warnings.
Nobody uses this from the wrapper... it brings in mbedtls_x509_crt_info()
even if you're using -ffunctionsections for a loss of about 1.7KB on Arm.
Let's chop it out...
The mbedtls openssl wrapper wants to use exports from mbedtls' net_sockets.c,
but this is only supposed to work on *nix and windows. Typically people
are using mbedtls on RTOS type platforms and to use it, net_sockets.c
needs some hacking.
Try to avoid that situation by porting the two exports we need into the
lws plat code and call from the wrapper.
Surprisingly -fdata-sections -ffunction-sections does not remove any string literals and __func__
implicit .rodata generated by the removed function's compilation.
That means potentially considerable deadweight is in the image even if the function is removed
at linktime.
This adds support for POST in both h1 and h2 queues / stream binding.
The previous queueing tried to keep the "leader" wsi who made the
actual connection around and have it act on the transaction queue
tail if it had done its own thing.
This refactors it so instead, who is the "leader" moves down the
queue and the queued guys inherit the fd, SSL * and queue from the
old leader as they take over.
This lets them operate in their own wsi identity directly and gets
rid of all the "effective wsi" checks, which was applied incompletely
and getting out of hand considering the separate lws_mux checks for
h2 and other muxed protocols alongside it.
This change also allows one wsi at a time to own the transaction for
POST. --post is added as an option to lws-minimal-http-client-multi
and 6 extra selftests with POST on h1/h2, pipelined or not and
staggered or not are added to the CI.
Now the generic lws_system blobs can cover client certs + key, let's
add support for applying one of the blob sets to a specific client
connection (rather than doing it via the vhost).
Some toolchains are in some C++ version mode that objects to redefinition
of a typedef even to the same thing.
Shift a couple for function declarations in the mbedtls wrapper
part so they can piggyback on just the one typedef for their
args.
Since new roles may be incompatible with http, add support for
alpn names at the role struct, automatic generation of the
default list of alpn names that servers advertise, and the
ability to override the used alpn names per-vhost and per-
client connection.
This not only lets you modulate visibility or use of h2,
but also enables vhosts that only offer non-http roles,
as well as restricting http role vhosts to only alpn
identifiers related to http roles.
This just supports "http/1.1" alpn and lets the client know it
can use keepalive earlier if it affirmitively negotiated
"http/1.1" on alpn.
mbedTLS wrapper needed a small adaptation to also allow
per-client-ssl control of the alpn negotiation list.
AG: unlike openssl, mbedtls does not load the system trust store.
So this change will make client tls operations that work OK on openssl fail on
mbedtls unless you provide the correct CA cert.
This allows lws to distinguish between untrusted CAs, hostname
mismatches, expired certificates.
NOTE: LCCSCF_ALLOW_SELFSIGNED actually allows for untrusted CAs, and
will also skip hostname verification. This is somewhat a limitiation of
the current lws verification process.
AG: improve error reporting up to the CLIENT_CONNECTION_ERROR argument
and add a note specific to mbedtls in the test client. Adapt the test
client to note the CA requirement if built with mbedTLS. Adapt the
minimal test clients to have the CAs available and use them if mbedTLS.
