The late_bail discrete unpick flow is missing some pieces compared
to lws_ss_destroy. Unify the creation fail flow to also use
lws_ss_destroy so everything in one place.
Make lws_ss_destroy() not issue any states if the creation flow
didn't get as far as issuing CREATING.
Normally when doing a Client Connection Error handling,
we can action any ss relationship straight away since
we are in a wsi callback without any ss-aware parents
in the call stack.
But in the specific case we're doing the initial onward
wsi connection part on behalf of a ss, in fact the call
stack does have earlier parents holding references on
the related ss.
For example
secstream_h1 (ss-h1.c:470) CCE
lws_inform_client_conn_fail (close.c:319) fails early
lws_client_connect_2_dnsreq (connect2.c:349)
lws_http_client_connect_via_info2 (connect.c:71)
lws_header_table_attach (parsers.c:291)
rops_client_bind_h1 (ops-h1.c:1001)
lws_client_connect_via_info (connect.c:429) start onward connect
_lws_ss_client_connect (secure-streams.c:859)
_lws_ss_request_tx (secure-streams.c:1577)
lws_ss_request_tx (secure-streams.c:1515) request tx
ss_cpd_state (captive-portal-detect.c:50)
lws_ss_event_helper (secure-streams.c:408)
lws_ss_create (secure-streams.c:1256) SS Create
Under these conditions, we can't action the DESTROY_ME that
is coming when the CCE exhausts the retries.
This patch adds a flag that is set during the SS's onward wsi
connection attempt and causes it to stash rather than action
the result code.
The result code is brought out from the stash when we return to
_lws_ss_client_connect level, and passed up in the SS flow until
it is actioned, cleanly aborting the ss create.
This causes the blocking dns lookup to treat EAI_NONAME as immediately
fatal, this is usually caused by an assertive NXDOMAIN from the DNS server
or similar.
Not being able to reach the server should continue to retry.
In order to make the problem visible, it reports the situation using
CLIENT_CONNECTION_ERROR, even though it is still inside the outer client
creation call.
It's open to user state callback to respond to the DISCONNECT we issue on
the proxy link closure by escalating it to a DESTROY_ME... we have to deal
with that if it comes.
In sai, on Xenial (only...) noticed that the wsi is still bound to the ss
handle, and can reference it even after the ss has been destroyed on
ss-testsfail sometimes.
Leave the handle knowing its wsi and able to detach it later during close.
We added the neccessary return check on set_metadata which is good, but it
doesn't take into account that for LWA, we will normally use the multipart
stuff, that provides its own conflicting content-type.
Currently the lwa streamtype policy doesn't even provide ctype metadata
type, let's just comment it out.
User reports problems with the close / retry flow not happening if we don't
pass thru the nwsi close... it may be happening before the sid1 migration.
Just log it and don't end the handling before the passthru. Logging it
because there was a reason for the change to not passing it through...
Trying to use the opaque pointer in the handle to point to the conn isn't
going to work when we need it to point to the ss handle.
Move it to have its on place in the handle.
It's already the case that leaving off the "tls_trust_store" member of the
streamtype definition in the policy causes the streamtype to validate its
tls connections via the OS trust store, usually a bundle OpenSSL has been
configured to load at init automagically, but also literally the OS trust
store in windows case.
Add tests to confirm that.
Defer recording the ss metrics histogram until wsi close, so it has a
chance to collect all the tags that apply.
Defer dumping metrics until the FINALIZE phase of context destroy, so we
had a chance to get any metrics recorded.
This fixes the proxy rx flow by adding an lws_dsh helper to hide the
off-by-one in the "kind" array (kind 0 is reserved for tracking the
unallocated dsh blocks).
For testing, it adds a --blob option on minimal-secure-streams[-client]
which uses a streamtype "bulkproxflow" from here
https://warmcat.com/policy/minimal-proxy-v4.2-v2.json
"bulkproxflow": {
"endpoint": "warmcat.com",
"port": 443,
"protocol": "h1",
"http_method": "GET",
"http_url": "blob.bin",
"proxy_buflen": 32768,
"proxy_buflen_rxflow_on_above": 24576,
"proxy_buflen_rxflow_off_below": 8192,
"tls": true,
"retry": "default",
"tls_trust_store": "le_via_dst"
}
This downloads a 51MB blob of random data with the SHA256sum
ed5720c16830810e5829dfb9b66c96b2e24efc4f93aa5e38c7ff4150d31cfbbf
The minimal-secure-streams --blob example client delays the download by
50ms every 10KiB it sees to force rx flow usage at the proxy.
It downloads the whole thing and checks the SHA256 is as expected.
Logs about rxflow status are available at LLL_INFO log level.
On 32-bit Linux compilers, long int == int == 32-bit. So even atol() cannot
handle ints above 0x7fffffff and clips any it finds at that.
There's only one instance in policy-json.c, use atoll() cast to uint64_t
to allow values up to 64-bit INT_MAX even on 32-bit machines.
If the larger application is defining vhosts using lejp-conf JSON, it's
often more convenient to describe the vhost for ss server binding to
that.
If the server policy endpoint (usually used to describe the server
interface bind) begins with '!', take the remainder of the endpoint
string as the name of a preexisting vhost to bind ss server to at
creation-time.
This provides a way to get ahold of LWS_WITH_CONMON telemetry from Secure
Streams, it works the same with direct onward connections or via the proxy.
You can mark streamtypes with a "perf": true policy attribute... this
causes the onward connections on those streamtypes to collect information
about the connection performance, and the unsorted DNS results.
Streams with that policy attribute receive extra data in their rx callback,
with the LWSSS_FLAG_PERF_JSON flag set on it, containing JSON describing the
performance of the onward connection taken from CONMON data, in a JSON
representation. Streams without the "perf" attribute set never receive
this extra rx.
The received JSON is based on the CONMON struct info and looks like
{"peer":"46.105.127.147","dns_us":596,"sockconn_us":31382,"tls_us":28180,"txn_resp_us:23015,"dns":["2001:41d0:2:ee93::1","46.105.127.147"]}
A new minimal example minimal-secure-streams-perf is added that collects
this data on an HTTP GET from warmcat.com, and is built with a -client
version as well if LWS_WITH_SECURE_STREAMS_PROXY_API is set, that operates
via the ss proxy and produces the same result at the client.
Setting the CONNECTED state only when SUBACK is received if the stream has
defined a subscription topic. This is to avoid SS from sending out SUBSCRIBE
right after CONNACK, even when the connection is not valid.
Really not having any logs makes it difficult to know what is really
happening, but if that's you're thing this will align debug and release
modes to just have ERR and USER if you give WITH_NO_LOGS
Until now we set metadata value pointers into the onward wsi ah data
area... that's OK until we get a situation the wsi has gone away before we
have a chance to deliver the metadata over the proxy link.
Add a variant lws_ss_alloc_set_metadata() that allocates space on the heap
and takes a copy of the input metadata. Change ss-h1 to alloc copies of
its metadata so we no longer race the wsi ah lifetime.
lws_ss_set_metadata can fail... eg, due to transient OOM situation... if it does,
caller must take appropriate action like disconnect and retry.
So mark the api as requiring the result checking, and make sure all the
examples do it.
